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ABSTRACT
The 2008 nancial crisis had a signicant impact on nancial institutions. Banks have
been in the limelight when some of them were liquidated and pensions funds have not been
immune to the eects of the nancial crisis. In the wake of the nancial crisis, governments,
regulators and political commentators have pointed an accusing nger at the securitization
market - even in the absence of a detailed statistical and economic analysis. The eight years
leading up to 2008 saw a rapid growth in the use of securitization by UK banks. We aim to
identify the reasons that contributed to this rapid growth. The time period (2000 to 2010)
covered by our study is noteworthy as it covers the pre-nancial crisis credit boom, the peak
of the nancial crisis and its aftermath.
We also investigate how the banks have gone about their fund-raising in support of
their investment without signalling the value of the bank to the investors. This involves
critical nancing decisions about their main nancing sources: Debt and equity issuance.
We attempt to establish which decision banks have taken in the recent years. We do this by
analysing nancial data of banks in the US for the period 2001 to 2011. We examine how
banks choose between the nancing instruments available at a given time and in dierent
nancial contexts. This provides evidence regarding the dierence between nancing options
available for investment opportunities that banks have at a given time. Thus, we show that
internal nance is preferred to external nance, and that the theory regarding the impact
of asymmetric information holds for banks on nancing decisions as modelled by Myers
and Majluf (1984). The steep drop in nancial markets in 2008 coupled with the ongoing
economic recession has also posed immediate challenges for pensions funds. We therefore
consider how safe the pension funds are in the current period of high stock market volatility.
We use the case of the Dutch pension funds since it is ranked to be the best managed pension
funds in the world. The pension risk for the rms together with the market risk will give
an idea of the impact of market volatility on pension asset allocation. It is expected that
most rms who allocated a large percentage of their assets to equity were negatively aected
by the stock market crash. Hence, pension funds are safe investing elsewhere other than in
equities despite the high returns.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
There has been a number of innovations in the nancial market. The 2008 nancial crisis
has brought a number of them in the limelight. One main innovation is securitization. This
thesis looks at how banks participated in securitization. In addition to securitization, is
the main concern of how bank raise their capital, hence our closer look at the bank capital
structure. Finally, the ripple eect of nancial crisis aects other nancial institutions. We
therefore consider how the pension funds were aected by the nancial crisis.
1.1 SECURITIZATION
Securitization is a nancial technique that pools assets together and, in eect, turns them
into a tradeable security. The securitization market outside the U.S. has grown in a piecemeal
but often innovative fashion. In the UK, in the early 1990s, there was a general downturn
in new mortgage business and house sales following a severe property prices downturn and
economic recession. This led to a downturn in the mortgage securitization market and to
early pressure for the market to diversify (Fabozzi and Kothari, 2008).
1.1.1 Denition of Securitization
Although securitization is widely discussed in the legal and nancial literature, no uniform
denition has emerged that satisfactorily describes it. There is no particular legal meaning
for securitization and, like many new nancial terms, it is often used to mean a variety of
things (Shenker and Colletta, 1991). Securitization is the process by which individual assets,
which on their own may be dicult to sell or even to attach a value to, are aggregated into
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securities that can be sold in the nancial markets (Levinson, 2002). Financial institutions
and businesses of all kinds use securitization to realize immediately the value of a cash-
producing asset. Hence, we can describe securitization as the nancial practice of pooling
various types of contractual debt such as residential mortgages, commercial mortgages, loans
or credit card debt obligations and selling the consolidated debt as bonds, pass-through
securities, or Collateralized Mortgage Obligation (CMOs), to various investors, (Fabozzi
and Kothari, 2008). The principal and interest on the debt, underlying the security, is paid
back to the various investors regularly. Securities backed by mortgage receivables are called
MBSs, while those backed by other types of receivables are Asset-Backed Securities (ABS).
Securitization is also refers to the pooling and repackaging by a special purpose entity of
assets or other credit exposures that can be sold to investors1. Securitization involves the use
of superior knowledge about the expected nancial behavior of particular assets, as opposed
to knowledge about the expected nancial behaviour of the originator of the chosen assets,
with the help of a structure to nance the assets more eciently (Fabozzi and Kothari, 2008).
Therefore, securitization is a nancing mechanism. It transfers nancial assets from their
owner (Originator), to a Special Purpose Entity (SPE) that, in turn, funds the acquisition
by issuing publicly rated securities to various parties (investors).
1.1.2 Why securitization?
The prediction by Greenbaum and Thakor (1987) was also backed by Benveniste and Berger
(1987), who suggested that securitization is able to transfer risks from risk-averse investors
to risk-neutral investors, and achieve Pareto Optimality2 eventually. By doing so, it is more
favourable to securitize the better assets through o-balance sheet transactions, and keep
the more risky assets on the balance sheets. The studies by Greenbaum and Thakor (1987),
suggested that securitization provides means to reduce risk, diversify portfolios and fund
1Denition by the Oce of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration (FDIC), the Federal Reserve Board (Board), and the Oce of Thrift Supervision (OTS), Attachment
OCC 2002-22.
2Also known as "Pareto eciency", it is an economic state where resources are allocated in the most
ecient manner. This is obtained when a distribution strategy exists where one party's situation cannot
be improved without making another party's situation worse. Pareto eciency does not imply equality or
fairness.
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both operations and new assets. They argue that by reducing the funding yield premiums
and the \excess" equity cushions entailed in traditional lending, securitization oers lower
cost nancing. Pennacchi (1988) also found that funding through loan sales is less expensive
for banks compared with traditional equity or deposit nancing due to lower costs associated
with required capital. This study showed that, in the presence of asymmetric information,
pooling assets and issuing multiple nancial claims with dierent risk characteristics against
the pool cash ow enables the issuer to increase its expected revenue. Flannery (1994), and
Lockwood et al. (1996) considered the role of securitization in mitigating the underinvest-
ment problem of nancial intermediaries. Lockwood et al. (1996) also suggested that the
cash inow from the ABS issue can be used to retire existing debt, which, in turn, reduces
interest expense and increases reported earnings.
With each potential benet comes a potential drawback for investors: Firstly, the repack-
aging process may lead to a lack of transparency or a delegation of the due diligence process
to other parties (such as the originating bank itself - which has its best interests at heart and
not those of the investors - or a ratings agency); secondly, the diversication of idiosyncratic
risk may be illusory in the sense that default correlations are low in good economic times
but may become very high in a credit-crunch or a recession; thirdly, there may be a percep-
tion of liquidity in a bull market but, in fact, liquidity in the market dried-up abruptly and
completely in the summer of 2007. Chapter 3 covers in detail the reason that might have
led banks to participate or not to participate in securitization.
1.2 BANK CAPITAL STRUCTURE
Capital structure refers to the way a rm -and in our case a bank- nances its investment
projects through some combination of equity, debt, or hybrid securities, as Myers and Majluf
(1984). A bank's capital structure is then the composition or 'structure' of its liabilities.
The rst attempt to explain the relationship between capital structure and bank value
was provided by Modigliani and Miller (1958) suggest. Their model is well known as \capital
structure irrelevance" which means the rm's capital structure does not aect its value.
Thereafter, models with fewer restrictions in their assumptions were used to examine the
3
relationship between capital structure and rm's value. They showed that debt would cause
the value of a rm to rise by the amount of the capitalized value of the tax shield. Therefore,
rms should employ as much debt as possible in order to maximize their value.
1.2.1 Equity holders and Debt holders
In line with our study, there are two papers, Heinkel and Zechner (1990) and Hirshleifer and
Thakor (1989) in which the asset substitution problem is considered; i.e., the incentive of
levered equity holders to choose risky, negative net-present-value investments. Hirshleifer
and Thakor (1989) showed how managers or rms have an incentive to pursue relatively
safe projects out of reputational considerations. Several properties of the debt contract
have important implications for determining capital structure. These are the bankruptcy
provision, convexity of payos of levered equity, the eect of debt on managerial equity
ownership, and the relative insensitivity of debt payos to rm performance.
Hirshleifer and Thakor (1989) considered a study where a manager has a choice of two
projects, where each project has only two outcomes; success or failure. Failure means the
same for both projects, but from the point of view of the shareholders, the high-risk-high-
return project yields both higher expected returns and higher returns if it succeeds. Suppose
that from the point of view of the manager's reputation, however, success on the two projects
is equivalent, i.e., the managerial labour market can only distinguish "success" or "failure."
Thus the manager maximizes probability of success while shareholders prefer expected re-
turn. If the safer project has a higher probability of success, the manager will choose it even
if the other project is better for the equity holders. This behaviour of managers reduces the
agency cost of debt. Thus, if managers are susceptible to such a reputation eect, the rm
may be expected to have more debt than otherwise. Hirshleifer and Thakor (1989) argue
that managers of rms more likely to be takeover targets are more susceptible to the rep-
utation eect. Such rms can be expected to have more debt, ceteris paribus. Conversely,
rms that have adopted anti-takeover measures will use less debt, other things being equal.
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1.2.2 The Theory of Capital Structure
A basic model of capital structure determination has derived from the with-taxes Modigliani
and Miller (1958) model with expansion to incorporate the nancial distress costs of debt.
This traditional static trade-o theory can be characterized by the assumption that capital
structure is optimized with management weighing up the relative advantage of the tax-shield
benets of debt against the increased likelihood of incurring debt-related bankruptcy costs
(Myers, 1984).
Heinkel and Zechner (1990) obtained results similar to Myers and Majluf using a slightly
dierent approach. They show that when the information asymmetry concerns only the
value of the new project, there can be overinvestment, i.e., some negative Net Present Value
(NPV) projects will be taken. The reason is that full separation of rms by project NPV is
impossible when the only observable signal is whether the project is taken. The equilibrium
involves pooling of rms with projects of various NPV with the equity issued by all such
rms being priced at the average value. Firms whose projects have low NPV will benet
from selling overpriced equity. This may more than compensate for a negative project NPV.
The result is a negative cut-o NPV such that all rms with project NPV above the cut-o
accept the project.
A signicant group examined in the empirical literature has sought to distinguish which
of the two main theories best explains capital structure practice. While the theories in their
basic form do lead to a set of `precisely opposite' predictions (Barclay and Smith, 1999),
there is increasing recognition that neither theory is able, independently, to explain the
complexity encountered in practice. This is particularly true when seeking a unied theory
to explain the broader array of corporate nancial policy choices (Barclay and Smith, 1999).
Fama and French (2002) assessed whether the partial adjustment model and the speed of
adjustment are useful tools for capital structure research. Specically, they examined the
speeds of adjustment to target capital structure observed at the rebalancing points as well
as between such points. They nd that the speeds of adjustment tend to be higher at the
rebalancing points than between such points, with the highest speeds of adjustment observed
in years with dual (debt and equity) transactions, consistent with the argument that rms
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are likely to use these transactions for rebalancing. Their results are inconsistent with the
premise of the partial adjustment model. Their results also show that a signicant fraction
of debt issues and reductions (20%{40% ) and an even larger fraction of equity issues and
repurchases (50%{60%) were associated with adjustments away from the target.
With regard to further empirical work, it seems essential that empirical studies con-
centrate on testing particular models or classes of models in an attempt to discover the
most important determinants of capital structure in given environments. Capital structure
decisions can concern value creation process (1) inuencing ecient investments decisions
according to the existence of conict of interest between managers and rm's nancial stake-
holders (shareholders and debt holders) and (2) aecting the relationship with non-nancial
stakeholders, as suppliers, competitors, customers, etc.
Frank and Goyal (2003) studied the extent to which the Pecking Order Theory of cap-
ital structure provides a satisfactory account of the nancing behaviour of publicly traded
American rms over the 1971 to 1998 period. Their analysis had three elements. First, they
provided evidence about the broad patterns of nancing activity. This oered an empirical
context for the more formal regression tests. It also served as a check on the signicance of
external nance and equity issues. Secondly, they examined a number of implications of the
Pecking Order Theory in the context of Shyam-Sunder and Myers' (1999) regression tests.
Finally, they checked on whether the Pecking Order Theory received greater support among
rms that face particularly severe adverse selection problems. We look in detail at the bank
capital structure in Chapter 4.
1.3 PENSION FUNDS AND ASSET ALLOCATION
Pension fund asset levels in most countries continued to show strong growth throughout 2010,
returning almost to pre-crisis levels, according to a 2011 OECD report3. This is evident in
Figure 1.1 below. Both economic and nancial indicators showed signs of further recovery
but the outlook for future economic growth in developed economies remains uncertain and
sluggish. In the past two decades (1990 - 2010) , funds have been confronted with nancial
3http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/63/61/48438405.pdf
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crises, tightening regulation, a maturing participant base, decreasing treasury yields and
increasing demands for transparency and accountability. Moreover, most dened benet
funds (DB), which guarantee benets to members are underfunded and have fewer assets
than the pension promises.
A few studies have also shown that strategic asset allocation dominates portfolio perfor-
mance. In particular, strategic asset allocation is shown to explain more than 90 percent of
the variability in pension fund returns over time, while the additional variation explained by
market timing is less than 5 percent. This is considered by Blake et al (1999). They note
that stockmarket timing is shown to cause an average loss of 20{66 basis points per year. In
their study they found a negative correlation between asset class returns and net cash ows
to the corresponding asset class, which points to rebalancing. In addition, they noted that
the asset allocation for UK pension funds drifts toward asset classes that performed rela-
tively well, in line with a free-oat strategy. Apparently, UK pension funds partly rebalance
their investments in response to dierent returns across asset categories, Blake et al (1999).
Hence, the degree of rebalancing versus free oat in pension fund asset allocation remains
an open question4.
We can note that there has been almost no analysis in the literature, either theoretical
or empirical, about how the risk level of a pension plans is aected by the stock market
volatility. Jin et al (2006) paper mentioned above is the closest to our research goal. The
authors are concerned about the rms' equity risk and whether it reects the risk in pension
scheme. We extend the model used in their research to examine how the stock market
movement aects the pensions.
Andonov, A,. et.al. (2012) assessed and analyzed the three components of active manage-
ment (asset allocation, market timing and security selection) in the performance of pension
funds. Using security selection they explained most of the dierences in pension fund re-
turns. Large pension funds in their sample on average provided value to the clients after
accounting for all investment-related costs, both before and after risk-adjusting. The active
management components in their study exhibited signicant liquidity limitations, which are
important in all asset classes, including equity and xed income. Security selection outper-
4http://www.pensions-institute.org/
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formance is largely driven by momentum trading, Andonov, A,. et.al. (2012). Accounting
for momentum reduces the security selection and osets most of the positive risk-adjusted
returns from market timing and asset allocation changes. Larger pension funds will always
realize economies of scale in their relatively small allocation to alternative asset classes, like
private equity and real estate. However, in equity and xed income markets they experience
substantial liquidity-related diseconomies of scale.
1.4 AN OUTLINE OF THIS THESIS
This thesis is arranged in the following order. The next chapter looks at the past research
in this areas - banks securitization, bank capital structure and pension fund asset alloca-
tion. There is vast amount of literature on securitization, while past studies under capital
structure concentrates on non-nancial institutions. Chapter 3 is essentially a study on
the determinants of bank securitization. We show that securitization has been signicantly
driven by liquidity reasons. In addition, we observe a positive link between securitization
and banks' credit risk. Chapter 4 deals with the bank capital structure. As far as we know,
this study is among the rst to look at this issue of which decision banks take to raise funds
for their investment projects. In chapter 5, we investigate how safe the pension funds are
today in the current period of high stock market volatility. Finally, chapter 6 summarizes
the main ndings of this thesis and chapter 7 considers future research and extensions.
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2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW
In this chapter we summarise research into bank securitization, bank capital structure and
pension funds asset allocation.
2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW ON BANK SECURITIZATION
The quantum of literature that investigates the motives for the use of the securitization
market has been growing in number. Attention seem to be drawn to the characteristics that
make nancial institutions more likely to securitize. Donahoo and Shaer (1991) suggested
that depository institutions securitize to reduce reserve and capital requirements. They ar-
gue that the so called \regulatory capital arbitrage" is not the only incentive to engage in
securitization, but also increased economies of scale, reduced costs of debt nancing, and
better diversication of funding sources. Minton et al. (2004) and Calomiris and Mason
(2004) provided an empirical test of the regulatory arbitrage hypothesis against the ecient
contracting hypothesis, which suggests that securitization lowers the cost of debt nance.
The evidence from both studies supports the ecient contracting view. In particular, Minton
et al. (2004) nd that unregulated nance companies and investment banks are more likely
to securitize than commercial banks, and that risky and highly leveraged nancial institu-
tions are more likely to engage in securitization than the safer ones. They nd that poor
performing risky institutions are more likely to securitize. Bannier and Hansel (2007) also
found consistent results using data on collateralized loan obligations (CLO) transactions by
European banks from 1997 to 2004. In particular, they nd that securitization-active banks
are large, lowly performing institutions with high credit risk and low liquidity. Their results
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indicate that banks are more likely to securitize when they face lower direct and indirect
costs and when they can gain larger benets. They also nd evidence that banks securitized
to modify their asset portfolio, taking up riskier prot opportunities.
2.1.1 Empirical Studies on Securitization
The empirical literature on securitization have examined the eects of securitization on the
issuing banks with slightly dierent focuses. One of the aspects analyzed is the quality of
assets securitized, and the ensuing impact on bank risks. Using data on Canadian banks
for the period between 1988 and 1998, Dionne and Harchaoui (2003) found a risk-increasing
eect of securitization. The authors suggest that current regulation encourages banks to
shift to more risky assets while securitizing their low risk assets. They also nd that, in
response to regulatory capital incentives, lenders retain riskier loans in their portfolios while
selling safer loans onto the secondary market.
The second aspect studied in this strand is the implicit recourse commonly provided
by the originating bank and the resulting risk and performance implications for the issuer.
In particular, Higgins and Mason (2003) and Calomiris and Mason (2004) argued that risk
remains with the securitizing banks as a result of implicit recourse. They nd that risk
retention by banks varies with type of securitization and is relatively low in case of mortgages,
while relatively high for revolving loans such as credit loans. This showed evidence of implicit
recourse in credit card securitizations using a model of fraud losses on US bank data from
2001 to 2006. In particular, they show that banks that securitize credit card receivables are
more likely to claim fraud losses; and banks with poorly performing securitization portfolios
are more likely to claim fraud.
A few authors focus on the reinvestment of securitization proceeds. Cebenoyan and
Strahan (2004) found evidence suggesting that banks use risk-reducing benets of securiti-
zation to engage in more protable, but higher risk, activities and to operate with greater
nancial leverage. Franke and Krahnen (2005) argued that the combined eect of retaining
the rst loss piece and selling senior tranches to investors should result in an ecient risk
allocation due to reducing the bank's exposure to extreme risks and hence have a positive
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impact on the bank solvency. However, their empirical analysis shows that banks use the
risk reduction achieved through securitization to take on new risks. Krahnen and Wilde
(2006) showed that, under certain assumptions on banks reinvestment behaviour and capital
structure choice, the issue of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) in true sale transactions
can lead to an increase in the issuing intermediary's systematic risk. Based on a dataset of
European CDOs, Haensel and Krahnen (2007) showed that securitization tends to increase
the systematic risk of the issuing bank.
Jiangli and Pritsker (2008), on the other hand, suggested a positive role for mortgage
securitization and relate the current turmoil in mortgage credit and securitization markets
to recent excesses in those markets. Using US bank holding company data from 2001 to
2007, the authors evaluate empirically how the insolvency risk, leverage and protability of
securitizers would change if banks had to take the securitized assets back onto their balance
sheet and nd that mortgage securitization reduces bank insolvency risk, increases bank
leverage and protability.
Purnanandam (2009) also provides consistent evidence, showing that US banks used the
proceedings from securitizations to issue loans with higher than average default risk. In
particular, the evidence shows that US banks using credit risk transfer (CRT) techniques to
a larger extent before the 2007 Subprime crisis had signicantly higher mortgage charge-os
after the crisis.
Recent studies by Mian and Su (2009), and Keys et al. (2009) found evidence that in
the last decade US banks securitized their worst mortgage loans. We can therefore, note that
there has not been a large number of empirical studies which have tried to shed some light
on why banks use securitization. Cardone-Riportella et al. (2010) is a notable exception.
They used a Logit regression model applied to data on 408 Spanish banks to investigate
the causes of the growth of securitization in Spain. Their results show that liquidity and
the search for improved performance are the decisive factors for securitization, whilst they
nd very little evidence supporting credit risk transfer and regulatory capital arbitrage as
motivating reasons.
This review reveals that the literature provides mixed evidence on the impact of securiti-
zation on the performance of the issuing bank. Our study contributes to the current debate
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and advances the existing literature by evaluating the impact of accessing the securitization
market on banks' cost of funding, credit risk, and protability employing a propensity score
matching approach.
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW ON BANK CAPITAL STRUCTURE
The models surveyed in this section have identied a large number of potential determinants
of capital structure. The empirical work so far has not, however, sorted out which of these
are important in various contexts. The theory has identied a relatively small number of
"general principles." The empirical evidence is largely consistent with the theory, although
there are a few instances where the evidence seems to contradict certain models.
We identify two main empirical approaches that have been used to obtain evidence on
factors that aect corporate nancing decisions. The rst approach, adopted in the majority
of the studies, seeks to explain observed capital structures in terms of the factors felt likely to
be important, usually using cross-sectional regression methods. With a few exceptions, UK
cross-sectional studies (Bevan and Danbolt, 1998) and panel regression studies (Antoniou
et al., 2002) generally found similar relationships to those found in the US. Antoniou et al.
(2002) showed that rms in three European countries (including the UK) adjust their debt
ratios to attain target structures, but at dierent speeds, suggesting that environmental and
traditions are also important determinants.
The robust observation from these studies indicate specic diculties for theory, partic-
ularly the negative relationship between debt ratio and protability. This is consistent with
the logic of pecking order theory but inconsistent with trade-o theory; the negative invest-
ment opportunity set observation supports Trade-o theory but not Pecking Order Theory.
Thomson (2003) identies several key features of rms that seem to be related to debt ratios
across a wide range of environments and through time: size (+), earnings variability (+),
asset tangibility (+), protability ({), investment opportunity set ({) and industry. He found
the evidence on tax inuence to be weak, perhaps reecting the endogeneity between tax
rates and nancing choice.
Bevan and Danbolt (2004) focused on the diculties in measuring gearing and found
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that debt determinants appear to vary signicantly between short-term and long-term com-
ponents of debt. The pecking order theory prediction that there should be a negative re-
lationship between the dividend payout ratio and investment. In a UK replication and
extension of the Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) test of pecking order against trade-o
theory, found mixed evidence, with neither theory being dominant. Overall, the evidence
for the UK (as for the US) is somewhat inconclusive. While various individual factors can
be identied as important, neither of the two major theories is capable independently of
adequately explaining the outcomes of rms' nancing decisions in practice.
More studies have begun to focus on dynamic aspects of capital structure such as whether,
as implied in the trade-o theory, rms engage in capital structure rebalancing.
2.2.1 Trade-o theory
The optimal debt level of a rm is determined by the benets of debt and the cost of the
debt. Firms will balance their benets and cost of debt to choose their debt level in the way
that maximizing the rm's market value (Myers, 1984). The main benet of debt nancing
is the \tax shield". Tax shield allows rms to pay lower tax because the interest of the debt
capital is deducted in the taxable income. Bankruptcy cost is one of the costs of debt. It
incurs with the perceived probability that the rm cannot deal with its debt obligations.
Risky rms have higher bankruptcy costs, thus risky rms borrow less.
2.2.1.1 Agency Cost Model The agency cost model was rst introduced by Jensen
and Meckling (1976). According to this model, there is conict between a rm's owners and
its managers. Harris and Raviv (1990) suggested that the conict between rm's owners
and managers arises because managers do not totally own the rm. Typically, managers of
rms are hired by rm's owners to act as their agents and have the authority to use the
rm's resources for the owner's benet. However, instead of maximizing the rm's value and
owner's benet, managers are more interested in their own benet which may dier from
the owner's benet. They will act in their own interests for higher salaries, job security,
perquisites or even direct exploitation of the rm's cash. The dierences of interest between
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managers and a rm's owner may sometimes even oppose each other. The rm's owners may
want to prevent the benet transfer by the managers, who have the authority to manager
the rm. Therefore, the owners may try to prevent the benet transfer by external monitor,
such as supervision by independent directors. These kinds of monitoring and control methods
involve cost, the cost is called agency cost. Hence, the optimal capital structure under the
agency cost model is the balance between the benets of debt and the cost of debt. Firms
will choose their own capital structure which minimize its total agency cost.
2.2.2 Pecking Order Model
The pecking order theory ( [Myers, 1984] and [Myers and Majluf, 1984]) argues that, due
to asymmetric information, rms adopt a hierarchical order of nancing preferences so that
internal nancing is preferred over external nancing. If external nancing is needed, rms
rst seek debt funding. Equity is only issued as a last resort. In the words of Myers
(1984, p. 585): \you will refuse to buy equity unless the rm has already exhausted its
debt capacity"|that is, unless the rm has issued so much debt already that it would face
substantial additional costs in issuing more."
Myers, in his 1977 study, was the rst to point out the possibility that high debt rela-
tionships can stimulate managers to reject positive net present value projects, which ends
up decreasing rm value. The presence of \risky" debt, that shows a lower market value
than the nominal one, has a particularly negative inuence on rms' investment choices.
Myers' (1977) analysis is based on the concept that a rm's value is made up of assets in
place and growth opportunities (based on the future ability to make protable investments).
Growth opportunities are compared to options, whose present value is a result of not only
the expected cash ow, but also the probability that the rm actually takes advantage of
them. In other words, the value of growth opportunities depends on investments made at
the manager's (decision makers) discretion, who has the power to exercise these options
The way that the assets in place are nanced, and thus the way the rm's capital is
structured, inuences the ability to create and take advantage of growth opportunities, since
in this manner pressure is put on the quality of the rm's decision making. Myers (1977)
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showed that when there is risky debt managers who act in shareholder interest tend to follow
a biased decision making process, that leads them to reject protable investments that could
oer positive net worth to the rm's value. In other words, shareholders of rms who have
risky debt are not willing to nance projects, thus taking on the cost, that would exclusively
or mostly benet the rm's debt holders. In these cases, the net present value of the project,
while positive, would allow the debt's market value to rise up to the corresponding nominal
value, without producing other benets for the shareholders. In fact, risky debt would act
as a sort of \tax" on the prots derived from the new investments, since most of the value
created would only serve to allow debt holders to recover their loan.
The pecking order model (Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984)) and its exten-
sions (Lucas and McDonald, 1990) are based on the idea of asymmetric information between
rm's managers and investors. Managers know more about the rm's true value than outside
investors. To maximize the wealth of existing shareholders, managers avoid issuing under-
valued new shares to nance new projects. Thus, issuing new equity is interpreted as a
negative signal, in the sense that the equity is being overvalued. This negative signal results
in the decline of stock price. The relation between the issue of new shares and the decline
of stock price is conrmed in several studies.
De Jong et al., (2011), test the static trade-o theory against the pecking order theory.
They focus on an important dierence in prediction: the static trade-o theory argues that
a rm increases leverage until it reaches its target debt ratio, while the pecking order yields
debt issuance until the debt capacity is reached.
2.2.3 Determinants of capital structure
In seeking to model the wide diversity of capital structure practice, a number of additional
factors have been proposed in the literature. First, the use of debt nance can reduce agency
costs between managers and shareholders by increasing the managers' share of equity (Jensen
and Meckling, 1976) and by reducing the `free' cash available for managers' personal bene-
ts. It may also encourage managers to perform better in order to reduce the likelihood of
bankruptcy, which is costly for managers. Conicts between debt-providers and sharehold-
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ers arise because the debt contract gives shareholders an incentive to invest sub-optimally in
very risky projects. This implies an agency cost of using debt nance. Jensen and Meckling
(1976) argue that an optimal capital structure can be obtained by trading o the agency
costs of debt against the benet of debt, in what might be termed an extended trade-o
model.
Second, Myers and Majluf (1984) argued that, under asymmetric information, equity may
be mispriced by the market. If rms nance new projects by issuing equity, underpricing may
be so severe that new investors gain more of the project NPV to the detriment of existing
shareholders. This may lead to an `underinvestment' problem since such projects will be
rejected even if the NPV is positive. This underinvestment can be reduced by nancing the
project using a security that is less likely to be mispriced by the market. Internal funds
involve no undervaluation and even debt that is not too risky will be preferred to equity.
Myers (1984) referred to this as the pecking order theory of capital structure. The description
follows earlier empirical work by Bevan and Danbolt (2002), in which they observed that
managers preferred to fund investment initially from retained prots rather than use outside
funds. This preference led rms to adopt dividend policies that reected their anticipated
need for investment funds, policies which managers were reluctant to substantially change.
If retained prots exceeded investment needs then debt would be repaid. If external nance
was required, rms tended rst to issue the safest security, debt, and only issued equity as
a last resort.
2.2.3.1 Market-to-book According to Myers (1977), rms with more assets in place
should more easily be nanced through debt than rms with growth opportunities, which
would present a naturally low leverage ratio. In fact, rms with high growth opportunities,
whose valuation depends on intangible assets and expected returns, do not presumably -
nance their projects issuing debt since they are subject to high nancial distress costs and
their intangible assets have no value in the event of bankruptcy. Under these conditions,
rms avoid issuing equity because much of the value created by investment would be used
to oset the creditors' position (underinvestment problem). On the other hand, rms with
growth opportunities, with less collateral assets, experience more problems when they are
17
in the presence of risky projects, because creditors see that as a way to expropriate wealth
from themselves (the asset substitution problem of Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
2.2.3.2 Protability The traditional theory of capital structure theorizes a positive re-
lationship between protability and leverage. Modigliani and Miller (1958) pointed out
that a company may opt for debt in order to take advantage of tax shields. Jensen (1986)
concluded that protable rms might issue debt whenever a rm's corporate control is in-
eective. The Pecking order theory of Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) took the
opposite point of view on this issue. A rm that is generating prots will retain earnings,
avoiding asymmetric information costs. The rule is to issue safe securities. Internal funds
are better than external funds and only, as a nal resort, should a rm issue stock. The
decision to issue stock is interpreted negatively by the market, and even when a rm opts
for external nance, the market sees debt nancing with collateral assets as the most log-
ical decision. Thus, a negative relationship between protability and leverage is expected.
In general, empirical results concerning the relationship between protability and leverage
support the Pecking order hypothesis (Rajan and Zingales, 1995).
2.2.3.3 Size Leverage is expected to be positively inuenced by size. The most plausible
reason to explain such a relationship is bankruptcy costs (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). This
mean that, rst, large rms have, on average, lower bankruptcy costs { this type of costs are
in, general, more xed { than small rms. Second, large rms have in principle more diver-
sied portfolios, with less probability of bankruptcy. Third, nancial institutions, because
they have less information about a small rm, need to allocate more resources concerning
the rm's monitoring, and penalize it by asking for higher interest rates. Although the vast
majority of research shows a positive relationship between size and leverage, such as Rajan
and Zingales (1995), Titman and Wessels (1988) reveals the opposite results .
Our study is closely related to the work by Rajan and Zingales (1995) who investigated
the determinants of capital structure choice by analyzing the nancing decisions of public
rms in the major industrialized countries. They found that the factors identied by previous
studies { protability, leverage target ratios, debt ratio and bank specic characteristics {
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are as important in determining the cross- section of capital structure in U.S. rms as they
aect the rm leverage in other countries as well.
The model we use in our study follows closely that of Panno et.al., (2003) who investi-
gated the empirical determinants of capital structure decisions of rms, and tried to provide
some contributions that helped to ll the existing gap between theory and empirical evi-
dence. Their article included a descriptive model of the choice between equity and long-term
debt for the rms based in UK and Italy. They found that the rms in both countries were
able to allow their gearing ratios to vary signicantly around the target ratio. These ndings
suggest that rms do not identify a strict, single optimal capital structure ratio as such, but
rather a range over which their capital structures are allowed to vary. We use their binary
model idea to examine the choice between debt and equity sources of nance for the US
banks
Similarly, Reint and Florian (2010) in their paper, "The Determinants of Bank Capital
Structure" used large U.S. and European banks data during the period 1991 to 2004 to show
that mispriced deposit insurance and capital regulation were not the main determinants of
capital structure. They found that the individual bank characteristics are ultimately the
most important determinant of banks' capital structures and that banks' leverage converges
to target set for individual or specic bank and that will be consistent for a long period
of time. Reint and Florian, (2010) failed to address the capital structure decision. Their
study extended empirical work on capital structure theory in three ways. First, it examined
a much broader set of capital structure theories, many of which had not previously been
analyzed empirically. Second, since the theories had dierent empirical implications in regard
to dierent types of debt instruments, the authors analyzed measures of short-term, long-
term, and convertible debt rather than an aggregate measure of total debt. Third, the study
uses a factor-analytic technique that mitigates the measurement problems encountered when
working with proxy variables.
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2.3 PENSION FUNDS AND ASSET ALLOCATION
There has been great interest in research on pension market issues since the 1980's. The
following subsections considers this past work, starting with the most recent one on rela-
tionship between the pensions and stock market, pension risk and share prices, in addition
to pension asset allocation.
2.3.1 Pension funds and stock market performance
Jin et al (2006) in their paper examined the empirical question of whether the equity risk
of U.S. rms as measured by beta, from the Capital Asset Pricing Model reects the risk of
their pension plans. They note that pension plan assets and liabilities are o-balance sheet,
and are often viewed as segregated from the rest of the rm, with its own trustees. Their
empirical ndings are consistent with the hypothesis that equity risk does reect the risk of
the rm's pension plan.
Franzoni and Martin, (2006), argue that the market signicantly overvalues rms with
severely underfunded pension plans. These companies earn lower stock returns than rms
with healthier pension plans for at least 5 years after the rst emergence of the underfund-
ing. The low returns are not explained by risk, price momentum, earnings momentum, or
accruals. Further, the evidence suggests that investors do not anticipate the impact of the
pension liability on future earnings, and they are surprised when the negative implications
of underfunding ultimately materialize. Finally, underfunded rms have poor operating per-
formance, and they earn low returns, although they are value companies. Their results and
ndings note that investors have failed to realize that an underfunded pension will eventually
hurt earnings. So when earnings nally do take a hit the stock gets punished.
Coile et al (2006) investigated the relationship between stock market performance and
retirement behaviour, paying particular attention to the boom and bust periods of the late
1990s and early 2000s. The authors begin by noting reasons to be sceptical between stock
market performance and retirement. First, retirement rates did not rise during the market
boom of the late 1990s, even after adjusting for the eect of the strong economy. Second, as
20
the sustained market decline only began in September 2000, the retirement response in late
2000 would had to have been very largely to drive a two-point reduction for the year as a
whole. The authors compare the eect of the stock market on the retirement behaviour of
individuals likely to have been dierentially aected by changes in the market.
Alestalo and Puttonen (2006) presented evidence for Finnish pension funds. They nd
that pension funds with younger members have a higher equity exposure, and pension funds
with a more mature age prole hold a higher share of xed income instruments.
Webb (2007) has argued that agency conicts between shareholders and pension plan
holders will aect both dividend and investment policies, since rms with large pension
decits who are acting in the interests of their shareholders will be more inclined to pay
out cash ows and to either underinvest (due to a debt-like overhang of pension liabilities)
or invest in risky projects (due to risk-shifting). Cocoa and Volpin (2007) discover some
evidence of risk-shifting in a sample of UK rms.
Bikker, J.A. et.al (2007) paper is the rst to examine the impact of stock market per-
formance on the investment policy of pension funds. They nd that stock market prices
inuence the asset allocation of Dutch pension funds. In the short term, outperformance
of equities over bonds and other investment categories automatically results in a higher ac-
tual equity allocation (and vice versa), as pension funds do not continuously rebalance their
investment portfolios. Their ndings suggest that the investment policies of pension funds
are partially driven by the cyclical performance of the stock market. Investment policies of
large funds deviate from that of small funds: they hold more equity and their equity allo-
cation is much more strongly aected by actual equity returns, reecting less rebalancing.
The largest funds react highly asymmetrically to positive excess equity returns, adjusting
their portfolios by signicantly more than 100%, reecting `overshooting' of free oating,
or positive feedback trading. Apparently, managers of large funds demonstrate great risk
tolerance, particularly in bull markets.
The negative relationship between age and equity exposure in the portfolio is usually
derived under the assumption that human capital is close to risk-free, or at least is not
correlated with capital return. Benzoni et al. (2007) put forward that in the short run, this
correlation is indeed low, while in the longer run, labour income and capital income are highly
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co-integrated, since the shares of wages and prots in national income are almost constant.
This nding implies that the risk prole of young workers' labour income is equity-like and
that they should therefore hold their nancial wealth in the form of safe bonds to oset
the high risk exposure in their human capital. Therefore, Benzoni et al. (2007) and Cocco
et al. (2005) suggested that the optimal equity share in nancial assets is hump-shaped
over the lifecycle: cointegration between human capital and stock returns dominates in the
rst part of working life, whereas the decline in human capital accounts for the negative
age-dependency of optimal equity holdings later in life.
As the contribution of Benzoni et al. (2007) are still in discussion among academics, we
only follow the recommendations of the original contribution in this eld.
One of the recent studies on pension information is by Cardinale, M., (2007) who em-
pirically tested pensions and corporate bond spreads. Cardinale considered corporate bond
data of U.S. companies for the 2001-2004 period where unfunded pension liabilities are in-
corporated in credit spreads. This study is limited to US pensions and not much has been
extended to other pension plans in the world. Klumpes and Kevin (2007) had a study to
examine the impact of pension reforms. They considered how the new U.K. pension ac-
counting regulations signicantly increase the exposure of the balance sheets of U.K. rms
to volatilities in pension fund valuations. Their results suggest that unexpected changes
in interest rates have a dierential eect on a rm's sources of pension, nancial, and core
earnings. Klumpes and Kevin fall short of covering the impact of the stock market on the
pensioners' investment.
Rauh (2009) nds that US rms with poorly funded pension plans, and thus the greatest
incentives to risk shift, are more likely to invest in safe assets such as government bonds and
cash. He suggests that risk-shifting is dominated by risk-management incentives to avoid
costly nancial distress. Franzoni (2009) examines the stock price reaction to mandatory
pension contributions, and nds a larger fall in stock prices for those rms that are a pri-
ori nancially constrained. Overall, he reports that overinvestment is the more signicant
problem for large rms, but underinvestment is more characteristic of smaller rms.
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2.3.2 Pension risk and share prices of the pension sponsoring rms
Feldstein and Seligman (1981) was one of the earliest studies to investigate the eect of a
rm's pension decit on it's share price. They found, using a sample of US manufacturing
rms, that the emergence of a decit is incorporated rapidly into the share price, in the
sense that the share price is reduced (relative to tangible assets) by the per share size of
unfunded pension liabilities. Feldstein and Mrck (1983) show that company share prices
reect pension plan surpluses as well as decits, and that the nancial markets `see through'
the manipulation of pension liabilities considered above and instead value the pension liabil-
ities of all rms at a common standard discount rate, very close to the average used across
all rms.
Bodie and Papke (1992) is the one paper to provide considerable empirical evidence that
the equity market valuation of rms takes into account the dierence between the value of
pension plan assets and its liabilities, i.e., the pension surplus or decit (if that dierence is
negative). There is earlier work by Feldstein and Seligman (1981), where they nd results
consistent with the conclusion that share prices fully reect the value of unfunded pension
obligations, so the market correctly takes into account pension liabilities when valuing a
company | a one dollar change of pension funding status will change the share price by one
dollar (both relative to the rm's market value).
Carroll and Niehaus (1998) found in a parallel test of debt market recognition of the
value of the pension surplus or decit, by empirically examining the positive relation between
funding of dened-benet pension funds and debt ratings. Furthermore, in both equity and
debt markets, there seems to be an asymmetric pattern in the impact of changes in pensions
assets and liabilities on the market value of the rm and on debt ratings: while each dollar
increase in liabilities lowers the market value of the rm by about a dollar, an equal increase
in pension assets raises the rm's market value by less than a dollar. This is consistent with
the view that, while an under-funded pension liability should be fully reected as a corporate
liability, over-funded pension assets are not entirely a corporate asset, due to the diculty of
converting an overfunded pension plan's assets into unburdened corporate assets. Moreover,
Ibbotson and Kaplan (2000) noted that in line with the ecient-market theory, evidence
23
shows that pension funds are unsuccessful in exploiting market timing to generate excess
returns.
Alier and Vittas (2000) investigated the impact of the volatility of investment returns on
replacement rates in the context of personal pension plans. The authors' ndings suggest
that overconcern about the impact on replacement rates of short-term volatility in stock
markets may not be warranted.
Vrinda Gupta (2006), analysed whether employees with a dened benet pension scheme
perceive risk to their expected income in retirement while forming their opinions about the
long-term business success of their employer. They use a dataset of pension risk indicators
for FTSE 100 companies and data from employees' opinion in the UK to show that employees
do seem to care about the level of funding of their benets.
2.3.2.1 The choice between asset classes Campbell and Viceira (2002) provided ex-
tensive theoretical analysis on strategic asset allocation. They provide an approach dierent
from the static mean{variance analysis, as they recognize that many investors seek to nance
a stream of consumption over their lifetime. The book shows that long-term ination-indexed
bonds are riskless assets for long-term investors and that stocks can be safer assets for long-
term investors than for short-term investors. A long-term investor may be willing to hold
higher proportion of stocks and ination-linked bonds, and less cash, than a short-term
investor.
Campbell and Viceira (2002) noted that empirical work on long-term portfolio choice
has lagged far behind existing theoretical literature. Perhaps for this reason, there has been
very slow diusion of understanding from academic literature to institutional investors, asset
managers, nancial planners, and households.
The surveys on pension fund asset allocation shows that studies have been carried out
in the US market. Papke (1991) reported some interesting data on the asset allocations of
US private pension funds, both for dened benet and dened contribution plans. The main
ndings for the dened benets plans were that larger single employer plans hold about 60%
in xed income securities and 20% in equities; and smaller single employers invest 50% and
20%, respectively.
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Healey and Rozenov (2004) studied the 200 largest dened benet pension funds in the
United States. They found that equity allocation increased its share from 48% in 1991
to 57% in 2001. They also reported that funds were increasingly allocating to alternative
investments, real estate, enhanced indexed equities, and bonds.
Blake et al. (1998) reported asset allocation and performance of more than 300 UK
pension funds. They found that the allocation practices of funds have remained rather
steady from 1986 to 1994. Notable observation was the high allocation to equities (78%)
with only 14% in xed income. However, the Blake et al. (1998) study concentrated on
performance rather than asset allocation. Therefore, it remains somewhat unclear why UK
pension funds invest so much more in equities than their US counterparts.
The debate over an optimal asset allocation for a pension fund has two extreme views.
One view states that bonds are the only way to match assets with liabilities, while the
contradicting view recommends equity exposures. Equity and xed income are generally the
biggest investment classes in pension funds.
2.3.2.2 Fixed income Bodie et al. (1999) argued that a pension fund, with a nancially
sound sponsor corporation, should not invest in equities at all. A fully funded pension fund
should only invest in xed income assets and, thus, minimize the additional contributions.
However, it is found that pension funds generally invest around 40% to 60% of their portfolio
in equities. Bodie et al. (1999) nd three reasons for these equity investments. First, a
sponsor sees the dened benet fund more like the dened contribution fund: a sponsor may
believe that a successful strategy may lead to extra benets and tries to maximize benets
paid to employees. Second, a sponsor believes in market timing and security selection ability.
Third, a sponsor in nancial distress may have an incentive to invest in riskier assets, as
there is the federal pension insurance.
According to Blake (2001), xed income investments are encouraged by regulators simply
because the discount rate used in pension liability calculation by actuaries and accountants
is based on bond yields. This means that in order to avoid the short-term mismatch between
assets and liabilities, pension fund asset allocation should be more heavily weighted towards
bonds. In the US, pension funds have a special tax treatment and this gives them the
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incentive to create an asset mix with a large spread between pre-tax and after-tax returns.
Therefore, tax reasons drive pension funds to invest more in bonds than in equities (Bodie et
al., 1999). For a fully funded healthy pension fund, Bodie (1988) recommends investments
only in taxable xed income securities. In Finland, pension funds do not have any special
tax treatment with respect to xed income securities.
2.3.2.3 Equity Black (1989) studied the role of equities in the portfolio of a pension
fund. Stocks are used to achieve higher expected returns, and, therefore, meet the pension
obligation in the future, while helping to lower expected pension costs. Black acknowledges
that some managers think about bonds as the only answer to hedge their pension liabilities.
However, equities also should be viewed as a hedge against a potential increase in pension
liabilities. Equities particularly hedge against the risk of salary ination, which causes an
increase in liabilities. Black states that stock prices and the expected rate of ination move
in tandem. This is called an `economic' view of liabilities.
Black (1989) divided pension liability into two categories: a narrow view and a broad
view. Both of these liability types act like a security. The narrow liability is dened as a
present value of all vested benets for current employees. Hence, it is only tied to past and
current, while not including the future. However, the narrow liability is only a snapshot of
the current work force, and, hence, the narrow liability is changing all of the time. Hedging
for the type of narrow liability is mainly performed using interest rate hedging methods and,
therefore, the narrow view suggests investing in bonds to hedge the liabilities.
According to Black, the broad liability is the present value of all benets to be paid,
and therefore it is always greater than the narrow liability. The broad liability is the narrow
liability plus salary increases, benets to be accrued, changes in the benets and additions
to the workforce. In most cases, the broad view suggests investing in stocks is superior.
Also Chun et al. (2000) argue that a growing company typically should have more equity
investments, and less bonds or real-estate investments, due to the higher expected rate of
return of equity.
Peskin (1997) argued that a pension fund's equity exposure is critical to the future
contribution cost. The equity exposure varies between pension funds. If a pension fund's
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liabilities do not act like bonds (i.e. the relationship between bonds and liabilities is volatile),
then a fund should have greater equity exposure.
2.3.2.4 Real estate Chun et al. (2000) studied the pension plan real estate investment
within an asset/liability framework. In the US, pension funds seem to hold a low proportion
of real estate in their portfolios, and the study nds that real estate investment is more
limited than one would expect on the mean{variance basis. The main result of the study is
that real estate is not highly correlated with pension plan liabilities and that the main role
of real estate is to hedge against the risk of ination.
Hudson-Wilson et al. (2003) gave several reasons why every investor should consider real
estate as a part of their portfolio. When their reasoning is applied to the pension fund world,
real estate seems to be an essential part of a pension fund's portfolio. Pension funds are
usually risk-sensitive investors: they have great concern for capital preservation, a moderate
actuarial target rate of return, and they have known liabilities. Also, the hedge against
ination is important to dened benet pension funds because their future benet payments
happen in real terms. In addition, pension funds have a heavy demand for cash and some
liquidity requirements in order to satisfy the liability stream.
2.4 MOTIVATION AND CONTRIBUTION TO THE EXISTING
LITERATURE
The past studies have indicated that securitization has been perceived as one of the most
prominent developments in the international nancial markets in recent decades, Due
(2008). Therefore the recent turbulences in nancial markets which underline the importance
of understanding asset securitization, a process that allows banks to fund their credit growth
and, potentially, to shed o credit risk and to arbitrage capital requirements. We contribute
to the extant literature by performing an analysis of UK banks, focussing principally on
whether it is the need for liquidity (i.e. the funding of their balance sheets), or the desire to
engage in regulatory capital arbitrage or the need for credit risk transfer that has led to UK
banks securitizing their assets.
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We show that securitization has been signicantly driven by liquidity reasons. In addi-
tion, we observe negative eects on Tier 1 capital ratios and a positive link between securiti-
zation and banks' credit risk. We interpret these latter ndings as evidence that UK banks
which engaged in securitization did so, in part, to transfer credit risk and that, in compar-
ison to UK banks which did not use securitization, they had more credit risk to transfer in
the sense that they originated lower quality loans and held lower quality assets. We show
that banks which issued more asset-backed securities before the nancial crisis suered more
defaults after the nancial crisis.
The impact of nancial crisis on banks also excites the study how banks have adjusted
in the process of raising their capital, Myers and Majluf (1984). We therefore examine the
determinants of banks issuing debt or equity. The results from our study on bank capital
structure provide evidence of interesting dierences between the two key choices of nancing
options for the available investment opportunities that banks would have at a given time.
This will be consistent with the main prescriptions of the more recent developments of
capital structure theory; on the whole where there is support for positive eects of size
and protability of given nancial institutions playing part. We expect the results to show
that internal nance is preferred to external nance and also develop a theory regarding
the impact of asymmetric information on the nancing decision as modelled by Myers and
Majluf (1984). The evidence documents the similarities between banks' and non-nancial
rms' capital structure may be greater than previously thought. Specically, this paper
establishes novel and interrelated empirical facts. Hence the capital structure study seeks to
explain why banks may choose dierent mixes of debt and equity to nance their operations.
The US Banks considered in the data sample represent a special case because of certain
unique features in the industry, including a federal safety net and extensive regulation. The
nancial crisis of the 2008-2009 provided another set of special circumstances in which banks
needed to raise capital. The preference banks have shown for issuing preferred shares in the
private market in favor of government nancing can be viewed through the lenses of capital
structure theories.
After 2008 - 2009 nancial crisis, it has been a dicult time for pension fund manager.
There have been few asset classes that would generate strong performance. This has been
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complicating asset allocation decisions to the point of paralysing investors1. Therefore, we
study the impact of stock market volatility study on pension funds asset allocation. We use
the case of the Dutch pension funds, since it is ranked to be the best managed pension fund
in the world. The data of the share prices and pension data for the companies listed on the
Amsterdam Exchange index (AEX) are used for our analysis. We look at the allocation of
pension funds assets and liabilities and the eect the stock volatility has had on them. We
use the data to calculate the market risk, measured by the beta or systematic risk of the
operating assets.
1http://www.nancialnews.com/2013
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3.0 WHY DO UK BANKS SECURITIZE?
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Securitization has been perceived as one of the most prominent developments in the inter-
national nancial markets in recent decades.
In this study we consider securitization as the process by which heterogenous and illiquid
credit-risky assets (e.g. bank loans) or instruments (e.g. a portfolio of bonds or credit default
swaps) are pooled and repackaged into marketable securities; where risks related to these
assets or instruments are separated from the transferrer's (i.e. the originator's) own credit
and operating risk, and where securities are issued to investors which are designed for the
specic risk tolerance prole of such investors. Therefore, we dene securitization as the
whole process whereby a bank or other nancial institution issues marketable securities
backed by the cash ows from a pool of underlying assets or instruments.
Securitization has signicantly changed the liquidity transformation role traditionally
performed by banks. Moving of a policy of banks from \originate and hold" to \originate,
repackage and sell" model has made large parts of previously illiquid loans, potentially liq-
uid. Prior to the 2007-2009 nancial crisis, the general view was that securitization led to
an overall improvement of nancial stability by spreading the risks among many investors
(Due, 2008). Securitization can be broadly divided into two categories: Mortgage-Backed
Securities (MBS) and the asset backed securities (ABS), which are non-mortgage securi-
ties. Securitization has become an important nancial instrument around the globe with
development of the Asset-backed securities (ABS).
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3.1.1 A Brief History on Securitization
Securitization originated in the 1920s when mortgage insurance companies sold guaranteed
mortgage participation certicates for pools of mortgage loans. Investors actively traded
these certicates until the real estate market crashed during the 1929 Great Depression.
Whole Business Securitization (WBS) arrangements, where senior creditors of an insolvent
business eectively gained the right to control the company. rst appeared in the United
Kingdom in the 1990s, and became common in various Commonwealth legal systems.
Many banks experienced severe disintermediation1 caused by a series of breakdowns
and crises occurring during the 1960s and 1970s, such as the collapse of Bretton Wood
System, two energy crises and high ination rates. The idea of securitization was therefore
put forward by several investment banks (Thakor, 1987). With the support from the US
government, Ginnie Mae issued the rst MBS in 1970, and at a later stage, both Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac entered the eld. Throughout the 1980s securitization grew in popularity to
become a widely recognized, cost eective nancing alternative to traditional bank sources.
By the mid-80s securitization had been extended to ABS through nancial innovation, such
as automobile loans, credit-card receivables, second mortgages and home-equity loans.
Securitization only reached Europe in the late 1980s, when the rst securitizations of
mortgages appeared in the UK. As the result of the credit crunch precipitated by the sub-
prime mortgage crisis, the market for bonds backed by securitized loans was very weak in
2008 unless the bonds were guaranteed by a federally backed agency. As a result interest
rates rose for loans that were previously securitized such as home mortgages, student loans,
auto loans and commercial mortgages (Fabozzi and Kothari, 2008).
Securitization has evolved from its tentative beginnings in the late 1970s to an estimated
$10.24 trillion in the US and $2.25 trillion in Europe as of the 2nd quarter of 2008 when the
nancial crisis was experienced. In 2007, ABS issuance amounted to $3.455 trillion in the
US and $652 billion in Europe2.
1This is where funds from savings banks were removed and placed into short-term investments on which
the interest-rate yields are higher.
2AFME/ESF Securitization Data Report; www.sifma.org/
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3.1.2 Asset-Backed Securities Market
According to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the US, ABSs are securities
that are backed by a discrete pool of self-liquidating nancial assets. Asset-backed securiti-
zation is a nancing technique in which nancial assets, in many cases themselves less liquid,
are pooled and converted into instruments that may be oered and sold more freely in the
capital markets, (Fabozzi and Kothari, 2008).
The nancial crisis has brought asset information to the centre of concern of market
participants and regulators. Asset-backed securitization, in general received partial blame
for the paucity of liquidity on bank balance sheets and the consequent credit crunch. After
the ABS market fell to near inactivity in 2009, the US federal government's Term Asset-
Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), provided backing and a boost to the issuance of
asset-backed securitization. The nature of ABS makes it dicult for them not to be rel-
atively illiquid, which has resulted in unbearable levels of market risk for most investors
(Trujillo, 2010). Their apparent liquidity before the crisis was a mirage, produced by a mar-
ket in continuous expansion, fed by Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs), Conduits, and other
low capitalized term-transformation vehicles. Too high expectations have been placed on
information enhancement as a means of restoring ABS markets. Investors are concerned
mainly with how the ongoing reforms will be implemented.
In this study, we look into development of the ABS market in the last decade and the
possible consequences of the suggested reforms, since there could be excessive expectations
on the capacity of such enhancements - information and disclosure - to restore ABS markets3.
3.1.3 Asset Backed Securities (ABS) and securitization
Securitization as a nancial instrument has had extremely signicant impact on the worlds
nancial system. Since the 1930s, securitization has become one of the most important
and abiding innovations to emerge in nancial markets. 1997 through to 2004 witnessed
growing industrial emphasis on risk management and investors were no longer just seeking
to maximise the amount of return on their portfolios but were looking to set strategies on
3The appendix gives more details on ABS and securitization
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the basis of when and how these returns would manifest across their portfolios. This desire
on the part of investors was further perpetuated by the bursting of the dot.com bubble in
2001. However, as investors ocked to safer pastures in the form of corporate bonds, the
xed income market became saturated, credit spreads tightened and high quality corporate
bonds became scarce thereby making portfolio diversication extremely dicult, Fabozzi
and Kothari, (2008).
There is an array of creative nancing techniques that have been have been outcome of
modern nancial innovation, which have included asset securitization. Issuers reap many
advantages by securitizing assets rather than keeping them on their books. For example, by
packaging their portfolios of credit card receivables as securities, major commercial banks,
have been able to reduce the amount of capital they would otherwise have to maintain under
new, stringent capital guidelines mandated by bank regulators. As the leading bank issuer
of credit cards, Citibank has also emerged as the largest issuer of securities backed by credit
card receivables,Thakor, (1987).
Investor acceptance of asset-backed securities has grown as the market matured. Con-
sequently, these securities now trade at interest-rate spreads over Treasury bills that make
them a relatively low-cost source of funding for many companies. Credit card-backed se-
curities, which in 1991 represented the largest single category of new issues (41 percent of
the dollar volume), have settled into a trading range of 65 to 105 basis points (0.65 to 1.05
percentage points) over Treasury with comparable maturities. Issues collateralized with auto
debt, the second-biggest market component (30 percent), trade at a spread of just 60 to 80
basis points, while oerings supported by home equity loans, the third largest (21 percent)
category, move in a range of 120 to 160 basis points.
Not surprisingly, asset-backed securities evolved out of the mortgage-backed securities
market, which developed in the 1970s when interest rates surged and thrift institutions found
themselves saddled with residential mortgages that were earning less than what they were
paying for deposits. Compared with mortgage-backed securities, asset-backed issues have
been relatively unaected by swings in interest rates. The reason is that the car loans and
other loans backing the securities have shorter maturities than mortgages, and therefore
people are less likely to re-nance when interest rates fall, Dionne and Harchaoui (2003).
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In that respect, asset-backed securities resemble non-callable bonds. Asset-backed securities
enable depository institutions, nance companies, and other corporations to "liquefy" their
balance sheets (i.e., raise cash by borrowing against assets) and develop new sources of
capital. Assets such as credit cards, automobile loans, and home equity loans are packaged
as the collateral for intermediate-term (i.e., maturity of one to ve years) securities and sold
in the public markets or as private placements. In its purest form, securitization is a means
by which non-banks can directly raise funds from capital market lenders to nance their
assets or projects which did not conform to the mainstream lending models of banks. The
participants in this market were traditionally small poorly rated entities and, as such, in
mainstream markets would have been subject to severe costs associated with the issuance of
debt. As an alternative therefore, such an organization would securitize its investments, sell
an AAA-rated tranche (say 90% of the underlying pool), a BBB-rated tranche (say 8% of the
pool) and retain an unrated rst loss security of the remaining 2% and retain rights to the
excess cash ows. Given the above mentioned nature of the market, non-bank participants
were not in direct competition with banks. However, all this changed over the last ten years
as structured nance grew and non-banks began lending to mainstream borrowers. Moreover,
banks also started adopting this structured nance model as it provided them with a means
through which to leverage equity and increase lending without requiring additional capital.
We can see this in the following Figure 3.1, shows the drop in whole securitization activity as
from 2007 to 2009. The Figure shows (a) bars representing non-retained issuance proxied by
issuance eligible for inclusion in underwriting league tables. The Line includes total retained
issuance proxied by issuance not eligible for inclusion. While (b) Residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS), (c) Commercial mortgage-backed securities and (d) Other asset-backed
securities which includes auto, credit card and student loan ABS.
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Figure 3.1: Global issuance of asset-backed securities; Source:
Dealogic.
3.1.4 Asset Backed Securities Market
Securitization is a nancing process where illiquid assets (mortgages, credit cards and student
loans) are pooled and converted into liquid liabilities which are then sold in the capital market
to raise (cheap) funds. The issuer uses these nancing vehicles to raise cash which is then
used to expand its balance sheet. Generally, the securitization of asset backed securities
(ABS) is handled by a so called special purpose vehicle (SPV), which issues tranches of
dierent risk 4. The SPV will create and also sell the securities. It follows that, if the SPV
has a separate balance sheet from the assets's originator; the latter can remove the risky
assets from the balance sheet and free capital for further investments.
Supposing that the asset's originator is a nancial institution with mortgages (i.e. illiquid
assets) on the balance sheet, and assuming the return on alternative investments being very
4Tranches with the rst lien (senior tranche) rated AAA and riskier tranches called junior tranches.
Generally originators retain junior tranches such as equity tranches.
35
high, the securitization process allows the originator to free capital which can be used to
gain extra return5. We can picture this through the quarterly collateral issuance of securities
in US and Europe as shown in the following Figures 3(a) and 3(b). In all the gures, the
volumes denominated in euro and the US volumes converted from dollar to euro based on
the $/e exchange rates as of quarter-end.
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Figure 3.2(a): European ABS issuance by collateral. Source: SIFMA
5It is surprising that, given the importance of securitization, very few empirical studies have attempted
to explain the reasons of securitization. Indeed, very important questions have not received, in my view,
the necessary attention. For example, has securitization been mainly used as a nancing tool or rather for
regulatory arbitrage ?
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Figure 3.2(b): US ABS issuance. Source: Securities industry and
nancial markets association
The European ABS issuance in the data used includes auto, credit card, leases, loans,
receivables while the European CDO issuance numbers only include euro-denominated is-
suance regardless of the country of collateral. We note that a substantial percentage of CDOs
are backed by multi-jurisdictional collateral, and historical CDO issuance totals have been
revised due to periodic updates of the sector.
The US ABS issuance includes auto, credit card, home equity, student loan, equipment
leases, manufactured housing, and other historical ABS issuance totals have also been revised
due to periodic updates of the sector. The US CDO issuance numbers only include US-
denominated issuance regardless of the country of collateral and may therefore include
European transactions which are denominated in US dollars and the historical CDO issuance
totals have also been revised due to periodic updates of the sector.
The ABS market has been growing very fast in US and also Europe, as can be seen in
Table 1.1. The combined annual total for USA and Europe between 2005-07 reached $3.8
trillion, falling to about $2 trillion6 in 2008.
6European securitization outstandings totaled EUR 1.88 tn as of 31 December 2009, EUR 1.74 tn, EUR
1.29 tn and EUR 1.11 tn as of end 2008, 2007 and 2006, respectively.
37
Table 3.1 : ABS issuance trend 2006 - 2009. Sources: ECB 2009, 2008, 2007 and 2006 Annual Reports
2006 2007 2008 2009
Average ABS
eligible €0.5 trillion €0.7 trillion €1.1 trillion €1.3 trillion
Average value of
assets put
forward
€930 billion1 €1,101 billion2 €1,579 billion €2,034 billion
Average share of
ABS 12% 16% 28% 23%
Overall ABS
amount
submitted
€112 billion €176 billion €442 billion €468 billion
European and US securitization issuance
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Figure 3.3: European and US securitization issuance. Source: SIFMA
From Table 3.1 and Figure 3.3, we can note that securitization market has been the most
exciting and fastest growing sector in the nancial markets before the nancial crisis. In fact
while most people may believe equities and all issues related are the primary driving forces
of the major global nancial centres, this could not be further from the truth. Over the past
ten years structured nance has witnessed phenomenal growth.
The market has been particularly dynamic not only in USA and UK but also in other
1Figure subsequently revised to EUR 906 billion
2 Figure subsequently revised to EUR 1,148 billion
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countries such as Canada. Figure 3.3 above and Figure 3.4 a below shows how the secu-
ritization market has been in the last decade. It seems that the market was doing well
in the US between 2000 and 2006, with the only dip in 2004. Surprisingly the trend has
been interesting in Europe, where the issuance of securities has been on the increase till last
year, 2009. It can be noted that the securitization market in Europe has still been growing
which can be armed by the issuance totals shown Figures 3.4 and 3.5, including Table
3.2, show the total value of collateral issued last year in Europe compared to those issued
in US during the same period. Although public opinion has been focusing on what went
wrong with securitization, there are many economic benets associated with it. For example,
it is widely recognized that securitization helps banks to re-allocate credit risk outside the
banking system to entities which are more equipped to manage this risk. Thus securitization
helps banks to eectively manage credit and liquidity risk7.
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Figure 3.4; Issuance by country. Source: SIFMA
7One reason why this has not happened is that during the boom, banks themselves became big holders
of ABS issued by other entities and held these securities on their balance sheets. For example at the middle
of 2006 banks held about 51% of all nancial institutions' exposure to the mortgage market (IMF, 2008).
Most of the banks holding these securities were ill-equipped to properly evaluate them and have in place a
sounded system of risk management.
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Table 3.2; ABS issuance - collateral, deals and interest. Source: Bloomberg
Figure 3.5: Canadian securitization market size. Source; Canadian National bank
3.1.5 The Collapse of the ABS Market
The current crisis in US and Europe has followed a pattern that has played out for decades.
The crisis was preceded by excessive borrowing and a speculative bubble across dierent
asset classes. Investors (particularly unsophisticated investors) were so condent in the
securitization market to be willing to buy Subprime mortgages or very complex instruments
such as CDOs which they did not understand. We can suggest that the CDOs are still a
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small proportion of the securities issued in the ABS market, based on three credit rating
agencies (CRAs) that track the issuance of CDO securities 3 years ago (after the peak of
nancial crisis), 2009 in both US and Europe yielding to a data summarized in the following
picture, Figure 3.6(a)
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
Proportion of total
issuance
 Fitch Ratings- Moody's Investor
Services-
Standard &
Poor's-
Credit Rating agency
CDO issuance in US and Europe - 2009
US
Europe
Figure 3.6(a): CDO issuance in US and Europe. Sources: Bloomberg, JP
Morgan, Merrill Lynch, RBS, Thomson Financial, SIFMA
From the summer of 2007, as a consequence of the Subprime crisis in the US, the ABS
market suered large losses, with the mortgage market being the one hardest hit. Probably
the turning point of the crisis was the collapse of Lehmann Brothers,. which hit hard an
already shaky nancial system. As a result spreads on securitized products soared and market
activity across dierent segments of the market stopped suddenly. In this context the ABS
market started shrinking even more, with bond issues backed by residential mortgages being
the most aected. To help restore liquidity in the market and support the ABS security
market, in November 2008 the Fed introduced the Asset Backed Securities Loan Facility
(TALF). Since the introduction of TALF8 spreads have largely dropped from historical high
8In eect, with the institution of the TALF, the Fed has acted as a lender of last resort as nancial
institutions were no longer able to raise funds using the securatisation market. Smaller non-banks lenders
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of 2008. Figures 3.6(b) and 3.6(c) show how the global ABS market reacted in 2008 and
2009.
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Figure 3.6(b): Global securitization issuance. Sources: Bloomberg, JP Morgan,
Merrill Lynch, Thomson Financial, SIFMA
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Figure 3.6(c): Global securitization issuance. Sources: Bloomberg, JP Morgan,
Merrill Lynch, Thomson Financial, SIFMA
ABS dealers as well as banks held ABS structures on their balance sheets and were
have been the ones most aected since they could not have access to the TALF.
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unable to sell them simply because there were no buyers at all. Investors were now "ying"
towards quality assets such as Treasury bills and similar securities. Following the collapse
of Lehmann Brothers investors became even more reluctant to enter in the ABS market.
`In such an illiquidity market, it was very challenging to obtain a reasonable price for these
securities9. Given the high degree of illiquidity in the ABS market, economists have proposed
dierent approaches to deal with this problem.
3.1.6 The Process of Securitization
The process of securitization can be described as follows. First, an entity (the originator)
desiring nancing identies an asset that is suitable to use. Loans or receivables are common
examples of payment streams that are securitized. Second, a special legal entity or Special
Purpose Vehicles ("SPV") is created and the originator sells the assets to that SPV. This
eectively separates the risk related to the original entities operations from the risk associated
with collection. When done properly the loans owned by the SPV are beyond the reach of
creditors in the case of bankruptcy or other nancial crisis; i.e. the SPV is bankruptcy
remote.
Next, to raise funds to purchase these assets the SPV issues asset-backed securities to
investors in the capital markets in a private placement or pursuant to a public oering.
These securities are structured to provide maximum protection from anticipated losses using
credit enhancements like letters of credit, internal credit support or reserve accounts. The
securities are also reviewed by credit rating agencies that conduct extensive analyses of bad-
debts experiences, cash ow certainties, and rates of default. The agencies then rate the
securities and they are ready for sale - usually in the form of mid-term notes with a term
of three to ten years. Finally, because the underlying assets are streams of future income,
a Pooling and Servicing Agreement establishes a servicing agent on behalf of the security
holders. The services generally include: mailing monthly statements, collecting payments
and remitting them to the investors, investor reporting, accounting, collecting on delinquent
accounts, and conducting repossession and foreclosure proceedings.
9We shall discuss in the next sections the relationship between asymmetry, security liquidity and the ABS
price.
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Chart 3.1(a) shows a typical process of securitization as illustrated by Kothari (2006).
We illustrate dierently it in Chart 3.1(b), which shows the three main participants in
securitization - the Originator, the Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) and the Investors. The
credit enhancer in Chart 3.1(b) is the entity that reduces the overall credit risk of a security
issue by providing senior subordinate structure, over-collateralization or a cash collateral.
The Originator (seller) is an entity making loans to borrowers or having receivables from
customers. SPE, also referred to as Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), is the entity which buys
assets from originator and packages them into security for further sale.
SPV
Special Purpose
Vehicle
Originator
Investors
Rating Agency /
Investment Advisor Servicing Agency
Originator receives proceeds from
asset-backed sale of securitiesOriginator sells loans to SPV
SPV sells asset-backed securities to
investors
Investors remit purchase price of
asset-backed securities to SPV
Chart 3.1 (a): Securitization process, Source: Kothari (2006)
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Chart 3.1(b): Process of securitization; Source: Author's illustration
3.1.7 Theoretical Reviews on Securitization
A general review of the reasons for securitization is found in Carlstrom and Samolyn (1993).
An informational asymmetric model by Greenbaum and Thakor (1987), predicted that banks
will securitize their best assets, retaining their worst. They analyzed the eect of the adverse
selection on asset structure of nancial institutions, and showed that if the nancial insti-
tution possesses private information about its assets which are not available to investors,
then the institution is better o if it sells and securitizes better quality assets and keeps
worse quality assets on its books and nance them with deposits. Their study showed that
not only the asset structure matters, but also it indicated the suitability of securitization in
transforming the asset structure.
In terms of wealth creation in the process of securitization, several researches mainly
focused on the US market. Lockwood et al. (1996) was one of the rst papers directly
testing the eects on the sellers' share prices by using the event study methodology with a
sample size of 294 ABS. They showed that strong banks experience wealth gain while weak
banks experience wealth loss at the time of the ABS announcement. Subsequently, Thomas
(1999) came to the opposite conclusion of signicant positive abnormal returns for banks'
shareholders, although the returns decrease with the creditworthiness of shareholders. This
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point was backed by Solano et al. (2006), which also found abnormal returns on the Spanish
market.
3.1.8 Benets of Securitization
It is worthwhile to note that the benets of securitization can be generally classied into
six main areas - means of funding, re-capitalization process, risk management, operating
eciencies, option for the rating agency and nally the management of nancial statements.
Table 3.2 below shows the benets' classes in the rst column and description of the benets
in the second column.
Benefit Description
Efficient Means
of Funding
n Provides access to triple-A funding regardless of the credit rating of the seller/servicer
n Offers a cost competitive source of funds relative to many traditional debt alternatives
n Demonstrates an alternative source of funding assets to the rating agencies and the equity market
n Provides perfect match funding for the assets
n Values asset portfolios at market value as opposed to book value
Re-
capitalization
Purposes
n Often reduces capital requirements, enabling capital to be redeployed to fuel growth
n Achieves greater borrowing capacity through the higher leverage obtained in selling assets through debt
financing
n Off-balance sheet financing may provide borrowing flexibility
n Increases balance sheet liquidity, facilitating future originations
Risk
Management
n Generates risk-free fee income from continued servicing of assets
n Allows for the transfer of credit risk in the portfolio
n Provides match funding for amortizing assets as principal payments on the assets amortize the outstanding
securities
n Diversifies funding sources
Table 3.2: Benet of securitization; Source: Author's summary
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Benefit Description
Operating
Efficiencies
n Facilitates asset and capital management –  the issuer would be positioned to either sell or retain assets
n Allows for expansion of servicing volume at the margin thereby reducing per cost of servicing
n Provides increased control over asset pricing as a result of the market discipline provided by a securitization
program
Rating
Agencies
n Demonstrates ability to access alternative liquidity
n May provide for capital preservation
n Initiates rating agency discussions beyond the corporate ratings group
Management of
Financial
Statements
n May constitute a sale of assets for financial reporting purposes
n Facilitates acceleration of income, if strategically desired
n May improve net interest margin of on-balance sheet assets
n Improves financial ratios (i.e., ROA, ROE ) related to balance sheet assets
n May constitute debt treatment of receivables financing for tax purposes
Table 3.2 (continued): Benet of securitization; Source: Author's summary
We can therefore summarize the advantages of securitization as presented in the discussed
literature:
 Primarily it changes relatively illiquid assets into liquid ones.
 It is a means for an entity to access future incomes while transferring non-collection risk
to others.
 It allows entities to raise money in capital markets at interest rates comparable to, or
lower than, other generally available sources of funds. The limited-recourse nature of
this nancing is preferable to debt nancing, which can involve personal guarantees on
a borrower's principals.
 Securitized monies are not treated as debt so it is o-balance sheet nancing. This can
favourably aect leverage and the debt-to-equity balance sheet ratio.
 Finally, securitization diversies nancing sources and allows companies to plan long-
term projects and investments.
From the point of view of the originating banks, there are three potential benets to be
gained by securitization: Firstly, the repackaging and sale of the banks' loans results in an
inow of cash and hence securitization enables the bank to fund itself; secondly, the transfer
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of credit risk to a third party - this means that, even if a bank has already lent substantially
to a particular borrower or group of borrowers (for example, within a specic geographical
region or sector of the economy), it can continue to lend to this same group (perhaps, for
relationship reasons) because the transfer of credit risk, via securitization, reduces the issuing
bank's concentration risk; thirdly, securitization may reduce the banks' regulatory capital
requirements.
3.1.9 Disadvantages of securitization
Like every nancial structure, a securitization structure also can have his disadvantages, such
as: First, the synchronisation of the interest generated by the pool and the interest paid to
the investors is a very arduous and tedious process. Secondly, the transfer of mortgages may
be dicult for legal, regulatory or tax reasons. In the Netherlands and in other European
countries such transactions have to satisfy the requirements of regulatory authorities. The
complexity of the transaction requires a very highly sophisticated documentation, which
covers every potential risk. Then, numerous participants and opinions as well as the volu-
minous documentation are very time consuming and costly. Finally, there are disadvantages
for the assignor. These include; the cost of the operation and the complexity of the pro-
cedure especially when considering the number of interveners and the costs of the nancial
engineering compared to those of a more classic nancing operation, Kothari, (2006).
The process whereby a bank securitizes its loans and sells them onto third parties is usu-
ally termed the \originate-to-distribute" (OTD) model (as opposed to the traditional \loan-
and-hold" model of using deposits to nance loans and holding the loans until maturity).
For part of our empirical analysis (section 3.5), we will draw a distinction between asset-
backed securities (ABSs) and collateralised debt obligations (CDOs). The former repackage
the originating bank's assets (i.e. loans) while the latter repackage the bank's liabilities or
synthetic instruments such as a portfolio of bonds or credit default swaps.
Anticipating our main conclusions, we show that:
1. The main driver of securitization has been liquidity i.e. the need for banks to fund their
balance sheets.
48
2. Funding has been of greater importance in driving the issuance of ABSs than in driving
the issuance of CDOs. For CDOs, regulatory capital has also been an important driver.
3. Banks which securitized tended to be larger than those which did not.
4. Those banks which had more rapid growth of their loan books, were more reliant on
wholesale interbank funding and had a larger gap between the size of their loan books
and their deposits were more likely to securitize.
5. Banks which securitized tended to have lower quality loan books.
6. Banks which securitized tended to have a greater proportion of non-performing loans in
the aftermath of the nancial crisis.
7. Large banks were the ones for which securitization was an important factor to explain
prots while smaller ones were the ones whose balance sheets were most highly exposed
to changes in the securitization market.
3.1.10 Trend in global securitization
Before the development of the securitization market, banks were essentially portfolio lenders
using deposits to nance loans and holding the loans until maturity (the \loan-and-hold"
model). Thus loans were funded principally by deposits, and sometimes by debt, which was
a direct obligation of the bank (rather than a claim on specic assets). Since the 1970s,
the securitization market has grown exponentially with the aggregate securitization volumes
exceeding $2.08 trillion worldwide (as of December 31, 2005). The securitization market
in Europe was rather undeveloped until the late 1990s. After that,, there was a signicant
increase in securitization activity. This increase may be linked to factors such as the greater
integration of European nancial markets as well as a shift towards a more market-based
nancial system. Figure 3.7 shows the growth of the European and US securitization market
between 2000 and 2010. The European securitization market reached its peak in 2008 i.e.
at the start of the nancial crisis.
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3.1.11 UK securitization market
Securitization in the UK has been on the increase since the end of 1990s (see Figure 9).
Between 2002 and 2008, there was a dramatic increase in securitization activity. Since then,
there has been an almost equally dramatic contraction.
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Figure 3.8: UK bank securitization 2000 - 2010; Source SIFMA
Since 2008, some regulators and political commentators have blamed securitization as
being one of the main catalysts for the nancial crisis. A popular viewpoint has been
that banks have embraced securitization mainly for regulatory capital arbitrage 10. Until
recently, under the Basel I framework (Jackson et al. (1999)), the minimum capital that
banks needed to retain was a very rough function of the level of risk held on their balance
sheets. For example, a loan to a borrower needed 8% of capital, no matter what the risk
of the borrower. In 1999 banking supervisors engaged in a thorough revision of the capital
regulatory framework. This led to the Basel II framework in which the capital requirements
of banks were thought to be better aligned with the risk prole of their portfolios. Thus banks
were expected to hold a higher level of capital for loans granted to higher-risk borrowers.
As a consequence of the 2007-2008 nancial crisis, regulators are now discussing ways to
implement a new regulatory (Basel III) framework to account for the main drawbacks of the
Basel II framework.
10Regulatory capital arbitrage is any transaction that has little or no economic impact on a nancial
institution while either increasing its capital or decreasing its regulatory capital requirement.
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In the remainder of this section, we
discuss the trends in global securitization, paying specic attention to the UK. In section
2, we review the extant literature. In sections 3 and 4, we describe the data, methodology
used in this study and results, section 5 discusses policy implications of our ndings for
regulators and monetary authorities and section 6 has the robustness analysis whilst section
7 concludes.
3.2 RELATED STUDIES ON SECURITIZATION
In this section, we review the extant literature on securitization.
DeMarzo and Due (1999) and DeMarzo (2005) conducted a theoretical analysis of se-
curitization. These papers build a model for security design which, although not specically
designed for the securitization market, t important applications such as asset-backed secu-
rities. They show that liquidity (a bank's need to fund its balance sheet) is an important
driver for security design.
There has not been a large number of empirical studies which have tried to shed some light
on why banks use securitization. Cardone-Riportella et al. (2010) is a notable exception.
They use a Logit regression model applied to data on 408 Spanish banks to investigate
the causes of the growth of securitization in Spain. Their results show that liquidity and
the search for improved performance are the decisive factors for securitization, whilst they
nd very little evidence supporting credit risk transfer and regulatory capital arbitrage as
motivating reasons. This result is consistent with the predictions of the DeMarzo and Due
(1999) model (i.e. the desire for low-cost funding incentivizes the growth of the securitization
market).
Hansel and Krahnen (2007) investigate whether the use of credit derivatives aects the
risk taken by large banks. Using a unique data-set of European Collateralized Debt Obliga-
tions (CDOs), they nd that the issuance of CDOs tends to raise the systematic risk (equity
beta) of the issuing bank. They also perform a cross-sectional analysis to identify the de-
terminants of the change in systematic risk and nd that equity beta increases signicantly
if the issuing bank is nancially weak (low protability and high leverage). Overall, their
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ndings suggest that credit securitization goes hand in hand with an increase in the risk
appetite of the issuing bank.
Dionne and Harchaoui (2008), using data for Canadian banks, investigate the eects
of securitization (rather than the reasons for it) on the risks incurred by the banks. They
conclude that there is a positive relation between securitization and banks' risk (dened
to include interest rate risk, market risk, liquidity risk and credit risk, as well as systemic
risks). Furthermore, they empirically show that securitization has a negative impact on Tier
1 capital11. Although this study makes an important contribution to the empirical literature,
it does not address the fundamental question of why Canadian banks use securitization in
the rst place.
Anito and Tagliaferri (2008) investigate the determinants for loan securitization in
Italy using data for Italian banks over the period 2000 to 2006. They show that, although
securitization is a composite decision, capital requirements play a driving role, suggesting
that Basel I may have created perverse regulatory incentives to move exposures o the
balance sheet. The empirical results conrm the widespread opinion that bank securitization
was a mechanism to engage in regulatory capital arbitrage. The main issue with that study
is that, compared with other countries such as the USA, the UK and Spain, securitization
in Italy has never been a widespread phenomenon. Indeed, Italian banks have mainly used
customers' deposits to nance their loan positions and the securitization market has been
concentrated in the hands of a very small percentage of Italian banks. Therefore, the main
conclusion of Anito and Tagliaferri (2008) might not be applicable in other countries.
Purnanandam (2011) investigates the originate-to-distribute (OTD) model of bank lend-
ing in the US and concludes that lack of borrower screening, coupled with leverage-induced
risk-taking, contributed signicantly to the sub-prime mortgage crisis.
Loutskina and Strahant (2009) consider the volume of jumbo mortgage originations rel-
ative to non jumbo originations and nd that it increases with bank holdings of liquid assets
and decreases with bank deposit costs. This result suggests that the increasing depth of the
mortgage secondary market fostered by securitization has reduced the eect of a lender's
11Tier 1 capital is the core measure of a bank's nancial strength from a regulator's point of view. It
is composed of core capital, which consists primarily of common stock and disclosed reserves (or retained
earnings), but may also include non-redeemable non-cumulative preferred stock.
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nancial condition on credit supply. Uzun and Webb (2007), using a panel of 112 banks in
the US which use securitization and a matched panel of banks which did not use securitiza-
tion, nd that bank size is a signicant determinant of whether a bank securitized its loans
and it is negatively related to the bank's capital ratios12. This provides some support for
the hypothesis that securitization is linked to regulatory capital arbitrage.
To summarize, we conclude that there is still mixed evidence of why banks use securiti-
zation.
3.2.1 Link between the existing literature and our study
Despite the size of the securitization markets and the popular viewpoint that securitization
partially led to the nancial crisis, there have been only a few studies which have tried
to shed some light on why banks used securitization and the eect of the OTD business
model on banks' balance sheets after the nancial crisis. In this chapter, we attempt to
address these issues using a unique dataset for UK banks. We seek to determine whether
the liquidity motive is the dominant one or, on the other hand, whether it is the regulatory
capital arbitrage or the credit risk transfer reasons that drove the increased securitization
by UK banks before the nancial crisis. We focus on the UK since it can be regarded as the
securitization laboratory of the world. In fact, many of the securitization products widely
used by the nancial industry across the world have been developed in the UK. Furthermore,
the UK securitization market is the largest market in Europe.
In contrast to most other studies that have considered the aggregate securitization (i.e.
including both ABSs (assets) and CDOs (liabilities)) of banks, we split securitization into
two separate categories - ABSs and CDOs - reecting that these two dierent classes of
securitization may serve dierent purposes.
If investors, banks, regulators and politicians are to make informed decisions about the
12These are ratios measuring a bank's nancial stability, where, as a general rule, the higher the ratio the
better the bank's nancial position. A standard capital ratio is:
Total Capital Adequacy Ratio which is dened as Tier 1 Capital plus Tier 2 Capital divided by risk-
weighted assets (see section 3.2.2).
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future of our nancial system, then we need the answer to the question: \Why do banks
securitize"? This is the question we address here.
3.3 DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA
The data-set used in this study, is constructed using Bloomberg and Bankscope, covering
the securitization market in the UK during the period 2000 to 2010. This data-set includes
annual accounts13 for 690 UK banks. The (annual) data-set covers commercial banks, real
estate and mortgage banks, investment banks, securities rms, investment and trust corpo-
rations, specialized governmental credit institutions, Islamic banks, non-banking credit insti-
tutions, all types of bank holdings in the UK, micro-nancing institutions, private banking
institutions, asset management institutions, retail nance companies, clearing and custody
institutions, group nance companies and corporative banks. It is worthwhile to note that
484 banks (70% of the total sample considered) have survived between 2000 to 2010. Table
3.3 shows the composition of our data-set (over the period 2000-2010) by specialization:
13Both the consolidated and unconsolidated statements are used to screen the banks on Bankscope.
Only one bank (Investec group) had aggregated statement with no companion, 74 banks had statements
of a mother bank integrating the statements of its controlled subsidiaries or branches with no unconsolidated
companion, 200 had statements of a mother bank integrating the statements of its controlled subsidiaries or
branches with an unconsolidated companion, 456 were banks with statements not integrating the statements
of the possible controlled subsidiaries or branches of the concerned bank with no consolidated companion.
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Table 3.3: The number of UK banks per specialisation for period 2000 - 2010
This table shows that the number of bank with respect to the classication in a given year. For
example there were 41 banks in 2000 and increased to 46 in 2001, 50 commercial banks in 2010
there are 225 commercial banks. This is also gives the total number of commercial banks in our
time period. The totals per column give the total number of banks in a given year considering all
classications.
Bank Year
Specialization 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
Commercial 41 46 50 59 64 72 84 87 102 198 225 225
Real estate & Mortgage 11 11 13 13 14 17 20 25 29 64 82 82
Investment 11 12 14 15 16 16 17 18 23 62 70 70
Securities 9 10 11 12 13 15 18 18 32 64 69 69
Savings 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 7 7 7
Other classication14 33 41 43 49 58 65 74 79 104 190 237 237
Total 107 122 133 150 167 187 215 229 302 595 690 690
The largest single group of banks are commercial banks (225 banks), while savings banks
(7 banks) are the smallest group. The other groups of banks are real estate and mortgage
banks (82 banks), investment banks (70 banks) and securities rms (69 banks). The remain-
ing 237 banks are all included under other specializations. A number of commercial banks
and securities rms had their last information available for the year 2008, which is, perhaps,
an indication of the eect of the nancial crisis on the banking sector.
The UK based banks include 92.61% foreign banks while 7.39% being the British owned
banks. The list of British owned banks is quite short as British banking has been highly
consolidated. The list15 of the banks reduced to 6% in 2008. This is accounted by the nine
banks that were acquired or had mergers. Northern Rock was one of the banks that was
nationalized by the UK Government, while Bradford & Bingley and Alliance & Leicester
14 This include the Islamic banks, cooperative banks, non-banking credit institutions, bank holdings,
central banks, micro-nancing, private banking and asset management banks, nance companies, specialized
governmental credit institutions, and multilateral government banks.
15http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/other publications/banks
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were acquired by Santander. This was followed by a single bank acquisition in 2009 and
2010. Hence only 5.65% of the UK based banks in 2011 are British owned banks.
3.3.1 UK bank data
We divide the data-set into two main sub-samples. The rst sample contains data for banks
that recorded at least one securitization activity during the period 2000-2010. The second
group contains data for banks that did not use securitization at all. We note that 527 banks
issued securities at least once between 2000 to 2010. Table 3.4 shows the percentage16 of
banks using securitization. We can see that the highest percentage of securitization activity
was recorded by investment banks; 97% of the total number of investment banks securitized
at least once between 2000 and 2010. Commercial banks have the lowest percentage (71%)17.
The high proportion of real estate and mortgage banks, securities rms, investment banks
and even savings banks involved in securitization, suggests that most UK banks have been
actively involved in securitization in the last decade. Hence, with the current securitization
trend, UK banks may no longer be deposit takers with a "loan-and-hold" business model
but instead have become originators of loans and issuers of securities with an "originate-to-
distribute" business model. Two of the main contributions of this thesis are to shed some
light on what caused the change in business model and how the change impacted on banks'
default rates after the nancial crisis.
16The percentage of securitizing banks:
Number of securitizing commercial banks in 2000
total number of commercial banks in 2000 =
27
41 = 66%
17The total percentage of banks securitizing within the given bank specialisation is calculated as follows
Total number of securitizing commercial banks between 2000 and 2010
total number of commercial banks between 2000 and 2010 =
159
225 = 71%
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Table 3.4: The percentage composition of UK banks that securitized for period 2000 - 2010
This table shows the percentage of banks using securitization. The percentage of securitizing
banks is computed as the number of securitizing banks at a given time divided by the number
of banks considered in the data at the same time. The formula is given as follows
Total number of securitizing commercial banks between 2000 and 2010
total number of commercial banks between 2000 and 2010
 100%
Bank Year
Specialisation 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
Commercial 27 30 33 36 38 43 50 52 60 132 159 159
66% 60% 75% 33% 40% 63% 58% 67% 53% 75% 100% 71%
Real state & Mortgage 10 10 11 11 12 14 17 21 23 55 69 69
91% 0% 50% 0% 100% 67% 100% 80% 50% 91% 78% 84%
Investment 11 12 12 13 14 14 15 16 21 60 68 68
100% 100% 0% 100% 100% 0 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 97%
Securities 9 10 10 10 11 12 12 12 23 50 55 55
100% 100% 0% 0% 100% 50% 0% 0% 79% 84% 100% 80%
Savings 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 6 6
50% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 86%
Other specializations 28 33 35 38 43 48 55 58 74 130 170 170
85% 63% 100% 50% 56% 71% 78% 60% 64% 65% 85% 72%
Total 86 96 102 109 119 132 150 160 202 433 527 527
80% 67% 55% 41% 59% 65% 64% 71% 67% 79% 90% 76%
3.3.2 Denition of Variables:
The total amount of securitization18 for each bank is constructed from the reported informa-
tion in the Bankscope database (which comes from banks' annual accounts) on an annual
18This is the sum of securities (i.e. Asset-Backed Securities (ABSs) and Collateralized Debt Obligations
(CDOs)) issued by each bank and is constructed from the reported information in the Bankscope database
on an annual basis for the period 2000 to 2010.
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basis for the period 2000 to 2010.
In the rst part of this study, we build on Cardone-Riportella et al. (2010) and consider
variables which are good proxies for funding (i.e. liquidity risk), regulatory capital arbitrage
and credit risk transfer.
We now discuss these proxies in detail.
3.3.2.1 Funding as motivator for securitization Some of the empirical studies cited
earlier nd that funding (liquidity risk) is an important driver of securitization, (Li, i = 1
to 6). We study the eect of six dierent measures of liquidity on whether banks chose to
securitize or not.
The rst proxy for liquidity that we use is the Interbank Ratio. This is dened as the
money lent to other banks divided by the money borrowed from other banks (all our proxies
are expressed as a percentage). If one views customer deposits as core funding, i.e. a stable
source of funds, then a measure of the liquidity risk that banks face is the degree to which
banks rely on interbank (i.e. wholesale money-market) funding. The Interbank Ratio is
shown in the formula below (money due from banks divided by money due to banks - here,
due means the money owed irrespective of whether the time of payment has arrived or not):
100
Banks toDue
BanksfromDueRatioInterbank ´=
(L1)
An Interbank Ratio greater than 100, means that the bank is a net liquidity provider
to the rest of the banking sector i.e. the bank is a net placer rather than a net borrower of
funds in the market and therefore it is more liquid. An Interbank Ratio smaller than 100
implies that the bank is a net liquidity buyer. For the largest banks in the world, the average
interbank ratio is 74.6% (see table 5). These large banks, in aggregate, are net borrowers
from the interbank market, relying on smaller banks, postal savings banks and credit unions,
etc., to supply them with the funding necessary to support their loan portfolios.
In the second proxy, we consider the ratio of liquid assets to deposits and short term
funding. The numerator is computed from all reserve assets (and hence implicitly assumes
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that all are equally liquid). This ratio can be considered as a deposit run o ratio since it
is a proxy for what percentage of customer deposits and short term funding could be met if
they were withdrawn suddenly. The higher this ratio, the more liquid the bank is and the
less vulnerable it is to a classic run on the bank. The world average ratio is 21% (see table
5).
100
Fundingterm-Short&Customer
AssetsLiquidFundingterm-Short&Deposits /AssetsLiquid ´=
(L2)
This ratio is the total amount of liquid assets available divided by the sum of deposits
and borrowing.
The fourth proxy for liquidity is the ratio of net loans to deposits and short term funding.
This is often called reserves-to-deposits. In this ratio, all loans are considered equally illiquid
(which is clearly a strong assumption). A higher ratio indicates a less liquid bank. The world
average of loans to deposits is about 68.5% (see table 5).
100
Fundingterm-Short&Customer
LoansFundingterm-Short&Deposits /LoansNet ´=
(L4)
The ratio of net loans to total assets indicates what percentage of the assets of the bank
are tied up in loans. The higher the ratio the less liquid the bank is.
This is a similar ratio to the previous one. The main dierence is that the denominator
is now replaced by total deposits and borrowing.
%100
debtesubordinat-equity&liability total-fundingOtherfundingS.T.&Customer
Loans
´
+
(L6)
3.3.2.2 Regulatory Capital Arbitrage The second group of variables that we consider
(a total of seven) are proxies for regulatory capital arbitrage, (Cj, j = 1 to 7).
Capital funds are dened as the sum of equity capital, hybrid capital and long-term
subordinated debt. The ratio of capital funds to customer and short term funding is dened
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as below.
%100
fundingS.T.&fundingCustomer
debtesubordinatcapitalHybridEquity
´
++
(C1)
We also consider the ratio of capital funds to net loans. The ratio is given by:
%100
LoansNet
debtesubordinatcapitalHybridEquity
´
++
(C2)
This ratio is a measure of the general nancial soundness of the capital structure. The
higher the ratio, the better is the solvency position of the bank.
100
EquityliabilityTotal
debtedSubordinatcapitalHybrid(EquityAssetsTotal /FundsCap ´
+
++
=
(C3)
This leverage ratio is simply another way of looking at the equity funding of the balance
sheet and is an alternative measure of capital adequacy.
%100
debtesubordinat-capitalHybrid-Equity&liabilityTotal
Equity
´
(C4)
The equity to total assets ratio measures the amount of equity protection that a bank
has in place against loan impairment. The higher this ratio, the more protection the bank
has. The ratio is computed as:
100
Equity&LiabilityTotal
EquityAssetsTotalEquity / ´=
(C5)
Tier 1 ratio measures shareholder funds plus perpetual non cumulative preference shares
as a percentage of risk weighted assets and o balance sheet risks as measured under the
Basel rules. This should be at least 4%.19. Tier I Capital is the actual contributed equity
plus retained earnings. It is used to describe the capital adequacy of a bank (it is its core
19The Basel I agreement stipulated that Tier 1 capital should be a minimum of 4% although anecdotal
evidence suggests that most investors will generally require a ratio of 10% or more in the aftermath of the
nancial crisis. The proposal in Basel III will increase Tier 1 capital during the January 2015 phase, from
4% to 6%.
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capital). Generally, shareholders' equity and retained earnings are referred to as "Core" Tier
1 capital 20. This ratio is given by:
100
Assetsweighted-Risk
Capital1Tier
Assetsweighted-Risk /Capital1Tier ´=
(C6)
The nal variable that we consider is the Total Capital Adequacy Ratio. This is the sum
of Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital divided by risk weighted assets21. (expressed as a percentage).
Under the Basel II and III frameworks, this ratio should be at least 8%. It is calculated
internally by the bank in question. The Total Capital Adequacy Ratio is a measure of the
amount of a bank's core capital expressed as a percentage of its assets weighted by its credit
exposure and is calculated as:
assetsweighted-Risk
capital2Tiercapital1TierCAR +=
(C7)
3.3.2.3 Credit risk transfer Credit risk is the risk that a counter-party will default
or delay payment on an obligation or that the value of a ow of payments will decline due
to an adverse movement in the counter-party's credit rating. Securitization oers banks the
opportunity to transfer credit risk to third parties. We consider six credit risk ratios, (Rk,
k = 1 to 6).
These are loans that may not be recovered and are not covered by equity. This indicates
the weakness of the loan portfolio relative to the bank's capital. The higher this percentage,
the worse is the bank's position.
20This include: common stockholders' equity, perpetual preferred stock, redeemable securities of subsidiary
trusts, accumulated net gains on cash ow hedges, intangible assets, goodwill, other disallowed intangible
assets, investment in certain subsidiaries among others
21Risk-weighted assets are a bank's assets weighted according to credit risk. Some assets, such as deben-
tures, are assigned a higher risk than others such as government bonds. Banks' assets are classied and
grouped in ve categories according to credit risk, carrying risk weights of zero (for example, home country
sovereign debt), twenty, fty, eighty and up to one hundred percent (the latter category has, for example,
most corporate debt). Banks with an international presence are required to hold capital equal to 8% of
risk-weighted assets.
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This ratio is a measure of the amount of total loans which are doubtful. The lower the
ratio, the better the quality of the assets.
100
loansGross
loansperformingNonloanssloans/GrosperformingNon ´=
(R2)
This ratio shows the relationship between the loan loss and the net interest income over
the same period.
The fourth ratio we consider is the loan loss reserve to gross loans. This ratio indicates
how much of the total portfolio has been provided for but not charged o. It is a reserve for
losses expressed as percentage of total loans. The higher the ratio, the poorer the quality of
the loan portfolio.
100
LoansGross/
ReserveLossLoanLoansGross /ReserveLossLoan ´=
(R4)
These are loans that may not be recovered and are not covered by reserves. It shows
what percentage of the bank's capital would be written o if the accumulated impairment
reserves were 100% of impaired loans and how vulnerable a bank's capital ratio would be as
a result.
These are loans that may not be recovered and are not covered by reserves. It shows
what percentage of the bank's capital would be written o if the accumulated impairment
reserves were 100% of impaired loans and how vulnerable a bank's capital ratio would be as
a result.
We dene a charge-o as a debt that has been determined uncollectible by the original
creditor, usually after the debtor has become seriously delinquent. Charge-os often occur
after six months of non-payment.
%100
LoansAverageDate-to-Year
RecoveriesDate-to-Year-OffsChargeDate-to-YearLoansgeOffs/AveraChargeNet ´=
(R6)
The net charge-o to average loans ratio indicates what percentage of the loan portfolio
has been cancelled by the balance sheet as it is considered denitely not recoverable. The
lower the ratio, the better is the bank's position.
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For control purposes, we also include a general characteristic of the originating entity in
the analysis as an additional regressor, namely the size of the bank. We analyze the impact
of bank size, which we measure as the natural logarithm of the bank's total assets.
3.3.3 The methodology
The main objective of this chapter is to correctly identify and measure the signicant de-
terminants behind the securitization behavior of UK banks. In the literature, some authors
(Sagarra, M. et.al, 2012) in their study on the determinant factors of securitization by Span-
ish banks, use the most parsimonious model. They choose their model in order to avoid those
variables that do not add relevant information. They did this by entering the variables into
the model in a stepwise fashion. The process was done by nding the best tting equation
model, using the maximum likelihood method. In order to obtain the nal model with the
stepwise process they started with a base model, that only composed by the control variables
(i.e. size and year dummies). Next they added all the variables from each group of deter-
minants, one by one, while seeking a reduction of the likelihood ratio (i.e., -2 log likelihood
value) and controlling for a substantial improvement of the chi square value, depending on
the degrees of freedom considered for the new variables entered in each model.
The nal model that Sagarra, M. et.al, (2012) nally arrived at, is similar to the model
we use in this chapter. Their model considered is the same variables dened above. They had
S being the dependent variable and refers to the bank asset securitization, while the group
of explanatory variables is composed by proxy variables for the four main determinants of
securitization, and by the group of control variables.
Si;t = b0+ b1CapitalRatioi;t 1+ b2LoanLossProvisions=NetInterestRevenuei;t 1+ (3.5)
b3NetLoans=(Dep+ STFunding)i;t 1 + b4CIRi;t 1+
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b5Size(LnTA)i;t 1 + b6Banktypei;t + b7Y eari;t + i;t
Mazzuca and Battaglia, (2011) in the study on eects of bank securitization on the
performance of Italian banks adopt the following multiple regression model:
yit = xi;(t 1) + i;t (3.6)
where the dependent variable, yit ,represented by banks' plain protability measures, a
risk-adjusted performance measure and a risk indicator { is a function of dierent groups
of regressors including some control variables { all lagged one year. Furthermore, all bank-
specic characteristics refer to (t   1) in order to avoid endogeneity bias. Despite that the
model enabled them to get the determining factors to measure the bank performance, it
was only suitable to the research aims: whether the securitization leads to wealth eects for
the bank's protability and which eects the securitization produces in terms of banks' risk.
This is not similar to our bivariate research question, hence the multivariate regression was
not our choice of model.
The two main literature that considered reasons of banks securitization in Spain, took
a bivariate model approach for their study. Martin-Oliver and Saurina (2007) in the study
of why Spanish banks securitized their assets considered two Probit models. First they
considered a Probit regression where the variable to be explained (COVEREDBOND) is a
dummy worth 1 if the bank has issued a covered bond during the year, and zero otherwise.
They expected that liquidity variables would play a role in explaining such a decision and,
at the same time, they expected both risk prole and solvency variables to play no role since
Spanish covered bonds, when issued, did not allow for risk transfer or capital relief. The
second Probit model was where the variable to be explained (ABS) is a dummy worth 1 if the
bank has securitized assets that year, dierent from covered bonds, and zero otherwise. They
also expected that liquidity variables would play a role in explaining such a securitization
while, at the same time, there was room for risk prole and solvency to be signicant given
that the bank can use the securitization to transfer risk and to reduce capital requirements.
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This model approach was also taken by Cardone-Riportella, et al (2009). Although they
considered the logistic regression.
Based on the model considered in the past studies we have narrowed our variables to
those in the Sagarra, M. et.al, (2010) nal tting equation model and Cardone-Riportella
(2009). For this reason, we do not enter the variables into the model in a stepwise fashion as
Sagarra, M. et.al (2010) did since their process was to nd the best tting equation model,
using the maximum likelihood method. Our main drive is that we want to explore which
are the factors behind the decision of securitizing assets in banks. Hence, the analysis of the
dependent variable is a dichotomous one, taking the value 1 in case the entity has securitized
for a specic year, and the value 0 in case it has not securitized that year.
3.3.3.1 Logistic regression Logistic regression (also known as the logistic model) is a
form of regression which is used when the dependent variable is dichotomous (in this case,
to securitise or not) and the independent variables are of any type. It is normally employed
when the object is to obtain a function that would serve to predict whether an observation
belongs to a particular group, or else when the object is to analyse the inuence of a series
of independent variables on the dependent variable (in our case, the bank's characteristics
that may inuence its decision to securitise or not).
We decided to use the logistic model since it is a qualitative response model in which the
dependent variable is an indicator of a discrete choice, a \yes or no" decision. In general,
conventional regression methods are inappropriate in these cases. Almost none of the quali-
tative response models can be consistently estimated with linear regression methods (Greene,
2007 ) and in most cases,the method of estimation is maximum likelihood. in each case, We
construct the logic model that link the decision or outcome of bank's choice to securitize,
at least in the spirit of regression. Our approach is to analyze in the general framework of
probability models:
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Prob(sec occurs) = Prob(Y = securitization) = F [relevant effects; parameters] (3.7)
With data on the variable of interest and a set of covariates (the possible determinants
of securitization), we are interested in specifying a relationship between the former and the
latter. Hence it is a regression like approach for explaining a binary (0/1) dependent variable.
We believe that the that a set of factors that determine securitization are all together in a
vector x, in order to explain the decision, we therefore have:
Pr(Y = 1jx) = F (x; ) (3.8)
Prob(Y = 0jx) = 1  F (x; )
The set of parameters  reects the impact of changes in x on the probability. The
problem at this point is to devise a suitable model for the right-hand side of the equation.
One possibility is to retain the familiar linear regression,
F (x; ) = x0 (3.9)
Since
E[yjx] = F (x; ) (3.10)
We can construct the logic regression model,
y = E[yjx] + (y   E[yjx]) = x0 + : (3.11)
Our requirement, then, is a model that will produce predictions of the main determinants
of securitization, consistent with the underlying binary model theory in equation (3.11)
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above. Therefore we consider the following Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) for a
Logit model:
Pr (Y i= 1 j Li; Cj; Rk; ; i ; j ; k ) =
exp(+
6P
i=1
i Li;t 1 +
7P
j=1
j Cj;t 1 +
6P
k=1
k Rk;t 1)
1 + exp(+
6P
i=1
i Li;t 1 +
7P
j=1
j Cj;t 1 +
6P
k=1
k Rk;t 1)
(3.12)
where if bank i, i = 1; 2:::; N securitized over the period under consideration, Yi = 1,
otherwise Yi = 0. We let Li;t 1 denote the funding ratios, Cj;t 1 denote the regulatory capital
ratios and Rk;t 1 denote the credit risk transfer ratios described above. The general model
we estimate can be written as in equation (3.13) below.
Yi;t = +
6X
i=1
i Li;t 1 +
7X
j=1
j Cj;t 1 +
6X
k=1
k Rk;t 1 (3.13)
p = Pr(Yi = 1 j Li; Cj; Rk; ; i ; j ; k ) =
eYi
1 + eYi
=
1
1 + e Yi
: (3.14)
All explanatory variable in equation (3.6), are lagged one period to avoid potential prob-
lems of endogeneity. The relationship between the dependent variable Yi and the probability
p that a bank records a securitization activity over a period of one year is given equation
(3.7).
To deal with potential problems of endogeneity we have performed all the analyses taking
the explanatory variables or regressors with a one-period lag. On the other hand, since we are
using panel data for our estimations, all the models are run using random eects to deal with
the unobserved heterogeneity across entities that the explanatory variables cannot capture.
A simple model assumes that the regression constant is the same for all cross-sectional
units. However, it is likely that we need to control the \individual" character in each entity.
One problem with xed eect estimations is that it is no longer possible to separate, in
discrete choice models, the parameters accompanying the regressors in the likelihood function
from the parameters of the eects (in case of being xed, they are dummies and, therefore,
they come with their respective parameters). Under these circumstances we cannot obtain
consistent (unbiased) estimators.
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Table 3.5 shows the expected signs for the explanatory variables in the model above.
We expect that the rst three ratios measuring liquidity (interbank ratio, liquid assets to
deposits and short term funding and liquid assets to total deposits and borrowing) should
make a negative contribution to the probability of securitization while we expect that the
remaining three ratios should make a positive contribution. The regulatory capital ratios
are all expected to be negative while the credit risk transfer ratios and the control variable
representing banks size are all expected to be positive.
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Table 3.5: Expected sign for the model
In this table, we have the expected signs of the explanatory variables.
(+) implies the positive contribution of the variable to
the securitization process while (-) implies negative contribution
Variable Expected sign
Funding
Interbank ratio (-)
Liquid assets/Customer deposits & ST funding (-)
Liquid assets/Total deposits & borrowing (-)
Net loans/Deposits & ST funding (+)
Net loans /Total assets (+)
Net loans/Total deposits & Borrowing (+)
Capital regulation
Cap.Funds/Deposits & ST funding (-)
Cap.Funds/Net loans (-)
Cap. Funds / Total assets (-)
Equity/Liabilities (-)
Equity/Total assets (-)
Tier 1 Ratio (-)
Total capital ratio (-)
Risk transfer
Impaired loans/Equity (+)
Impaired loans/ Gross loans (+)
Loan loss prov. / Net int.Rev (+)
Loan loss Res. / Gross loans (+)
Unreserved impaired loans /Equity (+)
Net charge-o/Average Gross loans (+)
Size
Log total assets (+)
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3.4 RESULTS
3.4.1 Descriptive statistics
We start with some descriptive statistics of our sample of UK banks (there are 690 banks in
total) which we split into two sub-samples: banks that securitized at least once during the
period 2000 to 2010 (a total of 527 banks - see Table 3.6a) and those that did not participate
in securitization at all during the period 2000 to 2010 (consisting of 163 banks - see Table
3.4b).
We make some general observations. We note that the Interbank Ratio (L1) is lower in
banks that did not securitize their assets (42.2% for non securitizing banks against 73.6% for
securitizing). The Interbank Ratio for both samples are signicantly less than 100. Hence,
UK banks, in aggregate, are net liquidity buyers. We may be able to interpret this result as
tentative evidence that banks turn to securitization as a source of funds.
The mean percentage of liquid assets to deposits and short term funding (L2) is 53.9% for
banks that are involved in securitization compared to 59.7% for those that did not securitize.
This may suggest that UK banks are, generally, highly liquid (the ratios are higher than the
world average ratio, 21%-see table 5)22. The ratio is lower for banks that used securitization.
The other liquidity ratios (net loans to deposits and short-term funding) give similar results.
Again, these results may tentatively suggest that UK banks are using securitization to raise
funds. It is also important to note that the ratios for both groups of banks are less than the
world ratio (68.5%) which would conrm the high liquidity of UK banks in comparison to
the world average.
We now consider the credit risk transfer ratios. We start with the loan loss reserve to
gross loans (R4). This ratio is 5.1% for banks that use securitization compared with 1% for
banks that do not use it. The world average (see Table 3.7) is 2%. This may indicate that
the quality of loans issued by UK banks that securitize are not, in general, of good quality,
and thus banks may resort to securitization in order to transfer credit risk.
The non-performing loans to the gross loans ratio (R2) is 5% for banks that use secu-
22Table 5 shows the world averages values of ratios available in Bank-scope. 30,052 banks have been used
from north America, Asia, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, Middle East, Africa, Oceania.
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ritization versus 0.38% for banks that did not use it. Again, this result may suggest that
securitization is used as a way to transfer credit risk. Banks that did not securitize have a
lower ratio which may imply that their assets are of higher quality. Finally, we consider the
regulatory capital ratios. Banks that use securitization (see Table 3.6 (a)) have, on average,
a lower Total Capital Adequacy Ratio (C7) than those that do not (see Table 6 (b)) use it
(3.8% against 4.6%). It is also important to note that in both cases, the ratio is signicantly
lower than the minimum 8% expected under Basel II. Both the two groups (i.e. banks that
use securitization and those that do not use) have lower Tier 1 ratio (C6) than the required
Basel II's minimum requirement of 4%. We note that under Basel III the Tier 1 ratio is
expected to be 6% and also that the sample includes the security rms and other non- bank
nancial institutions that are not bound to Basel regulation. The equity to total asset ratio
(C5) is lower for banks that use securitization than banks that do not use it (22% versus
29%). Thus, banks using securitization seem to have a lower cushion or protection than
banks that do not use it. Banks which use securitization are, on average, larger (7.6 against
5.4) than those which do not.
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Table 3.6 (a): Descriptive statistics, banks using securitization,
For total of 527 banks that securitized at least once during the period 2000 to 2010
Mean Std.Dev Skewnesss Kurtosis
Funding
Interbank ratio 73.56 153.07 3.17 14.27
Liquid assets/Customer deposits & ST funding 53.85 118.47 5.36 35.30
Liquid assets/Total deposits & borrowing 42.27 101.04 5.73 41.04
Net loans/Deposits & ST funding 51.75 84.35 5.11 39.19
Net loans /Total assets 33.01 32.56 0.49 1.75
Net loans/Total deposits & Borrowing 33.08 49.63 5.36 66.33
Capital regulation
Cap.Funds/Deposits & ST funding 19.29 80.40 6.39 44.19
Cap.Funds/Net loans 23.79 77.02 6.79 60.73
Cap. Funds / Total assets 8.13 16.91 3.59 17.04
Equity/Liabilities 55.58 142.93 3.60 16.54
Equity/Total assets 22.07 34.01 1.11 25.59
Tier 1 Ratio 2.48 6.53 3.53 18.42
Total capital ratio 3.82 12.71 11.39 190.29
Risk transfer
Impaired loans/Equity 10.35 38.36 7.65 82.08
Impaired loans/ Gross loans 1.27 5.28 11.37 177.31
Loan loss prov. / Net int.Rev 16.39 58.00 1.20 61.89
Loan loss Res. / Gross loans 1.39 5.07 8.58 92.93
Unreserved impaired loans /Equity 5.14 19.69 7.09 72.88
Net charge-o/Average Gross loans 0.18 0.88 8.54 91.64
Size
Log total assets 7.66 2.49 0.48 3.28
We have the descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables for number of securitizing banks, N=527.
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Table 6 (b): Descriptive statistics, banks not using securitization
Total of 163 Banks that did not participate in securitization at all during the period 2000 to 2010
Mean Std.Dev Skewnesss Kurtosis
Funding
Interbank ratio 42.23 145.11 4.36 23.23
Liquid assets/Customer deposits & ST funding 59.68 115.38 4.33 26.49
Liquid assets/Total deposits & borrowing 27.04 53.23 3.13 17.37
Net loans/Deposits & ST funding 5.74 30.34 3.16 29.74
Net loans /Total assets 1.00 3.19 4.52 26.32
Net loans/Total deposits & Borrowing 5.96 28.70 5.71 38.93
Capital regulation
Cap.Funds/Deposits & ST funding 10.52 63.60 10.84 130.06
Cap.Funds/Net loans 25.31 99.40 6.49 50.35
Cap. Funds / Total assets 4.94 13.36 4.71 27.59
Equity/Liabilities 52.18 115.88 3.17 13.19
Equity/Total assets 29.04 34.13 0.87 2.68
Tier 1 Ratio 1.01 8.66 11.86 151.95
Total capital ratio 4.58 45.31 12.86 171.49
Risk transfer
Impaired loans/Equity 1.53 11.88 10.52 123.67
Impaired loans/ Gross loans 0.38 2.25 6.71 49.73
Loan loss prov. / Net int.Rev 5.74 30.34 3.16 29.75
Loan loss Res. / Gross loans 1.00 3.19 4.52 26.32
Unreserved impaired loans /Equity 4.62 59.82 13.56 185.16
Net charge-o/Average Gross loans 0.39 2.55 8.04 72.67
Size
Log total assets 5.46 2.32 0.36 2.72
74
Table 3.7: World average values for the ratios (Bankscope)
Total of - Banks that from selected continents and countries, in addition to the whole world; the period 2000 to 2010
Variable China Japan Rest of Asia Europe North America Australia World average
Asset quality
Loan loss reserve/Gross loans 1.70 2.20 1.90 2.20 1.40 0.90 2.00
Loan loss reserve/Impaired loans 11.00 64.60 112.80 77.80 185.00 255.90 70.00
Impaired loans/Gross loans 15.50 3.40 1.70 2.80 0.80 0.40 2.90
Loan loss provisions/Net interest revenue 23.70 52.20 25.10 13.80 9.20 7.30 16.20
Capital adequacy
Basel Tier 1 capital/Risk assets 8.50 5.80 8.60 8.20 9.70 7.30 8.10
Basel total capital/ Risk assets 10.10 11.10 11.90 11.60 13.40 10.20 11.80
Equity/Total assets 3.80 4.00 7.60 4.10 8.20 7.30 5.00
Protability and eciency
Return on average assets 0.40 0.20 1.00 0.50 1.10 0.90 0.60
Return on average equity 11.60 4.60 12.60 12.00 13.60 12.90 11.80
Net interest margin 2.20 1.00 2.90 1.30 2.90 2.30 1.70
Expense ratio 45.10 54.10 51.50 63.70 63.80 56.70 61.20
Liquidity
Interbank ratio 205.10 98.10 196.10 76.40 46.50 85.20 74.60
Net loans/Deposits and Short term funding 65.30 62.10 74.80 68.40 70.00 100.60 68.50
Liquid assets/Deposits and short term funding 10.50 8.80 22.70 23.50 27.50 8.90 21.00
3.4.2 Analysis of multicollinearity
We perform an analysis of multicollinearity for the explanatory variables we use in the
sample. We study the matrix of correlations, Table 3.8 (a) below, which indicates that the
coecients of bivariate correlation are all close to zero, except for that between Tier 1 ratio
and Total capital ratio, which has a value of 0.6383, which is still not very close to 1. We
subsequently conrm this dependence through an analysis of multicollinearity. The Variance
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Ination Factor23 (VIF) for Tier 1 ratio reaches a value of 1.24 and 1.12 for the Total capital
ratio. As a result, we can use all the ratios for the analysis, whose values for the majority of
cases, are close to 1 as shown in Table 3.8(b) below.
The correlation matrix, in Table 3.8(a), shows that the explanatory variables are uncor-
related. This gives an evidence that the results in the Probit and Logit models considered
earlier are free from any inuence of the variables being similar. It also shows that there
is not prove of observed multicollinearity despite the sheer number if variables used in the
model. We use the following initials to represent the variables.
Thus, IR - the Interbank ratio, LA /D&ST F - the liquid assets/Dep &ST Funding,
LA/D& B - the Liquid assets/Dep & Bor, NL /TA - the Net loans/Total assets, N L/D
&ST F - the Net loans/Dep &ST funding, N Loans/T.Dep &Bor - the Net loans/Tot Dep
&Bor, C F/TA - the Cap Funds/Total Assets, CF/D &ST F - the Cap Funds/Dep &ST
funding, CF/NL - the Cap Funds/Net loans, E/TA - the Equity/Total Assets, E/L - the
Equity/Liabilities, Tier 1 R - the Tier 1 Ratio, TCR - the Total Capital ratio, IL/GL - the
Impaired loans/Gross loans, IL/E - the Impaired loans/Equity, LLP/NIRev - the Loan loss
prov/Net. Int Rev, LL/GL - the Loan loss reserve/Gross loans, UR IL/E - the Unreserved
impaired loans/Equity, NCO/AG L - the NCO/Average Gross loans.
23Variance Ination Factors (VIF) measure how much the variance of the estimated coecients are in-
creased over the case of no correlation among the X variables. If no two X variables are correlated, then all
the VIFs will be 1. If VIF for one of the variables is around or greater than 5, there is collinearity associated
with that variable. The easy solution is: If there are two or more variables that will have a VIF around or
greater than 5, one of these variables must be removed from the regression model.
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Table 3.8(a); Matrix of correlation,
CF/NL E/TA E/L Tier 1 R TCR IL/GL IL/E LLP/NIRev LL/GL UR IL/E NCO/AG L Total assets
CF/NL 1.0000
E/TA -0.0648 1.0000
E/L -0.0140 0.5042 1.0000
Tier 1 R 0.0115 -0.1278 -0.0849 1.0000
TCR 0.0110 -0.0898 -0.0318 0.6383 1.0000
IL/GL 0.4547 -0.0921 -0.0487 0.0848 0.0792 1.0000
IL/E 0.0567 -0.1887 -0.1226 0.1484 0.1574 0.4739 1.0000
LLP/NIRev -0.0590 -0.0736 -0.0449 0.0734 0.0826 0.1866 0.2246 1.0000
LL/GL 0.1565 -0.0369 -0.0209 0.0525 0.0478 0.2199 0.1147 0.1161 1.0000
UR IL/E 0.0816 -0.1629 -0.1029 0.1485 0.1525 0.5243 0.8962 0.1464 0.0794 1.0000
NCO/AG L -0.0306 -0.0577 -0.0485 0.0483 0.0477 0.1903 0.0538 0.2672 0.1936 0.0251 1.0000
Total assets 0.0228 -0.1475 -0.0920 0.1447 0.1547 0.1131 0.2606 0.0871 0.0235 0.2405 0.0264 1.0000
3.4.3 Variance ination factors
Looking at correlations only among pairs of predictors shown in the correlation matrix is
limiting. It is possible that the pairwise correlations are small, and yet a linear dependence
exists among three or even more variables. That's why we can use the variance ination
factors (VIF) to help us detect multicollinearity. As the name suggests, a variance ination
factor (VIF) quanties how much the variance is inated. As shown in the Table 3.8(b), all
values are less than 3, indicating lack of multicollinearity. This is also arms the lack of
multicollinearity.
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Table 3.8(a) : VIFs of the explanatory variables
Funding
Interbank ratio 1.39
Liquid assets/Customer deposits & ST funding 1.68
Liquid assets/Total deposits & borrowing 1.41
Net loans/Deposits & ST funding 2.73
Net loans /Total assets 1.99
Net loans/Total deposits & Borrowing 2.01
Capital regulation
Cap.Funds/Deposits & ST funding 1.53
Cap.Funds/Net loans 1.33
Cap. Funds / Total assets 1.10
Equity/Liabilities 1.25
Equity/Total assets 1.11
Tier 1 Ratio 1.24
Total capital ratio 1.12
Risk transfer
Impaired loans/Equity 1.22
Impaired loans/ Gross loans 1.28
Loan loss prov. / Net int.Rev 1.26
Loan loss Res. / Gross loans 1.27
Unreserved impaired loans /Equity 1.25
Net charge-o/Average Gross loans 1.31
Size
Log total assets 1.07
We have the descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables for number of securitizing banks, N=527.
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3.4.4 Empirical results
Following Cardone-Riportella et al. (2010) (but note that we use more variables than in
that study), we t the model in Equation (1) using a Logit model. Before proceeding with
the estimation of the model, we test for evidence of correlation amongst the variables in the
model and nd no evidence that multicollinearity is a problem in our data. Table 3.9 shows
the results of our empirical analysis. Five out of the six liquidity ratios are statistically
signicant and generally with the expected sign. The Interbank Ratio (L1) and the liquid
assets to customer deposits and short term funding (L2) are statistically signicant (at 5%
and at 10%) and have the expected sign. Net loans to deposits and short term funding
(L4) is signicant (at 10%) with the expected sign. Net loans to total assets (L5) and net
loans to total deposits and borrowing (L6) are statistically signicant but do not have the
expected sign. We now turn to the regulatory capital ratios. The Tier 1 ratio (C6) and the
Total Capital Adequacy Ratio (C7) are signicant and both have the expected sign. Size is
statistically signicant in each case.
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Table 3.9: Logit Models;
This table shows the signs and magnitude of the coecient of overall results from the Logit model ,
of the probability that the bank participates in securitization or not.
*signicance at 1%; **signicance at 5%;***signicance at 10%.
Coecient Probability
Funding
Interbank ratio -0.922 0.03**
Liquid assets/Customer deposits & ST funding -0.002 0.02**
Liquid assets/Total deposits & borrowing 0.001 0.54
Net loans/Deposits & ST funding 0.002 0.09***
Net loans /Total assets -0.071 0.09***
Net loans/Total deposits & Borrowing -0.778 0.04***
Capital regulation
Cap.Funds/Deposits & ST funding -0.001 0.20
Cap.Funds/Net loans -0.002 0.12
Cap. Funds / Total assets 0.017 0.11
Equity/Liabilities -0.005 0.58
Equity/Total assets 0.002 0.36
Tier 1 Ratio -1.161 0.03**
Total capital ratio -0.225 0.01*
Risk transfer
Impaired loans/Equity 0.53 0.21
Impaired loans/ Gross loans 0.01 0.33
Loan loss prov. / Net int.Rev 0.07 0.46
Loan loss Res. / Gross loans 0.04 0.15
Unreserved impaired loans /Equity 0.02 0.58
Net charge-o/Average Gross loans 0.00 0.28
Size
Log total assets 0.73 0.01*
R
2
0.78
80
The Logit model suggests that liquidity is the most important driver of securitization
in the UK while it generates weaker evidence that UK banks have used securitization for
regulatory capital arbitrage and for credit risk transfer.
Overall the results in Table 6, using the Logit model, conrm our expectations (see table
3). We expect a higher probability that a bank will securitize when the Interbank Ratio
is lower or when the size of the loans issued by the bank are large relative to the bank's
deposits and short-term funding (i.e. the bank is less liquid). To further check these results
we now use a Binary Probit model. Results are reported in Table 6, left-hand-side panel.
Overall, the Binary Probit model is supportive of the hypothesis that liquidity is an
important factor. Three of the liquidity ratios are signicant (at 10%) and all have the
expected sign.
However, there is now evidence that regulatory capital arbitrage and credit risk transfer
cannot be neglected24. Four out of the seven regulatory capital arbitrage ratios are now
signicant (and all four have the expected sign) and two of those are signicant at 5%. Four
out of the six credit risk transfer ratios are now signicant (and all four have the expected
sign) and two of those are signicant at 1%.
3.4.5 Results using ABS and CDO data
In this section we rene our denition of securitization and split the data by separately
considering ABSs and CDOs. Limited somewhat by data availability, we now use data for
231 banks issuing ABSs and for 335 banks issuing CDOs. Cardone-Riportella et al. (2010)
remark that since CDOs are related to the banks' portfolio of liabilities, credit risk transfer
should not to be a motivating factor for these securities while it should be an important
factor for ABSs25.
The ABS and CDO markets in the UK both grew substantially in the ve years prior
to 2008 to become some of the largest in the world: this merits an investigation into the
24We have also repeated the same empirical exercise by estimating a special case of the model where
we consider one variable at a time. The results (unreported for brevity but available on request) were
qualitatively unchanged.
25However, we believe that this remark is too strong. In fact, CDOs, especially synthetic CDOs, are also
used as credit risk transfer vehicles.
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determinants of such growth. We follow broadly the same approach as in the previous
section. However, we now use fewer variables (four as proxies for liquidity, four as proxies
for regulatory capital arbitrage and three as proxies for credit risk transfer) - mainly to
reect the availability of data. Firstly, we consider ABSs for which our data-set consists
of 231 banks. Table 3.10 shows the empirical results. We, initially, discuss the results of
the Logit model. When we split the data down the ABS and CDO dimensions, it seems
that the need for funding may be a less signicant factor. The Interbank Ratio (L1) is no
longer signicant and two of the three ratios which generate signicant coecients do not
have the expected sign. Turning to the regulatory capital ratios, the Tier 1 ratio (C6) and
the Total Capital Adequacy Ratio (C7) are signicant at 5% and both have the expected
sign. The Binary Probit model shows qualitatively similar results but the Interbank Ratio
is not highly signicant. The credit risk transfer ratios are insignicant for the Logit model
but two out of three are signicant (Impaired Loans/Equity (R1) at 10% (but not with the
expected sign) and Loan Loss reserve/ Gross Loans (R4) at 5%) when the Probit model is
used. Thus, there is now evidence that risk transfer seems also to be a motivating factor for
the growth of the market for ABSs in the UK. Thus, regulatory capital arbitrage does seem
to play an important role while there is some empirical evidence that ABSs have also been
used to transfer credit risk.
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Table 3.10: ABS Market.
This are results from Logit model considering 231, with fewer variables - mainly to reect
the availability of data (four as proxies for liquidity, four as proxies for regulatory capital
arbitrage and three as proxies for credit risk transfer)
*signicance at 1%; **signicance at 5%;***signicance at 10%.
Funding Coecient Probability
Interbank ratio -0.045 0.52
Liquid assets/Customer deposits & ST funding -0.018 0.10***
Net loans/Deposits & ST funding -0.012 0.02**
Net loans /Total assets -0.016 0.09***
Capital regulation
Cap.Funds/Net loans -0.019 0.49
Equity/Total assets 0.039 0.48
Tier 1 Ratio -0.102 0.03**
Total capital ratio -0.039 0.02**
Risk transfer
Impaired loans/Equity -0.016 0.89
Impaired loans/ Gross loans -0.098 0.90
Loan loss Res. / Gross loans -0.168 0.57
Size
Log total assets 0.147 0.07
R
2
0.68
We now turn to CDOs for which our data-set consists of 335 banks covering the period
2004-2010.
Table 11 shows the empirical results for CDOs. We, initially, discuss the Logit model.
Although funding seems, once again, to be an important driver of CDO growth in the UK,
regulatory capital arbitrage seems also important in understanding the growth of these nan-
cial securities. Two out of four regulatory capital ratios are statistically signicant (Capital
funds/Net loans (at 5%) and Tier 1 ratio (at 10%)) but only one of these is correctly signed
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(Tier 1 ratio). The Binary Probit model reinforces the previous results. Thus, although the
search for cheap funding seems to be relevant, the growth of CDOs in the UK may have
also been driven by regulatory capital arbitrage. This is an important and new result with
possible policy implications for governments and regulators. Credit risk transfer does not
seem to be a motivating factor for the large expansion of the issuance of these securities in
the UK.
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Table 3.11: CDO
This table shows the empirical results for CDOs for which our data-set
consists of 335 banks covering the period 2004-2010.
*signicance at 1%; **signicance at 5%;***signicance at 10%.
Funding Coecient Probability
Interbank ratio -0.017 0.044**
Liquid assets/Customer deposits & ST funding -0.002 0.104***
Net loans/Deposits & ST funding 0.015 0.616
Net loans /Total assets -0.013 0.090
Capital regulation
Cap.Funds/Net loans 0.011 0.025
Equity/Total assets 0.039 0.782
Tier 1 Ratio -0.067 0.032
Total capital ratio -0.012 0.119
Risk transfer
Impaired loans/Equity 0.087 0.093
Impaired loans/ Gross loans 0.039 0.541
Loan loss Res. / Gross loans -0.021 0.516
Size
Log total assets 0.012 0.101***
R
2
0.75
The dierences between the factors driving the growth of the ABS and CDO markets
are best captured by comparing and contrasting tables 7 and 8. They show that the twelve
variables we consider produce adjusted R-squared values of around 87% to 91%. The dier-
ences are that regulatory capital arbitrage is somewhat more important for CDOs than for
ABSs whereas funding and credit risk transfer are somewhat more important for ABSs than
for CDOs.
85
The size of the bank seems to be a determinant factor to explain the growth of securitiza-
tion in the UK regardless of the methodology used. This is also a noteworthy result. To put
it another way, large banks (perhaps, too-big-to-fail or the so-called G-SIFIs (Global Sys-
temically Important Financial Institutions)) are more likely to securitize - and this remark
applies to ABSs and (even more so to) CDOs.
Summarizing the empirical results reported above, we conclude that i) the search for
funding is the predominant reason why UK banks used the securitization market (this result
is also in line with theoretical models such as DeMarzo and Due (1999) and DeMarzo
(2005)) and ii) regulatory capital arbitrage and credit risk transfer have also played an
important role and therefore these factors cannot be neglected. The latter result contrasts
with some of the empirical papers cited earlier which nd the search for funding being the
only driver of securitization26.
3.4.6 Inside the ABS market
Structuring an ABS deal involves dierent people at dierent levels of the chain. For example
the originator of the loans, mortgages etc.(i.e. banks, credit card issuers) pools the assets.
The pool is then sold to a special purpose vehicle (SPV). The SPV will act as an intermediary
between the originator of the pool and the ABS issuer. Investors will nally buy the tranches
oered on the market. The dierent people along the chain are indeed likely to have dierent
information about the security. For example, the ABS issuer can have better information
about the price of the security. The same information is likely to be unavailable to the
investors27.
To simplify the discussion, suppose that there are only two parties involved in structuring
an ABS deal, namely, the issuer and the investor28. We assume that the issuer possesses
more information about the security than the investor. The informational advantage may
26However, these studies do not refer to the UK market but rather the Spanish and Italian markets.
27Issuers in the ABS market are generally investment banks, which have the know-how to better price the
securities. Investors are generally pension funds or even retail banks. However, asymmetric information can
also be due to rating agencies valuing the security. For example, generally, banks ask more than one rating
company to rate a structure; they have then the option to buy the best rate. Information about the credit
ratings of all the agencies involved are normally not disclosed to the public.
28This general assumption has no implication for our analysis.
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consist, for example, in private information about the future cash ow of the security or
sophisticated models to price it. Thus, there is a degree of asymmetric information between
the issuer and the investor29. Suppose that the issuer has a very high preference for liquidity
and uses the securitization market to raise cheap funds30. In such a context, the investor may
rationally anticipate that the issuer will sell a greater amount of the security when investor's
private information implies a lower value of the security (lemon problem31). It follows that
the investor will rationally oer a lower price for the security. Retention in this case is a
credible signal (i.e. the signal is a nancial decision which conveys information). In fact,
we have assumed that the issuer has a high preference for liquidity. Thus, the asymmetric
information gives rise to "liquidity cost"32. We have used the De Marzo and Due (1999)
model to further investigate this issue. The demand function for the security is depicted in
Figure 3.10.
29That is the investor knows that the issuer has private information about the security which are unavail-
able to it.
30This might be due to protable investments in the market.
31The lemon problem occurs because of information asymmetry between the buyer and the seller (i.e. the
seller has more information about the product being sold than the buyer). Thus, the buyer uses the quantity
of the product being sold by the seller as a signal of the quality of the product itself.
32This happens as the issuer has a high preference for liquidity given the available investment opportunities.
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q=1
q=1/2
Private valuation, f
Pf
Figure 3.10: Decreasing and convex prot function. Source; Author's
illustration
Figure 3.10 above shows that the demand function is decreasing and convex when price of
security, Pf is plotted against private valuation, f . Investors are naturally concerned about
the security that they are being oered since they anticipate that the seller has private
information that they do not know. Thus, the price of the security will be higher, the larger
the proportion (q) of the security retained by the seller on the balance sheet. The optimal
quantity of the security oered by the issue is decreasing. This is consistent with the fact
that the issuer will sell less of the security, when its expected payo is higher. Thus, there is
an endogenous relationship between the quantity of the security put on sale and its market
price. Furthermore, from this graph it appears that there is a direct link between the degree
of asymmetry in the market, liquidity and the security price. We shall investigate this issue
further in the next section.
3.4.7 Rescuing ABS Markets
Figure 3.11(a) below shows the prot from securitization from dierent face values of the
debt issued. The prot is plotted for dierent degrees of asymmetry, ranging from low
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asymmetry (m = 1%) to high asymmetry (m = 14%). We have used the DD (1999) model
to simulate the prot.
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Figure 3.11(a): Securitization prot, Source; Matlab simulation
It is clear that the prot from securitization falls as the "lemon" problem becomes worse.
Indeed when m is very high (i.e. the degree of asymmetry is very high), the issuer will have
to retain a larger proportion of the security and thus the issuer faces higher holding costs33.
There are two important things which can be learned from Figure 3.11(a). Firstly, when
the "lemon" problem is very persistent (as happens during a nancial crisis), any marginal
proportion of the security put on sale in the market is likely to have a substantial impact
on its market price (and thus on the issuer prot). On the other hand if the lemon problem
is not very serious (m = 1%), the issuer may issue bonds with large face value (d =1). In
this case, we have a pure pass-through security.
Figure 3.11(a) is important to better understand the economic implications of most of
the regulatory proposals being discussed these days. In fact, dierent proposals have been
33The issuer will be forced to post more capital against the security and therefore issuer will have less
capital available for investments.
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suggested to reform and re-start the ABS market; for example, the White Paper (2010)
proposed by the Association of Mortgage Investors, the SEC (2010) and the EU proposals.
Among the many dierent things proposed in the SEC (2010) document, following the
EU approach, we would like to discuss a few which, in our view, are very important. The
SEC (2010) document proposes that a xed retention proportion (5%) of the security should
be retained on the issuer's balance sheet. This is the so called "skin in the game". The
risk retention approach is aimed to distinguish those securities which are of a sucient
quality while avoiding the reliance on ratings. In other words, the issuer puts his money at
stake with the investors and consequently this will constitute an incentive to issue higher
quality securities. It is very likely that this proposal may have a substantial impact on
the ABS market liquidity in the future. It is dicult to understand how ve percent (or
indeed any oor) can be selected. Furthermore, following our discussion in the previous
section, the proportion (q) of the asset sold to investors constitutes a credible signal which
the (uninformed) investor can use to infer about the private information available to the
issuer34. Of course a much higher degree of market transparency would probably make
this signal useless. However, the impact on the market protability overall is probably
underestimated.
The SEC also proposes the so called new disclosure rules for the ABS market. ABS
issuers, instead of relying on "principles" based disclosure, will have to report specic infor-
mation for each asset in the pool. This data should be made available by the issuers to the
public after ling of a computer program35. Given the importance of these proposals, we
shall discuss them further in the next sections.
3.4.8 Proposals in ABS markets
Thus, the proportion of the security retained by the issuer constitutes a credible signal (i.e.
the investor observes the proportion of the security put on sale by the issuer and the investor
34Issuers in the past have already held a proportion of the issued security on their balance sheets. However,
generally, the proportion retained was a small proportion and therefore it would have been unlikely to drive
the issuer to focus on the quality of the loans. However, given the high appetite for high yield in the past
fteen years, the incentive for the issuer to sell the retained security was very high.
35The SEC goes much further than that, to also suggest that this information should then regularly be
updated when assets in the pool change, etc...
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uses this information to infer about the quality of the security). For example in Figure 3.11(b)
below, it is optimal for the issuer to issue debt with face value 60. The issuer's prot will
then be equal to 0.91%. Suppose now that the proportion of the security retained by the
issuer is xed by regulation so that the issuer can only issue debt with face value equal to
40. In this simple case the issuer's prot would drop36 to 0.74%. That is a signicant drop
in the securitization prot. Will such a drop in the revenue from securitization impact on
the market as a whole? This is an important question to address before taking any decision
on setting a oor. Thus, the proposal of a 5% oor (see SEC, 2010)37 is likely to hit the
issuer hard but there is no evidence that it will lead to higher quality securities.
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Figure 3.11(b): Securitization prot. Source: Matlab simulation
As a way to make the ABS market more transparent, the SEC38 proposes new disclosure
rules for ABS issuers, the rationale being that more transparency in this market is in the
interest of both investors and issuers. As mentioned above the SEC proposal favours the
36The red line in Figure A8(b) shows the sharp drop in the prot in this case.
37http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2010.pdf
38http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2010.pdf
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institution of a "machine-readable, standardized format that is useful to investors and the
market" (SEC, 2010). The SEC requires, for each asset (loan) in the pool the disclosure of
specic data relating to the terms of the asset, obligor39 characteristics etc.
We believe that such a degree of disclosure is unnecessary and is likely to impact nega-
tively on the market. To see this, consider Figure A8(c) below.
3.4.9 Securitization and Originate-To-Distribute Model on Banks' defaults
We examine the role of credit risk transfer in greater depth by considering what happened
to banks, using the Originate-To-Distribute Model (OTD) model, in the aftermath of the
2007 nancial crisis. The empirical results in the previous section show that, at least in part,
UK banks used the securitization market to transfer credit risk. However, at the onset of
the nancial crisis in the summer of 2007, the securitization market suddenly became frozen
and therefore banks were unable to further securitize their assets. This would have left them
with considerable credit risk that they were unable to transfer to third parties - at exactly
the time that banks were facing dramatically increased funding and credit risks. In order to
quantify this, we follow Purnanandam (2011) and estimate the eect of the OTD model on
banks' ABS and CDO annualised default rates using the following bank xed-eect model:
defaultit = i + 1aftert + 2aftert  preotdi +
k=KX
k=1
kXit + it (3.15)
The dependent variable in equation (3.8) above measures the default rate of the portfolio
of bank i in year t. Following Purnanandam (2010), we use net charge-os (net of recoveries)
as a proxy for the default rate40. The intercept i is the bank xed eect, while Xit is a
vector of bank characteristics41. The variable preotdt is a time invariant variable measuring
the extent of the bank's participation in the Originate-to-distribute (OTD) market. This
is measured by the volume of CDOs (or ABSs) originated by a bank between 2004 to 2010
39An individual or company that owes debt to another individual or company (the creditor), as a result
of borrowing or issuing bonds, also called debtor.
40Due to data limitation we cannot use non-performing assets. Net charge-o indicates the percentage
of the asset issued by the bank that may have been nally written o the book. Thus it is an appropriate
proxy for the default rate.
41We use some of the same variables used before.
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scaled by the bank's position in CDOs (or ABSs) at the beginning of the year. The variable
aftert is a dummy variable taking the value one in the period after the nancial crisis began
and zero otherwise. Thus, the coecient on this variable captures the time trend in default
rate before and after the nancial crisis42. The coecient on the interaction term (i.e.,
aftert preotdi) measures the change in net charge-os around the crisis period across banks
with varying intensities of participation in the OTD market prior to the crisis. Thus, 2
measures the change in default rate for banks that originated loans primarily to sell them
to third parties, as compared with the corresponding change for banks that originated loans
primarily to retain them on their own balance sheets.
3.4.10 OTD model Results
Tables 3.12(a) and 3.12(b) present the empirical results of the model in equation (3.8).
42We consider the period 2004 to 2007 as the period before the nancial crisis while 2008 - 2010 as the
period after the nancial crisis.
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Table 3.12(a): Default rate for ABS issued 2004 -2010
Using 231 banks, this table shows the coecients measuring
the default rate of the portfolio of bank i in year t.
*signicance at 1%; **signicance at 5%;***signicance at 10%.
Coecient Probability
1 0.14 0.011*
2 0.58 0.096
Funding
Interbank ratio 0.26 0.013**
Net loans /Total assets 0.42 0.002*
Capital regulation
Cap.Funds/Net loans 0.40 0.180
Tier 1 Ratio 0.22 0.004*
Risk transfer
Impaired loans/Equity 0.02 0.050**
Impaired loans/ Gross loans 0.01 0.847
Size
Log total assets 0.03 0.045**
R
2
0.82
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Table 3.12(b): Default rate for CDOs issued period 2004 - 2010
Using 335 banks to measure the default rate of the portfolio of bank i in year t.
*signicance at 1%; **signicance at 5%;***signicance at 10%.
Coecient Probability
1 0.03 0.002*
2 0.01 0.088***
Funding
Interbank ratio 0.26 0.003*
Net loans /Total assets 0.00 0.870
Capital regulation
Cap.Funds/Net loans 0.40 0.003*
Tier 1 Ratio 0.22 0.001*
Risk transfer
Impaired loans/Equity -0.02 0.084***
Impaired loans/ Gross loans -0.08 0.014**
Size
Log total assets 0.01 0.059***
R
2 0.77
We note that 1 is signicant at 1% both in the case of ABSs and CDOs. This tells us
that the nancial crisis has been a contributing factor to the increase in default rates suered
by UK banks. 2 is also statistically signicant and positive. This means that the banks
that were using an OTD model before the nancial crisis, were the ones to suer the most
from defaults after the nancial crisis. We remark that the 2 coecient is much larger for
ABSs (0.5778) compared to CDOs (0.0142). This indicates that banks had a much larger
proportion of ABSs written o after the nancial crisis (compared to CDOs). Finally, banks
that used the OTD (Originate-to-distribute) model (as opposed to the traditional \loan-and-
hold" model) before the nancial crisis were the ones to suer the most (in terms of defaults)
after the nancial crisis. We attribute this to the fact that the market for ABSs was frozen
abruptly in the summer of 2007 and hence they were unable to sell o their securitized loans
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and suered the consequences.
3.4.11 Protability of UK banks that securitized
As we have already remarked, UK banks have been heavily involved in the securitization
market. In this section we aim to investigate how the securitization market has impacted on
banks' protability in the UK. We split banks into two groups - the rst group consists of
commercial and savings banks and the second group consists of investment and real estate
banks. Closely following Jiangli and Pritsker (2008), we consider the following linear model
for a measure of protability, Rate of Return on Operating Assets (RROA):
RROAit = i +
4X
s=1
'isMis + 
2X
g=1
!isGig (3.16)
where RROAit is the protability ratio Rate of Return on Operating Assets for bank i
at a given year t, Mis, s = 1,2; 3; 4; are measures of securitization considered in the study
(ABSs and CDOs issued, total assets and Loans) and Gig, g = 1; 2; represents the group
classication of the banks that securitized and where the parameter  takes the value 1 for
the group of commercial and savings banks and 0 for the group of investment and real estate
banks.
We start with the results presented in the rst four rows of Table 3.13 (which do not
dierentiate between the type of bank but, instead, dierentiate on whether the bank secu-
ritized or not). The results in Table 3.13 indicate that large banks are the ones for which
securitization is more important to explain prots. Furthermore, all the coecients on the
variables used are signicant and with the correct sign. More interesting is that the measure,
relating to total assets, is larger for the securitizing banks (50.59%) than for the non securi-
tizing (1.42%). This may imply that banks which securitized depended on securitization to
increase their overall prots.
The size of the coecients on the variables used in Table 3.10 is generally larger for
commercial and savings banks as opposed to investment and real estate banks. This result
shows that commercial and savings banks were more exposed to the securitization market
than investment and real estate banks (i.e. their balance sheets were more sensitive to
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changes in the conditions of the securitization market). Therefore, while investment banks
were the ones for which securitization was more important to explain prots, commercial
and savings banks are the ones more exposed to price uctuations in this market43 - and, of
course, the price uctuations were greatest during the nancial crisis.
Table 3.13: Protability of UK banks 2004 -2010
Using 690 total banks data set - sum-total of securitizing and non-securitizing banks,
we analyse the impact of protability of the probability of securitizing or not securitizing, for  = 0
*signicance at 1%; **signicance at 5%;***signicance at 10%.
Securitizing banks Non securitizing banks
Variable Coecient Probability Coecient Probability
ABS 0.03 0.004*
CDO 0.22 0.002*
loans 0.64 0.011* 0.02 0.008*
total assets 0.51 0.003* 0.01 0.001*
we analyse the impact of protability of the probability of securitizing or not securitizing, for  = 1
Variable Coecient Probability Coecient Probability
ABS 0.42 0.003* 0.02 0.001*
CDO 0.50 0.001* 0.49 0.002*
loans 0.20 0.003* 0.00 0.004*
total assets 072 0.001* 0.69 0.001*
3.5 POLICY RELEVANCE OF OUR RESULTS
Central banks are expected to continue accepting ABSs as collateral in their funding oper-
ations for the foreseeable future. Hence, our empirical ndings have potentially signicant
policy implications for regulators and central banks.
43To account for endogeneity between bank's protability and securitization, we have also repeated the
empirical exercise in Table 10 using GMM but results were qualitatively unchanged.
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The key result we observed is that liquidity is the most important driver of securitization
for UK banks, ahead of regulatory capital arbitrage and credit risk transfer. This is not to
underestimate the motivating inuence of the latter two factors, but it does put in perspective
the value of securitization as a funding tool in the nancial markets. The other key result
we noted was the higher probability that a bank will securitize when its interbank ratio is
lower (that is, when it is a net borrower from the interbank market).
In the rst instance we conclude that securitization will remain an important technique
for funding purposes. The emphasis on bank funding models in the post-2008 environment
is for a reduced reliance on unsecured short-term wholesale funding, and greater reliance on
customer deposits and secured long-term wholesale funds. It is reasonable to expect that
securitization markets will form part of the latter, either in the form of ABSs or Covered
Bonds.
The Basel III and FSA liquidity regimes place a greater emphasis on secured funding,
which banks are addressing by embarking on \asset enablement" programmes, to ensure
that sucient collateral is available for use in secured funding transactions. Our ndings
suggest that it is imperative for banks with interbank ratios lower than 100% to make asset
enablement a priority. The long-term signicance of this is considerable: some banks will
have to modify their business models substantially before they are in a position to originate
only assets that are viable for use as secured collateral. Banks that are not able to do
this, and still wish to run customer loan-deposit ratios greater than 100%, will remain net
borrowers from the interbank market. In the long run this will add substantially to their
costs, because their liquid asset buer requirement will be higher.
The other side of this is the impact on the bank funding model. As the share of encum-
bered assets grows as banks move to secured funding, including securitization, the position
of senior unsecured and subordinated debt holders worsens as the encumbrance ratio worsens
and the loss-given-default value in a bankruptcy event rises higher. This has implications
for the long-term viability of unsecured long-term debt from an investor perspective, and
will result in higher unsecured funding costs. Ultimately, the requirements of the Basel III
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) suggest that banks
will need to continue to employ securitization as part of their long-term liquidity funding
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strategy.
Regulators may need to provide incentives for banks to invest in ABS tranches to ensure
that non-bank investors continue to remain engaged in the market. If a transaction is
not undertaken for risk transfer purposes, the originator can retain the junior tranche but
mezzanine tranches may not nd institutional investors and have to be placed with banks.
The regulatory capital risk weighting on these tranches may be a disincentive for banks to
purchase them.
For securitization to produce any regulatory capital benet requires that banks demon-
strate \signicant risk transfer" arising from the transaction. Therefore if the primary mo-
tivation for the structure is to transfer credit risk, rather than raise funding or generate
regulatory capital arbitrage, it would be more appropriate to consider a synthetic securiti-
zation. This would avoid the need to nd cash investors for the deal.
We remarked above that regulators may need to provide incentives for banks to invest
in ABS tranches. Other incentives or disincentives are also possible: In 2010, the UK
government introduced a tax on banks proportional to their volume of short-term wholesale
funding as a mechanism to try to reduce their reliance upon it. It is worthy of note that
the savings rate of UK citizens is rather lower than that of citizens in Germany and Italy,
for example, and much lower than that in Asian countries such as Japan and China. The
UK government might consider tax incentives for UK citizens to save a greater proportion
of their incomes. This would have the eect of increasing the pool of savings which might be
deposited with UK banks. Tax incentives to encourage private saving might be politically
easier to implement than incentives for banks to issue or invest in ABS tranches.
3.6 ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS
In this section we present robustness checks on the main results presented above. Firstly,
to account for possible outliers, we use robust regression (see Tables 3.14(a) to 3.14(c).
Secondly, we have considered two dummy variables in the model. The two dummy variables
enable us to see how the characteristic of a bank (commercial bank or savings bank) aects
its decision to securitize its loans. We start with CDOs (see table 3.14(a)). The results in
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Table 3.14(a) conrm what we reported earlier: While the search for funding is an important
element in explaining the growth of the securitization market in the UK, regulatory capital
arbitrage and risk transfer cannot be neglected. All the coecients have the expected sign.
While both the two dummy variables are signicant, in Table 3.14(b), savings banks seem
to be the ones more willing to implement a liability securitization program. This result is in
line with the analysis of Cardone-Riportella et al. (2010) for Spanish banks and in line with
the results in Table 10.
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Table 3.14 (a): Robust regression,
change in R
2
( base of 0.82), found when only two factors from each group are considered in the model.
This table show the change in R
2
when we introduce the
factors one after the other.
Coecient Change in R
2
Funding
Interbank ratio -0.908 -0.14
Liquid assets/Customer deposits & ST funding -0.002 -0.08
Liquid assets/Total deposits & borrowing -0.002 -0.11
Net loans/Deposits & ST funding 0.001 0.27
Net loans /Total assets -0.065 0.00
Net loans/Total deposits & Borrowing -0.765 -0.31
Capital regulation
Cap.Funds/Deposits & ST funding -0.002 0.00
Cap.Funds/Net loans -0.003 0.00
Cap. Funds / Total assets 0.032 0.00
Equity/Liabilities 0.003 0.10
Equity/Total assets 0.007 -0.52
Tier 1 Ratio -0.164 -0.30
Total capital ratio -0.097 -0.19
Risk transfer
Impaired loans/Equity -0.554 0.01
Impaired loans/ Gross loans 0.091 0.15
Loan loss prov. / Net int.Rev 0.074 0.00
Loan loss Res. / Gross loans 0.004 0.00
Unreserved impaired loans /Equity 0.024 -0.33
Net charge-o/Average Gross loans 0.037 -0.26
Size
Log total assets 0.753 0.02
*signicance at 1%; **signicance at 5%;***signicance at 10%.
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We now turn to the ABS market. Results in Table 3.14(c) are in line with results in
Table 3.14 (b). Furthermore, it is noteworthy that neither of the two dummy variables are
now signicant, Table 11(b). In addition to the robustness results reported in this section,
we have used a battery of additional tests (Panel OLS with xed eects - reported in table
3.14(b) and (c) below.
Table 3.14 (b): CDO robust regression variables
Panel OLS xed eects regression results
*signicance at 1%; **signicance at 5%;***signicance at 10%.
Funding Coecient Probability
Interbank ratio -0.19 0.055*
Liquid assets/Customer deposits & ST funding 0.08 0.046
Net loans/Deposits & ST funding 0.50 0.000*
Net loans /Total assets 0.66 0.004*
Capital regulation
Cap.Funds/Net loans -0.06 0.001*
Equity/Total assets -0.09 0.047*
Tier 1 Ratio -0.11 0.000*
Total capital ratio -0.44 0.001*
Risk transfer
Impaired loans/Equity 0.06 0.000
Impaired loans/ Gross loans -0.58 0.000
Loan loss Res. / Gross loans -0.19 0.051
Size
Log total assets 0.03 0.001*
R
2
0.59
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Table 3.14 (c): ABS robust regression variables.
Panel OLS xed eects regression results
Funding Coecient Probability
Interbank ratio -0.43 0.002***
Liquid assets/Customer deposits & ST funding 0.13 0.048
Net loans/Deposits & ST funding 0.27 0.000*
Net loans /Total assets -0.03 0.585
Capital regulation
Cap.Funds/Net loans -0.01 0.070***
Equity/Total assets 0.30 0.000
Tier 1 Ratio -0.53 0.074*
Total capital ratio -0.86 0.000*
Risk transfer
Impaired loans/Equity -0.02 0.074
Impaired loans/ Gross loans 0.42 0.106
Loan loss Res. / Gross loans -0.89 0.589
Size
Log total assets 0.70 0.000*
*signicance at 1%; **signicance at 5%;***signicance at 10%.
3.7 CONCLUSION
This study has analysed the reasons why UK banks securitize or did not securitize during the
period before the 2007 nancial crisis. We have shown that the search for liquidity (i.e. the
need to fund their balance sheets) has been the principal motive for UK banks to securitize.
We have also shown that regulatory capital arbitrage and credit risk transfer have played a
role, albeit a smaller one, in the decision of banks to securitize. We have shown that banks
which issued more asset-backed securities (ABSs) before the nancial crisis suered more
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defaults after the nancial crisis. We attribute this to the fact that the market for ABSs was
frozen abruptly in the summer of 2007 and hence they were unable to sell o their loans and
suered the consequences as the credit-crunch and the global nancial crisis took their toll
on the quality of the banks' loan books.
Finally, we showed that large banks were the ones for which securitization was more
important to explain prots while commercial and savings banks were the ones whose balance
sheets were the most exposed (and highly sensitive) to changes in the conditions of the
securitization market.
As Cardone-Riportella et al. (2010) note in their study, since the credit-crunch started
in the summer of 2007, "more and more banks have been seen to underwrite their own
securitization programs in order to use them as a guarantee to obtain funding from the
European Central Bank (ECB)". Already extant securitized bonds have been used in a
similar fashion. Although such funding will require substantial "haircuts", the fact that the
ECB, and other central banks, will accept ABSs as collateral in return for funding strengthens
the motivation to understand why banks securitize and what the consequences are.
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4.0 HOW DO US BANKS RAISE FUNDS FOR THEIR
VALUE-CREATING INVESTMENTS; DEBT OR EQUITY?
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Bank capital has been much in the news during the recent nancial crisis. Banks have
striven to reduce what they perceived to be excessive dependence on deposit-based funding
by having recourse to market-based funding. Researchers have assumed, mainly as a matter
of convenience when they are not primarily concerned about the bank's choice between debt
and equity, (Admati, et.al., 2011) that banks hold the minimum capital level. But the
question that arises today is: Where do banks raise or acquire the funds for their value-
creating investments?
Theoretically, it is noted that internally-generated cash ow will be the dominant source
of funding in all developed economies: Typically, 60-80% for US rms and 50-60% for the
other OECD rms. The bulk of external funding is in the form of debt. Seasoned equity
issues only account for 4-8% of external nancing. Prots re-invested in a rm (retained
earnings) is equivalent to a new equity issue each year. This keeps the leverage ratio1 from
rising too high with time, but bank prots everywhere are declining as a source of capital for
large rms especially in US; it is much less so in Europe2 and Japan, (Yermo and Severinson,
2010).
1This is the value of the rm's debt divided by the value of its total assets
2U.S. banks continue to be regulated under Basel I, which limits the size of bank balance sheets relative
to their equity. European banks, on the other hand, have been regulated under Basel II, which jettisoned the
total leverage ratio in favour of carefully calibrated risk weights for every exposure. As a result, U.S. banks
have been incentivized to load up on risky assets that oered the highest returns at the lowest leverage, while
European banks were incentivized to load up on less risky assets with low regulatory capital requirements,
enabling them to maximize leverage. This is also why European banks love mortgages and U.S. banks like
leveraged loans, why European banks like Triple-A and U.S. banks like Double-B.
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The current nancial crisis has challenged the bank nancing process and highlighted
three issues. First, as a result of the freezing of wholesale and interbank markets, there is
a decreasing availability of funding. Secondly, there is a rising cost of bank funding, partly
as a result of increased bank counterparty risk. Thirdly, there is shortening of funding
maturities that challenges asset liability management (ALM) and protability in the context
of relatively at or even inverted yield curves. During the current nancial crisis, condence
in banks as debtors was eroded, risk aversion increased and investors such as money market
and mutual funds have had to deal with their own liquidity diculties (e.g. redemptions).
The development of asset securitization played an important role during the decade 2001-
2011, as it facilitated the expansion of the funding tools available to banks.
There are three implications that we get from this study3:
1. Issuing riskless securities4 is better than issuing risky ones, such that with risk-free debt,
no lemon enters the market. This considers the impact of the agency problem where the
prot or gain by the owner-manager in their model can be less expensively resolved by
issuing risk-free debt.
2. It is better to build up nancial reserves (by restricting dividends, for example) so that
higher proportions of capital needs can be supplied from internal sources: as internal
funds increase, the average quality of the banks entering the market increases. This
holds irrespective of the type of external nancing.
3. When equity is issued, the stock price will fall. Since any project nanced with external
equity is viewed as a lemon, the perceived present value of the bank and, hence, its stock
price will fall.
In this study, we borrow from the empirical literature on non-nancial rms to explain
the capital structure of large, publicly-traded banks (De Jong, et.al., 2011). We note that
there are considerable similarities between the capital structures of banks and non-nancial
rms. We consider a number of interesting questions: Do banks behave as though they have
target debt ratios? Do they have similar targets for the composition of their debt? Does
3Some of these implications are similar to those derived by Myers and Majluf (1984); although the
rationales are totally dierent since we are considering banks while they considered rms.
4Although the banking industry is a risky industry, we refer to the triple-A debt to be the riskless security.
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liquidity conditions of the banks and their economic and nancial performance aect their
choice of instruments? And are debt ratios inuenced by other factors such as operating
risk, bank size and the composition of their assets?
We will therefore consider the determinant factors for capital decision made by US banks.
In spite of the continuing theoretical debate on capital structure, there is relatively little
empirical evidence on how banks actually select between nancing instruments at a given
point in time.
In past studies on rms, capital structure has been seen to be either a rm's leverage
ratio or it's capital ratio5 (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Using these concepts, we use a sample
of US banks to nd out how banks' capital structure has been improved. The theory on a
rm's capital structure as also explained by Harris and Raviv (1990), indicates that large
rms have more diversied sources of cash; thus, they are less likely to face a sudden cash
shortfall. In general, these results are broadly supportive of the pecking order theory6 and
inconsistent with the trade-o theory7.
The questions we attempt to answer in this study are: How do US banks raise their
funds? Which option do banks consider viable: Debt or equity issuance to raise funds?
Finally, does asymmetric information aect capital structure decisions?
The capital-structure8 decision is one of the most fundamental issues in corporate nance.
We nd that bank debt-equity issuance is related to bank size, protability, liquidity and
asymmetric information. In addition, we nd that bank leverage is an increasing function
of both the number of banks and the number of non-bank nancial institutions with which
the bank has business relationships.
We have the following order in this chapter: Section 4.2 looks at the theoretical back-
ground regarding debt and equity nancing sources; section 4.3 which the related past stud-
5This is the value of the rm's equity (often in the case of banks, it is seen as measure of regulatory
capital) divided by the value of its assets.
6The Pecking Order Theory (1984) assumes that corporate managers are better informed and thus possess
superior information concerning the true value and future prospects of the rm. The pecking order theory
suggests that the rm will rst use internal funds.
7According to the trade-o theory, rms with a debt ratio below the target ratio adjust their debt upward
towards the target debt ratio, and rms with a debt ratio above the target ratio adjust their debt downward
towards the target debt ratio.
8We dene the capital structure as how the bank nances its overall operations and investments by using
dierent sources of funds.
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ies. We then cover the data description and methodology in section 4.4 and look at the
results in section 5 before concluding in section 6.
4.2 CAPITAL STRUCTURE THEORIES
4.2.1 Firms and capital structure
Most rms have nancial issues concerning either the capital structure (nancing) or the
capital budgeting (investment), Brealey, R. et.al. (2010). Capital budgeting decisions by
rms involve long term investments needed by the rms. This often depends on the amount
reported on the balance sheet from the xed assets | both tangible and intangible assets.
We can illustrate this in chart 4.1 below.
The nancing decision by rms involves the way they need to raise funds for investment
projects. This is aected by the gures on the balance sheet corresponding to the rms
current liabilities, long term debt and the share holder equity. This is illustrated in chart
4.2 below. Capital structure is thus the key issue that follows closely on capital budgeting
decision. This indicates how important it is for managers to make correct nancing and
investment decisions.
Current
Assets
Fixed Assets
1 Tangible
2 Intangible
Shareholders’
Equity
Current
Liabilities
Long-Term
Debt
What long-
term
investments
should the
firm engage
in?
The Capital Budgeting Decision
(Investment Decision)
Chart 4.1: Firm investment decision,
Source: Ideas from Brealey (2010)
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How can the firm
raise the money
for the required
investments?
The Capital Structure Decision
(Financing Decision)
Current
Assets
Fixed Assets
1 Tangible
2 Intangible
Shareholders’
Equity
Current
Liabilities
Long-Term
Debt
Chart 4.2: Firms nancing decision.
Source; Ideas from Brealey (2010)
4.2.2 Banks and capital structure
The attention of the banks' capital structure has been of great interest especially with the
current concern of the nancial crisis. In 2008 and 2009 the U.S. government injected $235
billion of capital into the banking system as part of the Troubled Asset Relief Program9
(TARP). This can also be seen in the work of Banyi, et.al (2010). The issue of capital
structure for banks will often be linked to regulatory capital levels which have been too
low for large US banks, especially the large bank organizations that create systemic risks.
Therefore, nancial economists have recently been paying attention to the factors that govern
banks' capital choices. The reason is that, understanding bank capital decisions over the
past 10-year period including the period of the recent crisis, can provide insights on how
banks relate to other rms in making their nance raising decisions.
9The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) is a program of the United States government to purchase
assets and equity from nancial institutions to strengthen its nancial sector. It was signed into law by U.S.
President George W. Bush on October 3, 2008. It was a component of the government's measures in 2008
to address the subprime mortgage crisis. The TARP program originally authorized expenditures of $700
billion and was expected to cost the U.S. taxpayers as much as $300 billion.
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4.2.3 US bank debt and equity issuance trend
As we can clearly see from the graph in gure 4.1, debt10 issuance activities was negatively
aected, with both net issuance and debt instrument maturities decreasing in 2008. The
corporate debt issuance has been on the rise from 2009 to 2011 but the other issuance |
Asset Backed Securities (ABS) and Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) | are still low. In
parallel, investor demand for more short-term instruments such as certicates of deposit
has increased. And while covered bonds initially appeared to be a viable replacement for
o-balance sheet securitization, their issuance has also dried up in US.
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Figure 4.1: US banks debt issuance, Source: SIFMA
In the US, the implementation of government rescue plans has led to unsecured bonds
and covered bonds competing with government guaranteed instruments. As the crisis has
unfolded, all funding sources have gradually been aected. Banks previously relied mainly
on wholesale funding; thus they have been able to change to more stable sources.
10Debt in this case is used to represent the bonds, collateralised loans and obligations, asset backed
securities, mortgages and mortgage loans.
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Figure 4.2: US banks equity issuance trend, Source:
SIFMA
Capital markets represent sources for banks to raise long-term funds. These include
bond and equity markets. Issuance equity has been on an upward trend for the period
between 2000 and 2009. The downward trend between 2000 to 2003 can be attributed to the
consequences of the dot com bubble. There was an upward trend till 2007, after which we
had a drop in 2008 that can be seen to be due to the nancial crisis. This has also aected
the issuance as from 2009 where we can see a downward trend.
4.2.4 Pecking order theory
One of the most popular models of corporate nancing decisions in capital structure literature
is the pecking order theory also considered by Myers (1984). It is based on Myers and
Majluf's (1984) argument concerning asymmetric information and its impact on the rms'
capital structure. Myers (1984) argues that if managers know more than the rest of the
market about their rm's value (information asymmetry), the market penalizes the issuance
of securities (like equity) whose expected payos are crucially related to the assessment of
such value. While banks may be special, in the rst instance, banks are rms. Hence while
the concepts mentioned in these subsections are based on rms, they are also applicable to
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banks.
The changes in debt for the banks have played an important role in assessing the pecking
order theory11. This is because the nancing decit is supposed to drive debt. The theory
predicts that when investments exceed earnings, debt grows, and when earnings exceed
investments, debt falls. Dividends are assumed to be sticky in the short term. The pecking
order theory discussed in the following subsection, attempts to indicate the nancing decit
as investments plus change in working capital plus dividends less internal cash ow. The
theory predicts that in a regression of net debt issues on the nancing decit, the estimated
slope coecient should be one.
4.2.4.1 The factors that Pecking Order Theory is based on. The Pecking Order
Theory assumes that managers will always act in the best interest of existing shareholders,
(De Jong, et.al.,2011). It suggests that the behavior and actions of managers (especially
nancing decisions) constitute important signals to outsiders as regards managers' private
beliefs. These assumptions of pecking order theory suggest that there is an order of preference
for the rm of capital sources when funding is needed.
More protable companies will therefore have less use of external sources of capital and
may have lower debt-equity ratios. When internal funds are exhausted, the rm will then
issue debt until it has reached its debt capacity. Only at this point will rms issue new
equity. This theory also suggests that there is no target debt-equity mix for a rm. Hence
there are three factors that the pecking order theory is based on and that must be considered
by rms when raising capital (De Jong, et.al.,2011):
1. Internal funds are cheapest to use (no issuance costs) and require no release of private
information.
2. Debt nancing is cheaper than equity nancing.
3. Managers tend to know more about the future performance of the rm than lenders
11We consider the situation where the banks prefer rst to nance investment with retained earnings,
then, when they need outside funding, they prefer to issue severe debt instead of equity. Thus, the capital
structures are determined largely by the history of needs for external nance. Pecking-order theory explains
negative intra-industry correlation between protability and debt to equity ratio, and the negative share
price reaction on announcement of an equity issue (i.e. information asymmetry).
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and investors. Because of this asymmetric information, investors may make inferences
about the value of the rm based on the external sources of capital the rm chooses to
raise: Equity nancing, when a rm is overvalued; and debt nancing, when a rm is
undervalued.
Hence we can say that pecking order theory of incremental nancing decisions is the
theory that uses asymmetric information to argue that rms prefer to fund their investments
using internal nance, then (if internal nance is insucient) by debt issues, and then (as
a last resort) by equity issues. Therefore, the pecking order theory predicts that companies
will recur to stock issuances only as a last resort, after cheaper alternatives (like internal
cash, bank debt, or public debt) have been exhausted. Also, pecking order theory of capital
structure can be a theory in which capital structure evolves as the cumulative outcome of
past incremental nancing decisions.
In other words, a rm management's superior information about the rm's assets and
prospects (about the value of its risky securities) in relation to the market should generate
a hierarchy of nancing policies with a preference for internal over external nance and for
debt over equity. According to this hierarchy, rms should nance new investments with the
least information-sensitive securities, i.e., rst with retained earnings, then with safe debt,
then with risky debt, and nally, under duress, with equity.
4.2.4.2 Signaling eect of capital structure decision In corporate nance, asym-
metric information refers to the notion that a rm's insiders, typically the managers, have
better information on the value of their rm's assets and investment opportunities than do
market participants. This asymmetry creates the possibility that the market will not price
the rm's claims correctly, thus providing a positive role for corporate nancing decisions.
Ross (1977) designed a model that illustrates how mispriced equity gives managers the in-
centive to signal the market. The managers' private information becomes available through
capital structure decisions. Ross (1977) suggests that the manager of a rm whose wages
depend on current and future values of the rm will use debt to signal the quality of the rm
(known only to him) to the market. The dependence of his wage on the current value of the
rm gives him the incentive to signal, while a penalty in the case of bankruptcy dissuades
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him from overstating the value. This is a conrmation that information asymmetry does
aect the capital structure decisions of U.S. rms and hence US banks. Similarly, Leland
and Pyle (1977) contend that the proportion of equity held by the owner-manager acts as a
signal to the quality of the rm.
Market imperfections bring with it information costs. This is because with asymmetric in-
formation, leverage may reveal something about the existing rm. Market timing will involve
managers taking advantage of superior information: issue equity when the rm is overvalued
and issue debt when it is undervalued. Hence managers will use nancing decisions to signal
future prospects of rms. They issue equity to signal good growth opportunities (preserve
nancial exibility), and issue debt when expected cash ows are strong and stable. This
leads to the pecking order theory discussed earlier.
In a world of asymmetric information in which only the insiders know the quality of
their rm, it is claimed that debt, even if it is risky, is more advantageous than equity
because issuance of debt is less attractive to inferior rms (rms with relative lower total
assets and market capitalization). The advantage of debt arises from the fact that it can
keep unprotable rms out of the market, thus improving the average quality of rms in
the market, as is also mentioned by Myers and Majluf (1984). This advantage exists even
if the rms cannot be perfectly sorted in the signaling equilibrium. The following gure 4.3
illustrates how managerial announcements change leverage, typically signalling information
about the value of the rm. The gure shows that at a given original state of the rm,
with debt to equity ratio, (D=E), the insider forecasted decision will aect the debt ratio
depending on the nature of the decision made. When an insider has a revised forecast
decision that gives good news (increase in value of the rm), it gives the scenario where the
rm has the highest debt to equity, D=E1 ratio. While for the revised decision that gives the
bad news (expected losses by the rm), the rms debt to equity ratio is the lowest, D=E2:
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forecast at t=1 (bad news)
Figure 4.3: Asymmetric information and managerial signaling through
capital structure. Source: Ideas from Myers and Majluf (1984)
4.2.5 Miller and Modigliani (MM) theories of capital structure
Modigliani and Miller (1958) established the foundation of capital structure theory. They
demonstrated that in a market of fully informed investors (no taxes, and risk-free debt), the
value of a rm and in particular, its equity value, is determined without regard to the rm's
capital structure. In general, we would expect the market to place very heavy weighting on
current and recent past earnings in forming expectations as to future returns. Hence if the
owners of a rm discover a major investment opportunity which they feel would yield much
more than the cost of capital, they might well prefer not to nance it through common stock
at the then ruling price, because this price may fail to capitalize the new venture.
Miller and Modigliani (MM) assumed that a rm can separate the investing (capital
budgeting) decision from the nancing decision. The nancing decision seeks to increase the
value of the rm by selecting the best borrowing pattern for the rm. MM's rst proposition
assumes no taxes and concludes that capital structure is irrelevant. This rst proposition
indicates that it does not matter how the rm nances its operations since the value of
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the rm remains unchanged and is based only on the investing choices of the rm. A zero
dividend growth valuation model illustrates the intuition behind and the implications of
this MM's rst proposition. Thus, if the cost of capital is unchanged and cash ows are
unchanged, then the value of the rm is unchanged, (Diamond, D. et.al.,2000).
4.2.5.1 The cost of capital MM's second proposition suggests that the rm's cost of
equity (Re) is a function of the required return on the rm's assets, weighted average cost of
capital (WACC):We represent it, using ideas from Wachowicz and Horne (2004) in equation
(4.1) by RA, the cost of debt which also is related to the interest rate (Rd) and the debt (D)
to equity (E) ratio.
Re = RA + (RA  Rd) (D
E
) (4.1)
Equation (4.1) indicates that in the nancial market scenario without taxes, theWACC;
i.e. (RA) is simply the weighted average of the cost of debt and the cost of equity. We
illustrate this equation in Figure 4.4(a), which shows the relationship of a rm's assets
weighted average cost of capital (WACC) or (RA), the cost of debt (Rd) and the debt (D)
to equity (E) ratio.
Debt-equity ratio, D/E
Cost of capital
WACC = RA
Rd
Re = RA + (RA –Rd ) x (D/E)
Figure 4.4 (a): Cost of capital on debt issuance
We note from the above graph that if a rm has no debt to issue, then the equity investor
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will require only Re; the cost of equity which depends on the business risk. As the rm uses
debt, the equity cost increases due to the nancial leverage risk premium. The graph shows
that the cost of capital Re of a rm increases in proportion to the debt to equity ratio (
D
E
).
The debt adds value to the rm due to the interest deductibility (assume taxes only).
MM's second theory introduces corporate taxes. In this case, MM concludes, in Proposi-
tion I, that the optimal capital structure is 100% debt. Therefore, Figure 4(a) above, shows
the MM theory without corporate taxes (the irrelevance of the model) where the cost of eq-
uity (Re) rises in a prescribed manner to oset the lower cost of debt Rd producing WACC
that remains unchanged by the use of nancial leverage.
4.2.5.2 The value of rm (levered, (VL) and all equity, (VU)). As the use of debt
nancing is increased, the cost of equity will rise; and so even if the earnings per share ratio
is increased through the use of debt nancing, that benet is oset by a higher discount
rate. Hence, from a shareholder wealth perspective, under the MM assumptions, nancing
strategy is irrelevant and because interest payments are tax-deductible, the value of a levered
rm (VL) increases with debt. Thus if taxes exist and interest expenses remain deductible,
then debt adds value to the rm due to the tax shield. IfWACC remains the same regardless
of the nancial strategy used by the rm: VL = VU ; is the value of an all-equity rm and
nancial strategy is irrelevant.
VL = VU + TC B (4.2)
where TC is the corporate tax rate, B is the debt issued and hence (TC  B) represents
the tax shield.
VL = VU + PV (Taxshield) (4.3)
The present value (PV ) of the tax-shield can be calculated as shown below. In a simple
case, we assume that the rm has 100% likelihood of using the income deduction, all the
variables are constant, the interest shield rD is the same as the cost of debt or the discount,
Rd and the rm will renew the debt forever (the tax shield will last forever). With these
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assumptions the value of the tax shield is as shown, with ideas from Wachowicz and Horne
(2004) in equation 4.4.
PV (Taxshield) =
rDDC
rD
= DC (4.4)
where D is the dollar value of debt, rD is the interest shield or also equal to the cost
of debt and C is the corporate tax rate. The impact of these on the value of the rm, V;
when without issue of debt, VU , and with funds from issued debt VL, can be illustrated in
a graphical form as shown in Figure 4.4(b) below. The gure shows that the actual value of
the rm depends on the tax shield and the debt issued. The value of the rm at any given
time will be VU ; when there is no debt issued. This value then rises till an optimal debt, B

is issued; then a decrease in the rm's value is observed due to the nancial distress costs.
Debt (B)
Value of firm (V)
0
Present value of tax
shield on debt
Present value of
financial distress costs
Value of firm under
MM with corporate
taxes and debt
VL = VU + TCB
V = Actual value of firm
VU = Value of firm with no debt
B*
Maximum
firm value
Optimal amount of debt
Figure 4.4 (b): Relationship between the value of the rm and debt issuance;
Source : Wachowicz and Horne (2004)
MM implies that when the equity is underpriced, asymmetric information makes retained
earnings and debt better nancing tools than new equity as also illustrated by DeMarzo
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(1988). DeMarzo (1988) does not discuss the potential implications of bankruptcy in their
asymmetric information scenario. The larger a project's unrecognized NPV, the higher will
be that limit, with all else equal. Firms with a higher level of unrecognized NPV will have
more incentive to issue debt rather than new equity. In the Myers and Majluf (1984) model,
managers will pass up positive NPV investments if the equity necessary to nance them is
suciently underpriced by the market. Therefore, the decision to issue equity and invest
will convey negative information to the market and the price will drop at the announcement.
Myers and Majluf suggest that the under-investment problem can be avoided by issuing
a security with less risk, a security that is less sensitive to mispricing (riskless debt, for
example, cannot be mispriced). Given the under-investment problem, capital structure is
driven by a hierarchy of preferences, or a pecking order discussed in an earlier subsection,
for the issuance of new capital. Therefore this theory also shows that managers will prefer
internal funding (or riskless debt) to risky debt, which, in turn, they prefer to equity.
4.2.6 Static trade-o theory
The Static trade-o model (predating the 1980s) | this include studies by Jensen and
Meckling (1976) and Titman et.al.(1988) | does not incorporate information asymmetry.
In reality, information asymmetry exists between corporate managers and outsiders. The
static trade-o theory, which focuses on the benets and costs of issuing debt, predicts that
an optimal target nancial debt ratio exists, which maximizes the value of the rm. The
optimal point can be attained when the marginal value of the benets associated with debt
issues exactly osets the increase in the present value of the costs associated with issuing
more debt (Myers, 1984).
The high leverage observed for banks is closely related to what makes banks more special
than rms in other industries. Unlike non-nancial rms, banks' liabilities (e.g. demand
deposits) are used as money and are as a safe store of savings (e.g. certicates of deposit)
that can be called on at short notice. More recently, other types of bank liabilities, for
example, asset-backed securities, have served as collateral for a host of nancial transactions.
This high leverage presents the most important challenge to the trade-o theory. It suggests
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that rms prefer to use retained earnings to external nance, and that when external funds
are required, debt is preferred to new equity (Myers and Majluf, 1984).
Figure 4.5 below illustrates the impact of rm's cost of equity Re and debt Rd on MM
with corporate taxes. The cost of equity rises throughout as more debt is added. The cost
of debt rises at higher levels of debt and WACC falls initially because the benets of the
tax-deductibility of interest expense outweigh the marginal increases in component costs;
however, at higher levels of debt, the tax-advantage of debt is oset and the value of the
rm falls when WACC starts to rise.
Debt/Equity rat io
% cost of source
of capital
R0
Optimal
D/E
0
WACC, first it decreases but
eventually increases with D/E
WACC is minimized at the
“optimal”D/E ratio.  Here, the
value of the firm V L is maximized
RE, the firm’s cost of
equity, always
increasing with D/E
RD
Figure 4.5: Cost of capital on debt issuance, under static trade-o theory; Source: Wachowicz
and Horne (2004)
We can conclude from gure 4.5 above that WACC is minimized at the optimal debt-
to-equity ratio. The bonds are almost risk-free at low debt levels and that Rd is independent
on leverage, while Re increases linearly with debt-equity ratios; and the increase in expected
return reects increased risk. As rms borrow more, the risk of default rises and Rd starts
to increase while Re increases more slowly (because the holders of risky debt bear some of
the rm's business risk). The minimum WACC occurs where the stock price is maximized.
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Thus, the same capital structure that maximizes stock price also minimizes the WACC.
This arms the statement "trade-o theory is that theory of capital structure based on a
trade-o between tax savings and distress costs of debt and pecking order theory" is the
theory where rms prefer to issue debt rather than equity if internal nance is insucient.
Therefore the theory has been described to be static rather than dynamic with the taxes
and contracting cost driving the rm value, Wachowicz and Horne, (2004). We can also note
that optimal trade-o between cost of issuances will often be a benet of capital structure.
Then, the large, stable protable rms will always have more debt, and the higher the costs
of distress the lower debt to be issued. Finally, the lower the taxes, the lower the debt and
the less (more) favorable tax treatment of debt (equity), the lower debt.
4.2.7 Financing decisions
The nal capital structure adopted by banks is a function of the variables that theoretical
models suggest they should be important. These include operating risk, bank size, asset
composition and liquidity considerations. There are three nancing methods that companies
use: debt, equity, and hybrid securities.
Assuming that the primary nancial goal of managers in a bank is shareholder wealth
maximization, this translates to maximizing stock price. The value of any asset is the present
value of the cash ow stream to owners. Most signicant nancing decisions are evaluated
in terms of their nancial consequences. Stock prices change over time as conditions change
and as investors obtain new information about a company's prospects. In equilibrium, a
stock's price should equal its \true" or intrinsic value. Intrinsic value is a long-term concept.
To the extent that investor perceptions are incorrect, a stock's price in the short run may
deviate from its intrinsic value.
4.2.8 Debt nancing
Debt nancing ranges from simple bank debt to commercial paper and corporate bonds. It is
a contractual arrangement between a company and an investor, whereby the company pays
a predetermined claim (or interest) that is not a function of its operating performance, but
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which is treated in accounting standards as an expense for tax purposes and is therefore tax-
deductible. The debt has a xed life and has a priority claim on cash ows in both operating
periods and bankruptcy. This is because interest is paid before the claims to equity holders.
If the company defaults on interest payments, it will be declared bankrupt; its assets will be
sold, and the amount owed to debt holders will be paid before any payments are made to
equity holders. The basic feature of a debt is that it is a promise by the borrowing rm to
repay a xed amount of cash by a certain date, Dewatripont and Jean (1994). The sources
of funding is through debt issues which comes in the form of bond issues or long-term notes
payable. Short-term debt such as working capital requirements is also considered to be part
of the capital structure. Figure 4.6 below shows the trend of the amount raised from debt
issued by the top US banks (ranked by total assets). We realize that the banks have raised
largest amounts through issue of debt. Citibank showed itself to be the greatest beneciary
of debt issuance where it raised the highest total of $240.5 billion till 2007, and its lowest
total of $57 billion in the rst part of 2012. JP Morgan reported highest amounts as from
2008 till 2012. There has been an upward trend in debt issues for the top banks. There is
also a clear picture that debt issuance was lowest in 1999 -2000 period which could be due to
the eects of the dot.com bubble. From 2001 we note an increasing trend with a drop seen
in 2008 and a recent decline as from 2010 to date, which can be attributed to the nancial
crisis.
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Figure 4.6: Amount raised from debt issuance; Source: Bloomberg
4.2.9 Equity nancing
Like other rms, banks' decisions to issue securities are driven by the need for funding.
The choice of instruments is made after taking into account a number of factors which
include: bankruptcy costs, agency costs and taxes. In addition, since a bank's liability
structure is regulated through capital adequacy standards, the issuance of debt and equity
instruments may also be aected by the eligibility of these instruments as components of
regulatory capital. Bank capital regulation supports equity issuance by requiring a minimum
amount of common Tier 1 equity, while it only allows the use of a limited amount of bonds.
Since banks need to meet the capital requirements on an ongoing basis and their ratings
and funding costs are increasingly risk-sensitive under restricted deposit insurance, banks
typically choose to hold a buer above the minimum Tier 1 requirement12. This is the case
even though equity issuance is more expensive than bond issuance.
Equity nancing includes owners' equity, venture capital (equity capital provided to a
private rm in exchange for a share ownership of the rm), common equity, and warrants
12The Tier 1 ratios of major international banks are typically 6%-12%.
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(the right to buy a share of stock in a company at a xed price during the life of the warrant).
Unlike debt, equity nancing is permanent in the company, its claim is residual and does
not create a tax advantage from its payments as dividends are paid after interest and tax;
it does not have priority in bankruptcy, and it provides management control for the owner.
US banks have raised funds through equity which is classied as common stock, preferred
stock or retained earnings. Figure 7 below shows that the top US banks had an interesting
equity issuance trend. Morgan Stanley is the top performing bank that depends on equity
issuance where it raised a high of $32.5 billion in 2010; its lowest was $6 billion in rst half
of 2012. High amounts were raised between 1999-2001 and between 2009-2012. This could
be due to the eorts that the American government made to counter the crises in 2000 and
2008.
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Figure 4.7: Amount raised from Equity issuance; Source: Bloomberg
There was an interesting trend of how the stock price and intrinsic value changed before
the nancial crisis in 2008 as shown in Figure 4.8 below. It can be seen that the stock was
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over valued during periods: 1988-1995 and 2003-2008. The gure shows a bank's actual
price and intrinsic value as estimated by its bank management over time, (Brigham and
Houston, 2009). We note from the gure that the intrinsic value rises because the bank
retains and reinvests earnings each year, which tends to increase prots. The intrinsic value
jumped dramatically in 2003, when a research and development (R&D) breakthrough raised
the management's estimate of future prots before investors had the information. The actual
stock price tended to uctuate with the estimated intrinsic value; but investor optimism and
pessimism, along with imperfect knowledge about the true intrinsic value, led to deviations
between the actual prices and intrinsic values.
Figure 4.8: Stock Prices and Intrinsic Values before 2008 nancial
crisis; Source; Brigham and Houston (2009)
Maximizing the intrinsic value will maximize the average price in the long run, but not
necessarily the current price at any time. The management might make an investment that
lowers prots for the current year but raises expected future prots. If investors are not
aware of the true situation, the stock price will be held down by the low current prot even
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though the intrinsic value was actually raised.
4.2.9.1 Hybrid Securities Hybrid Securities are securities that share some characteris-
tics with both debt and equity. They include, for example, convertible securities (dened as
debt that can be converted into equity at a prespecied date and conversion rate), preferred
stock, and option-linked bonds. MM demonstrated that, under a certain set of assumptions,
the choice between any of these securities (referred to as capital structure or leverage) is not
relevant to a company's valuation. The assumptions include: no taxes, no costs of nancial
distress, perfect capital markets, no interest rate dierentials, no agency costs (rationality),
and no transaction costs. These assumptions are, in fact, the main drivers of capital structure
and gave rise to the trade-o theory of leverage.
4.2.10 Capital Structure and the bank asset value
We use (Myers and Majluf, 1984) to consider the bank asset value in relation to relation
to capital structure. We start by assuming a \perfect world" status of the banks, based
on the work of MM which shows that capital structure is irrelevant. MM rst proposition
13 is based on the assumption of perfect capital markets. Perfect capital markets include
characteristics such as no taxes, no transactions costs and that the lending and borrowing
rate are the same.
Market imperfections include tax (US Tax Code):
Deductibility of interest leads to lower cost of debt (Rd(1   t)). Simple specication
overvalues benet and ignores personal taxes which decreases investors debt return and in-
creases investors preference for equity. We also have contracting costs such that in imperfect
markets, alternative ways to contract optimal behavior are necessary. The costs of nancial
distress will imply underinvestment (rejecting NPV > 0 projects). The benets of debt in-
clude monitoring function, managing free cash ow problem (accepting NPV < 0 projects).
Hence contracting costs and taxes are primary motives for static trade o theory debt as
mentioned earlier.
13Proposition I: The market value of any rm is independent of its capital structure.We note that value is
derived from market imperfections.
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Capital Structure is irrelevant according to MM's rst proposition. The best way to
understand how capital structure creates value is to consider the nancial market where
capital structure does not create value. If this was true we would see random patterns of
nancing across banks. We would have a bank considering issuing debt and at the same
ensuring that little eect is felt by the shareholders. In this case the assumption is such that
if the bank issues debt, they will buy back an equivalent amount of stock. Therefore, it means
that any change in capital structure will also aect the bank's investment opportunities. This
is a key motivation on what decision the bank considers to raise funds.
4.3 RESEARCH ON CAPITAL STRUCTURE
Capital structure has been considered by many other researchers since the work of Modigliani
and Miller, (1958). Capital structure research can be divided into two major groups:
(a) Studies done to consider the determinants of capital structure and thus the motivating
factors for the rms to have capital structure decisions. Subsequent researchers have
systematically examined the eects of relaxing various conditions determining capital
structures.
(b) The second group has covered the theories explaining capital structures. Despite in-
evitable dierences of opinion among researchers in this second category, the current
consensus is that the empirical evidence is consistent with the trade-o model in which
rms choose a target leverage ratio to which they actively adjust over some period of
time.
Furthermore, alternative views in which rm managers make nancing decisions with
little or no thought of hitting a target leverage ratio have received little empirical support
to date. But even its proponents recognize that the standard model has limited power to
explain rm capital structure decisions for the last 50 years.
The works of Baxter and Cragg (1970), may be regarded as the rst empirical studies
that directly investigated the debt-equity nancing decision. They found that banks which
are small, that have high price-to-earning ratios and have high leverage, are more likely to
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issue equity. However, their evidence on coverage ratios14 and risk was weak, conicting
and non-signicant. It is also worth noting that Martin and Scott (1974) found that a
high payout, low protability and a high proportion of xed assets, all tended to indicate a
debt issue. They also found in their study of UK rms that market conditions play a highly
signicant role in determining the probability that a rm will issue debt, thus indicating that
equity issues are more likely to follow market rises, as they will also tend to follow periods of
unusually high residual returns on the bank's shares. These studies provided evidence that
companies appear to make their choice of nancing instrument as if they have target levels
of debt in mind. The results are consistent with the notion that these target debt levels are
themselves a function of company size, bankruptcy risk and asset composition.
In addition, Marsh (1982) did an empirical study of security issued by UK companies
between 1959 and 1974 focusing on how companies select between nancing instruments at
a given point in time. This showed that UK companies are heavily inuenced by market
conditions and the past history of security prices in choosing between debt and equity.
On the whole, the empirical studies have identied a general tendency to try to determine
and maintain a well dened long-term target debt level, of course the pattern displayed by
the actual debt level over time is not steady in the short-run, but uctuates around the
target level in response to timing considerations and capital markets conditions. It is in fact
expensive to retire either debt or equity once issued.
Titman and Wessels (1988) analyzed the explanatory power of some of the recent theories
of optimal capital structure. Their study extended empirical work on capital structure theory
in three ways. First, it examined a much broader set of capital structure theories (eect on
debt ratios arising from non-debt tax shields, volatility, collateral value, or future growth
of a rm), many of which had not previously been analyzed empirically. Second, since the
theories had dierent empirical implications in regard to dierent types of debt instruments,
the authors analyzed measures of short-term, long-term, and convertible debt rather than
an aggregate measure of total debt. Third, their study used a factor-analytic technique that
mitigates the measurement problems encountered when working with proxy variables. Their
14This is a measure of a company's ability to meet its nancial obligations. The higher the coverage ratio,
the better the ability of the enterprise to fulll its obligations to its lenders.
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results suggested that rms with unique or specialized products have relatively low debt
ratios. They also found that smaller rms tend to use signicantly more short-term debt
than larger rms. Their model explained virtually none of the variation in convertible debt
ratios across rms and found no evidence to support theoretical work that predicted that
debt ratios are related to a rm's expected growth, non-debt tax shields, volatility, or the
collateral value of its assets. However, they found some support for the proposition that
protable rms had relatively less debt relative to the market value of their equity.
The impact of equity issuance was considered by Korajczyk et al. (1991) who found
that a rm's stock price experiences signicant abnormal rises on average prior to its issuing
equity. In addition, they found that equity issues are clustered after earnings announcements
and that the extent of the price drop at the announcement increases insignicantly with time.
Close to our US sample data study, is the work by Rajan and Zingales (1995) who inves-
tigated the determinants of capital structure choice by analyzing the nancing decisions of
public rms in the major industrialized countries. They found that the factors identied by
previous studies | protability, leverage target ratios, debt ratio and bank specic charac-
teristics are as important in determining the cross-section of capital structure in U.S.rms
as they aect the rm leverage in other countries as well. Despite all the interest ndings,
banks and nancial institutions were not included in their sample.
In addition to earlier works on the Static Trade-o Theory and the Pecking Order Theory
(Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984), Andrew (2003) also considered the "trade-o" and
"pecking order" theories. These two theories could be the most inuential approaches to
understanding rms' capital structure decisions. The paper adopts two approaches to exam-
ining capital structures using rm-level panel data for rms in both Spain and the United
Kingdom. First, he examines debt ratios and nds them to be decreasing in cash ow or
protability and increasing in the investment. The results are consistent with the pecking
order approach and generally inconsistent with the trade-o approach suggesting behaviour
consistent with the existence of a hierarchy of nance faced by rms in Spain and the United
Kingdom. Although he considers the aspects of the two dierent nancial systems such that
they nd some modest evidence for the Spain based rms. They note that the bank-based
nancial system, has some evidence that the eects of debt ratio are weaker for larger rms
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and for rms with equity held by nancial institutions. While for the United Kingdom, a
market-based nancial system, they found the tendency to issue debt is compared to that
for issuing new equity and found to be more sensitive to nancial characteristics of the UK
based rms.
Panno (2003) investigated the empirical determinants of capital structure decisions of
rms, and tried to provide some contributions that help to ll the existing gap between
theory and empirical evidence. Their article included a descriptive model of the choice
between equity and long-term debt for rms based in UK and Italy. He found that rms
in both countries were able to allow their gearing ratios to vary signicantly around the
target ratio. These ndings suggest that rms do not identify a strict, single optimal capital
structure ratio as such, but rather a range over which their capital structures are allowed to
vary.
Frank and Goyal (2004) examined the relative importance of factors in the leverage
decisions of publicly-traded U.S. rms from 1950 to 2000. They considered the most reliable
factors that were median industry leverage that would give a positive eect on leverage;
market-to-book ratios that would have a negative eect on leverage; the collateral that has
a positive eect; rm prots which would have negative eects on leverage; dividend paying
which would have positive eects; rm size measured by the natural logarithm of total assets,
would have positive eects and expected ination would also have a positive eect. They
nd that shocks to equity value are followed by osetting actions in the debt market.
Halov and Heider (2005) advanced a new version of the pecking order theory. They
argued that when there is greater asymmetric information about risk than bank asset value,
debt is characterized by a more severe adverse selection problem and hence rms would only
issue equity. They showed that as asset volatility increases, rms use equity rather than debt
to nance their decits. Thus, the conventional pecking order may be more appropriate in
explaining the nancing behaviour of mature rms15 as these may have more asymmetric
information about value. Kayhan and Titman (2007), in showing that rms behave as if they
15Mature rm also called mature company is a company at the stage in its life cycle when it grows at the
rate of the economy at large. This is marked by earnings growth (or shrinkage) in line with most of the
rest of the economy. Mature companies often pay higher dividends than those in a growth industry or a
transition industry.
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have a target debt ratio, provided further literature on determinants of capital structure.
Their evidence suggested that the need for investment, cash ows, and stock returns lead to
transitory deviations from leverage targets, but rms gradually undo these deviations.
Antonios et al.(2008) in their paper aimed at investigating the determinants of choice
between private and public debt for British and German listed companies. They found out
the presence of a few similarities in the debt-mix structure of German and British rms.
Although they are closer to the objective of our study, they did not look at equity as source
of funding for the rms.
Reint and Florian (2010) in their paper, "The Determinants of Bank Capital Structure"
use large U.S. and European banks data during the period 1991 to 2004 to show that mis-
priced deposit insurance and capital regulation were not the main determinants of capital
structure. They found that the individual bank characteristics are ultimately the most im-
portant determinant of a bank's capital structure and that a bank's leverage converges to a
target set for an individual or specic bank and that will be consistent for a long period of
time. They failed, however to address the capital structure decision | the choice of nancing
a bank will prefer to raise funds.
4.4 MODEL SPECIFICATION
The most inuential model16 we consider in this study is Stewart Myers's pecking-order
model, in which rms nance investments out of cash whenever possible, sell debt only if
cash ows are too low, and sell new equity only as a last resort. According to this view,
a rm's leverage ratio increases when its cash ows drop and it is compelled to issue new
16An alternative model would have been Dynamic Trade o model. The limits of the Dynamic Tradeo
Model. The empirical importance of industry eects and of other variables that might be interpreted in ways
that have little to do with a tradeo between tax savings and the costs of nancial distress, for example,
rm size, rm protability, or market-to-book value, limits our condence in the dynamic tradeo model.
Furthermore, in a capital structure literature, Lemmon, M.L., et.al.(2008), it is highlighted the limited
explanatory power of the model. Lemmon and his co-authors found that, even including industry eects,
the traditional model explains, at most, 30 percent of the variation in rms' capital structures; an economist
would say that the model has limited power to explain the data. Perhaps more important, Lemmon and his
co-authors nd that rm xed eects have a lot more explanatory power than all of the traditional factors
put together. A xed eect is a persistent factor associated with a particular rm: We know it's there, and
we know that it helps explain the rm's choice of capital structure; we just don't know what it is.
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debt17 to nance expenditure, and its leverage ratio declines when cash ows increase and
internal funds build up. In contrast to the assumption of trade-o models, a rm manager
in a pecking-order type world will make no attempt to actively adjust toward some target.
A descriptive model of the choice between equity and long-term debt is developed. The
coecients of the model are estimated using Logit analysis.
The model
We noted earlier that banks may decide both to raise short-term debt and thus draw
down liquid funds or sell new long-term securities when faced with the need of raising funds.
In this study, we attempt to model the choice the bank would make between equity and
debt issuance. This will cover especially those cases in which banks resort to the long-term
capital market. Since past empirical investigations seen in section 4.3 above, have shown
that in several instances the sales of debt and stocks tend to occur at discrete intervals and
in relatively large amounts, the actual choice of instrument is of great interest.
Beginning with Titman and Wessels (1988), then Rajan and Zingales (1995) and more
recently Frank and Goyal (2004), the empirical corporate nance literature has converged
to a limited set of variables that are reliably related to the leverage of non-nancial rms.
Leverage is positively correlated with size and collateral, and is negatively correlated with
prots, market-to-book ratio and dividends. The variables and their relation to leverage
can be traced to various corporate nance theories on departures from the Modigliani-Miller
irrelevance proposition.
Reint and Florian (2010), who looked at the determinants of capital structure only
consider the following standard capital structure regression:
Lict= b0+b1MTBict 1+b2 Pr of ict 1+b3Ln( Si zeict 1) + b4Collict 1+b5Divict+cc+ct+uict
(4.5)
17Debt in this case is used to represent the bonds, collateralised loans and obligations, asset backed
securities, mortgages and mortgage loans.
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Their explanatory variables are the market-to-book ratio (MTB), protability (Prof),
the natural logarithm of size (Size), collateral (Coll) (all lagged by one year) and a dummy
for dividend payers (Div) for bank i in country c in year t. The regression model they used
included time and country xed eects (ct and cc) to account for unobserved heterogeneity
at the country level and across time that may be correlated with the explanatory variables.
They found that the standard errors are clustered at the bank level to account for het-
eroscedasticity and serial correlation of errors as also indicated by Petersen, 2009. Although
Reint and Florian (2010) dened the dependent variable as one minus the ratio of equity
over assets in market values which therefore includes both debt and non-debt liabilities such
as deposits; this model could only explain adequately the factors that inuence the capital
structure but it fails to give a reason for the possible choice of either equity or debt. Hence
the need for binary model.
To control for potential heteroscedasticity problems the variables are deated by the
book value of total assets in accordance with Bevan and Danbolt (2000 and 2002). This
study also uses White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance
for mitigating heteroscedasticity in calculating the t-statistics. Rajan and Zingales (1995)
estimated their regression by using maximum likelihood and a censored Tobit model. They
argue that the ordinary least square (OLS) results are very similar to those results that are
obtained using the alternative techniques. Bevan and Danbolt (2002) have conrmed these
ndings. As a result, we consider a dierent model from the common one used and discussed
in previous studies.
Following the model ideas of Panno (2003) and De Jong et.al. (2011), we construct a
binary model in such a way that it assumes the choice the banks make in the equity or debt
issuance. The main assumption is such that bank j will only issue one type of fund source
(either debt or equity) at a given point in time. This characterization may at rst appear
not completely realistic, since in principle banks might be willing (for various reasons) to
issue both debt and equity at the same time. The decision to opt for a binary choice is to
model the bank's nancing decision, which relies on the necessity to dierentiate between
those banks that decided to resort to a particular nancing option (say debt) from those
which opted for the other nancing instrument (say equity). This also helps to gain some
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indication of the factors that could account for the particular decision they made.
Furthermore, before making the nancing decision, the logistic model does not rule out
the possibility that a bank which has just raised funds by issuing one nancial instrument,
can decide to issue other nancial instrument. In the sample, there are banks that for the
same year appear in both sides of the sample (debt and equity) indicating that they have
made an issue of both debt and equity in the same year being considered, De Jong et.al.
(2011).
Therefore we assume that a bank's choice of nancing instrument will depend on a well
dened set of characteristic variables. We consider the banks' debt ratios. Theory predicts
that the composition of debt will depend on the bank's size, asset composition18 and forecasts
about future economic performances. Hence the explanatory variables in the model include
liquidity variables, protability variables and market condition variables. We will designate
these variables for each bank j; at time lag t   1; as a vector x

jt 1. A signicant role in
the debt/equity choice played by these variables have been supported by both theory and
previous empirical evidence.
Analytically, we assume that a bank's choice of nancing instrument is a function of debt
ratio in the following way
drjt = B

0x
jt 1
+ ujt 1 (4.6)
where drjt is the bank j
0s desired debt ratio at time t, x

jt 1 is a vector of bank char-
acteristics that include bank specic characteristics, Bs; dividend policy factors, Dp; and
investment policy factors, Ip. These factors are related to the nancing decision the bank
would make at any given time t   1, B

0 is the corresponding vector of coecients, (i; j
and k ) and ujt 1 is a stochastic error term. The general linear model in equation 4.5 can
also be written as:
Yi;t = +
5X
i=1
i Bsi;t 1 +
2X
j=1
j Dpj;t 1 +
2X
k=1
k Ipk;t 1 (4.7)
18Asset composition can be dened as the proportion of the dierent nancial instruments held by the
bank in the total value of its assets.
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In the above equation, all explanatory variables are lagged one period to avoid potential
problems of endogeneity. We assume a linear model for the variables to be as in equation
(4.5) above and then consider the binary choice model such that we have Pr(Zjt = 1), the
probability that bank j will issue debt at time t given that it will make an issue of either
equity or debt, Panno (2003). Hence equation (4.5) then becomes
Pr(Zjt = 1) = Pr(B

0x
jt 1
+ ujt 1 < 0) (4.8)
In this case if we look at a random sample composed of n banks at time t, and suppose
that the rst i issue equity while the remaining n  i issue debt, the logarithmic likelihood
function can be characterized as
iX
j=1
loge[Pr(B
0x
jt
+ ujt < 0)] +
nX
j=i+1
loge[1  Pr(B
0x
jt
+ ujt < 0)] (4.9)
The value of this likelihood function depends on the vector of parameters B

0. The vector
of maximum likelihood estimators B^0, which we are interested in, is obtained by estimating
the parameters B

0 using the Logit model (or, with another transformation, the Probit model).
The relationship between the dependent variable Zi and the probability p that a bank
records a debt issuance activity over a period of one year is given by:
p = Pr(Zi = 1 j Bsi; Dpj; Ipk; i ; j ; k ) =
eZi
1 + eZi
=
1
1 + e Zi
: (4.10)
In specifying the relationship between Z; and X , we can write the Logit model by
considering the following Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) for the Logit model:
Pr(Zjt = 1 j Xk ) =
exp(+
5P
i=1
i Bsi;t 1 +
2P
j=1
j Dpj;t 1 +
2P
k=1
k Ipk;t 1)
1 + exp(+
5P
i=1
i Bsi;t 1 +
2P
j=1
j Dpj;t 1 +
2P
k=1
k Ipk;t 1)
(4.11)
where if bank i, i = 1; 2:::; n issued debt over the period under consideration, Zi = 1,
otherwise Zi = 0 and Zi is assumed to depend on the j observable variables described above,
represented by x

jt.
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The Logit and Probit models above provide a way of quantifying the relationship be-
tween the characteristics of the banks and the probability of issuing one of the two nancing
instruments, Panno (2003). In this model, Z (the dependent binary random variable) repre-
sents a two-way option of the issue of either equity or debt. When debt is issued, Z equals 1
whereas when equity is issued Z equals 0. Thus the interesting analysis will be based on the
value of the parameter P , the probability that Z equals 1 or P = P (Z = 1): Z is assumed
to depend on the observable variables.
4.5 DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES
We divide the explanatory variables into four groups. The rst group consists of variables
that measure deviations from target debt levels. These variables, which include the bank
dividend policy, give an idea about the importance of target debt levels in capital structure
decisions (if for example an optimal capital structure is in some ways pursued by banks). For
the target debt ratio, simple estimates were used, such as historical averages together with a
second group of variables. This in addition to the leverage variables form our second group
of variables. They are used in this model and have the sole function to act as proxies for
the target ratios. The third class of variables include bank size, risk and asset composition.
They are selected based either on theoretical grounds, Myers and Majluf (1984), or because
previous empirical studies claim they are important determinants of debt ratios; Rajan and
Zingales (1995), Bunn and Young (2004), Reint and Florian (2010). We introduce the last
class of variables in order to test other possible relevant determinants of corporate capital
structure. As theory often suggests these group of variables; the role of the protability of
the rm, and other variables such as the payout ratio, the number of directors and the price
earning ratio are considered.
4.5.1 Bank specic characteristics (Bs)
4.5.1.1 Bank size and operation risk We consider the following as proxies for the
debt ratio (leverage); the bank size (measured by total assets), the risk position of the bank
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(measured by the beta) and the asset composition. In the model, bank size is measured
by banks' total assets; we use log total asset as the variable which represents the natural
logarithm of total assets.
The size of the rm should be positively related to the leverage ratio. The rationale for
this theory is the evidence provided by Warner (1977) and Ang et al. (1982). This suggest
that the impact of the direct costs of bankruptcy on borrowing decisions of large banks is
negligible. It is also argued that larger banks are more diversied, have easier access to the
capital markets, and borrow at more favourable interest rates. A further reason for smaller
banks to have lower leverage ratios is that smaller banks are more likely to be liquidated
when they are in nancial distress. We expect a positive relationship between bank size and
the debt (leverage) ratio.
The risk position of a bank is a potentially important determinant in the capital structure
decisions of managers; the leverage ratio should be negatively related to the risks faced by
the rm, as primarily determined by the variability and uncertainty of its sales and costs.
The risk measurement is the beta or systematic risk of the bank, dened as the ratio of
the covariance of the return of the bank with the market, and the variance of return of the
market. A negative relationship is expected between the beta and the nancial leverage.
Risk taking banks will tend to issue equity rather than debt if they are in need of new funds.
The variable in the model is Beta. The higher the proportion of assets in place, the higher
one would expect a bank's long-term debt ratio to be.
A measure of asset composition is also included in the model. This is taken as the ratio
of xed to total assets. However, a high value in the xed to total asset ratio may imply a
low portion of the rm's current asset or in general the more liquid asset with respect to the
long-term stock; this aspect may lead to an opposite relationship between asset composition
and leverage. The variable in the estimation is asset composition.
4.5.1.2 Liquidity Empirical studies that cover dierent time periods, samples of rms,
and countries indicate that a rm's leverage tends to be higher when a rm is larger. Rajan
and Zingales (1995), Bunn and Young (2004), Reint and Florian (2010) all showed that when
a rm has more tangible assets, had its market-to-book ratio | that is, the value of the rm's
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stock divided by the book value of its assets | then its leverage will be always be lower.
These researchers have interpreted these factors as evidence that concerns about nancial
distress play an important role in the rm's capital structure choice. Large rms have more
diversied sources of cash, and thus, they are less likely to face a sudden cash shortfall. A
rm's tangible assets include machines and inventories, assets that could potentially be sold
much more easily than a rm's intangible assets: its trademarks, its reputation for quality,
brand recognition, or the accumulated knowledge of its workforce. In the event of a decline
in cash ows, a rm may be able to avoid default by selling some of its tangible assets. The
market-to-book ratio is often interpreted as a measure of the rm's growth opportunities;
for example, future investment activities that investors see as valuable and, thus, raise the
rm's stock price but which are not yet embodied in assets in place.
Leverage is positively correlated with size and collateral, and is negatively correlated
with prots, market-to-book ratio and dividends. It is important to note that the literature
on what determines banks' target leverage ratios is relatively small, the samples and model
specications are dierent, and not all ndings are consistent, (Flannery M, 1994). We focus
primarily on those results that are consistent across studies and that pertain to leverage
ratios or capital ratios (common equity/assets) measured at market prices.
Liquidity ratios are used mostly to judge a rm's ability to meet its short-term obliga-
tions. The liquidity ratio may have varied eects on the capital structure decision working
in opposite directions. First, rms with higher liquidity ratios might support a relatively
higher debt ratio, due to a greater ability to meet short-term obligations when they fall
due. From these eects one should expect a positive relationship between a rm's liquidity
position and its debt ratio. However, rms with greater liquid assets may use these assets
to nance their investments. If this happens there will be a negative relationship between
the rm's liquidity ratio and its debt ratio.
Moreover, the liquidity of the bank's assets can show the extent to which these assets
can be manipulated by shareholders at the expense of bondholders. As a measure of the
liquidity position of the banks under examination, the `Current Ratio' is tested, dened as
the ratio of current asset to current liabilities, the `Cash Flow Margin' dened as the ratio
of cash inows earned for ordinary operations, plus depreciation, plus tax equalization, plus
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overseas tax, to total sales. In the estimation the variables are respectively named current
ratio and cash ow margin.
4.5.1.3 Protability Myers (1984) pointed out that rms prefer retained earnings to be
their main source of nancing investment (the Pecking Order Theory of capital structure).
The second preference is debt nancing, and last, new equity issues, which might be due
to the signicant transaction costs of issuing new equity. It is suggested that the observed
capital structure of rms will reect their cumulative requirement for external nancing. In
this sense, the protability of a bank gives it the ability to use retained earnings over external
funds and we expect a negative association between the protability of a bank and its debt
ratio.
Another theory, according to MM, maintains that one could also expect a positive rela-
tionship between leverage and protability, essentially because leveraging up increases the
`debt tax shield' and thus the gain from leverage is surely higher for more protable rms
with a higher marginal tax rate. In addition, a highly protable bank will be characterized
by a positive nancial leverage, and this presumably creates an additional incentive to resort
to debt nancing. This interpretation predicts a positive relationship between leverage and
protability. The measure of protability is `Pre-tax Prot Margin', the ratio of pre-tax
prot to total sales, named pre-tax-prot margin in the regression.
4.5.2 Dividend policy variables (Dp)
This describes how much dividends a bank is paying and how the bank chooses to arrange
the actual dividend payment. All dividend payments are payments from the bank to the
shareholder. The variables we consider include: Payout Ratio, included in part because past
literature found it to be a useful discriminator, in part because it could have some explanatory
power in the analysis of the debt-equity issue. If one assumes that banks attempt to minimize
transaction costs in their joint nancing and dividend policy decisions, one could reasonably
expect a positive association between the payout ratio and debt issue. In the regression this
variable is called dividend payout, and is dened as current ordinary dividends divided by
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prot after tax.
The `Number of Directors' instead was thought to be a simple but interesting way to
assess the validity of agency predictions on the agency problem existing between shareholders
and directors. On the one hand, one could expect leverage to be negatively related to
the number of directors, essentially because directors may be pursuing the goal of creating
`nancial empires' so they tend to favour equity issues, which make the bank bigger. On the
other hand, agency theory suggests a positive relationship between leverage and the number
of directors in order to mitigate the conict between shareholders and managers, because
increases in the proportion of the bank nanced by debt increases the managers' share of the
equity, and, this also reduces the `free' cash available to the directors. In the estimation the
variable is number of directors, and accounts for the number of executive and non-executive
directors.
4.5.3 Investment policy (Ip)
The `Reinvested Earnings' variable (retained earning in the model), is an indicator of inter-
nally generated funds. This variable might prove to be interesting in assessing the validity
of the pecking order theory. The last variable, the price/earnings (P/E) ratio (dened as the
ratio of the stock price to earnings per share) is meant to measure the price that investors
are prepared to pay for each dollar earning. With the P/E variable one introduces a timing
and market condition variable in the model, since the P/E ratio is meant to capture the
market assessment of a bank. The P/E ratio variable should identify the tendency for equity
issues to follow periods of strong share price performance. It is referred to as price-earning
ratio.
4.5.4 Sample and data analysis
Our data comes from three sources - Bankscope, Bloomberg and Datastream. We obtain in-
formation about banks' balance sheets and income statements from the Bankscope database
(of the Bureau van Dijk) and Bloomberg database. We then get information about banks'
stock prices and dividends from Thompson Financial's Datastream database and Bloomberg.
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Our sample starts in 2001 and ends in 2011. The starting point of our sample is determined
by data availability in Bankscope. We decided on 2011 as the end point in order to include
the eects of the banks' extensive use of o-balance sheet activities in the run-up to the
Subprime bubble leading to the 2007{09 nancial crisis. We focus only on the largest 135
listed and publicly traded commercial banks and 708 listed and publicly traded bank-holding
companies in the United States, thus the sample consists of 7080 bank-year observations.
Special care has been taken to eliminate the survivorship bias inherent in the Bankscope
database. Bureau van Dijk deletes historical information on banks that no longer exist in
the latest release of this database. For example, the 2011 release of Bankscope does not
contain information on banks that no longer exist in 2011 but did exist in previous years.
We address the survivorship bias in Bankscope by reassembling the panel data set by hand
from individual cross-sections using historical, archived releases of the database and also
comparing with the Bloomberg data. We used the last release of every year from 2001 to
2011 to provide information about banks in that period only. For example, information
about banks in 2001 in our sample comes from the December 2001 release of Bankscope.
This procedure also allows us to quantify the magnitude of the survivorship bias: 12% of
the banks present in 2001 no longer appear in the 2011 release of the Bankscope dataset.
4.5.5 Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.1 provides descriptive statistics for the variables we use in our data. Mean for log.
total assets is 3.92 and the standard deviation is 4.08. Even though we selected only the
largest publicly traded banks, the sample exhibits considerable heterogeneity in the cross-
section. The largest bank in the sample is almost 15 times the size of the smallest. The assets
of banks are typically 4 times as volatile as the prots of the banks (4.08% versus 0.98%).
The cash ow margin of banks is 27.9% of assets, which is more than banks' protability
(15.8% of assets). Banks hold much less retained earning; 1.79 versus 3.92 mean of log total
assets, respectively. We can note that log total equity is 53% of the debt to equity ratio,
while log of total debt is 13.6% of the debt to equity ratio. The range indicates the largest
dierence in amount of equity issued by the banks, which is almost 12 times of the smallest
141
amount. While, the spread for the total debt issued is lower, the largest amount issued
being 10 times the smallest amount. The mean beta is 0.52, which implies that US banking
appears to have been relatively safe, based on the choice of funding for their investment
during the sample period. This matches the earlier nding by Flannery et al. (2008).
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the model, N=708 banks, period 2001 - 2011
Variables Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Range
Bank characteristics
Log. total assets 3.9228 4.0805 0.3171 1.6430 14.6334
Beta 0.5161 0.7894 0.5047 6.6807 9.4797
Current ratio 4.9976 7.6447 2.6844 20.3652 80.5560
Cash ow margin 1.0949 1.9498 1.7915 6.1332 13.3575
Pre-tax prot margin 0.6202 0.9844 -1.4584 49.7760 21.5727
Dividend policy
Price-earning ratio 14.0060 150.6110 14.5809 395.9550 5125.3530
Dividend payout 12.7075 65.2497 0.4865 93.9356 1642.4100
Investment policy
Retained earnings 1.7911 2.6419 1.2790 3.7879 12.1246
Number of directors 12.5339 6.7615 0.0230 3.3202 35.0000
Leverage/Funding
Debt-equity ratio 4.9976 7.6447 2.6844 20.3652 80.5560
Log total equity 2.6686 3.0210 07001 2.4538 12.3463
Log. total debt 0.6813 1.8604 2.9928 11.8692 10.7262
4.6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section we perform the Logit estimation models in equation (4.8) set out above. We
use the data from the 708 US banks sample. Unlike Panno (2003), we would like to include all
the variables mentioned earlier. Table 4.2 shows regression that tested the inuence of asset
composition on the nancing decisions of banks. The variable has positive coecient and
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signicant at 5% and 10% for the Logit and Probit models respectively. This is as expected
where the predicted positive sign displayed shows that the higher the asset composition, the
more likely a company is to issue equity.
Table 4.2: Logit estimation using 708 US banks, period 2001 - 2011
***, **, *as signicance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively
Variables Logit
Bank Specic characteristics (Bs) i Probability
Log. total assets 0.5519

0.0102
Beta 0.1874

0.0318
Current ratio 0.0183

0.0035
Cash ow margin 0.2386

0.0191
Pre-tax prot margin -0.1253

0.0006
Dividend policy (Dp) j
Price-earning ratio 0.0103 0.5922
Dividend payout -0.0925

0.0106
Investment policy (Ip) k
Retained earnings 0.1083

0.0157
Number of directors -0.0031 0.1963
Model Diagnostics
R-squared 0.76926
Adjusted R-squared 0.76891
Table 4.2 above shows that all bank specic variables are signicant. All but protability
variables are positive. This implies that the size, operation risk and leverage of the banks
are determinant factors in bank's choice of nancing sources. The large banks have high
chances of issuing debt which is evident with the 55.19% and 53.18% values from the Logit
and Probit models respectively. This agrees with the theory that smaller banks will choose
to issue equity rather than debt. Hence large banks have better access to nancial markets to
raise long-term debt. The coecients for the beta variable at 18.74% and 14.98% show that
the banks operation risk also favours the banks choice to issue debt although the likelihood
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is less than 50%. This could imply that risk taking banks, as predicted by a great part of
nancial theory, to be more likely to issue equity rather than debt, because of the uncertainty
about the future economic and nancial performance.
We also note that bank leverage coecients (cash ow margin and current ratio) are
positive. This is in support of the positive eect of the liquidity measures on bank's borrowing
decisions. Hence it is consistent with the expectation ability of a bank to meet its short-term
payments. Current ratio are much lower for both models, 1.83% and 1.75% but the cash
ow margin coecient values are much better, 23.86% and 25.71%. This is very much in
support of the banks with a large positive liquidity position to issue debt and have a positive
signal to the nancial markets.
The banks with high protability are expected to issue equity to raise funds. This is
evident by the negative sign of the protability (Pre-tax prot margin) coecient in Table
4.2. The dividend policy variables are expected to have negative signs since they are in
support of the equity issuance by banks. This can be seen from Table 4.2 where the dividend
payout ratio is negative. This means that the banks issuing debt will have a decrease in
dividend payout to the shareholders. Although the coecient of price-earning ratio has a
positive sign it is insignicant for the Logit model while being signicant for Probit model
at 10% signicance level. Thus it cannot be used to draw any meaningful interpretation.
The coecients for the investment policy variables have dierent signs. The retained
earnings have positive signs and the values are 10.83% and 12.29% from the Logit and Probit
models respectively. This means that the US-based banks in our sample are medium-retained
earning banks that are highly-levered and actively use debt in funding the investment project.
The coecient for the number of directors has negative sign implying that more of the bank's
management will favour the issuance of equity than debt.
Although the funding strategies of banks have changed substantially due to the nancial
market crisis, Table 4.2 indicates that US-based banks prefer to issue debt to equity since
most of the banks are large and highly levered. The economic environment prior to the
crisis favoured funding structures that were highly dependent on ample liquidity. When that
liquidity unexpectedly ceased to be available, banks that relied heavily on market funding
were forced to make signicant adjustments, not only to their funding strategies, but also,
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in some cases, to their business models.
4.7 DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE
In the previous section, we considered the factors that will inuence the bank's choice of
funding. Another concept that is much closer to choice of funding is the determinants of
banks capital structure. We now use our sample of the 708 US based banks to examine
the determinants of capital structure by considering the Reint and Florian (2010) standard
capital structure regression model, in equation (4.9). We expect that the determinants of
capital structure will be same as the characteristics that inuence the choice of nancing
instrument chosen by the US banks above.
Lict = '0+'1MTBit 1+'2PROFit 1+'3Ln(sizeit 1)+'4Collit 1+'5Divit 1+ct 1 (4.12)
Where the dependent variable is the market leverage, which is one minus the ratio of
equity over assets in market values. The explanatory variables19 are the market-to-book ratio
(MTB), protability (Prof ), the natural logarithm of total assets (Size), collateral (Coll),
all lagged by one year and a dummy for dividend payers (Div) for bank i in year t. The
regression includes time xed eects (ct) to account for unobserved heterogeneity across time
that may be correlated with the explanatory variables. Standard errors are clustered at the
bank level to account for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of errors. The dependent
variable is one minus the ratio of equity over assets in market values. It therefore includes
both debt and non-debt liabilities such as deposits. The argument for using leverage rather
than debt as the dependent variable is that leverage, unlike debt, is well dened. Leverage
is a structure that increases the sensitivity of equity to the underlying performance of the
bank.
19We follow Frank and Goyal (2004) in our denition of variables; where the Market-to-book ratio (MTB)
= market value of assets/Book value of assets; Prots (Prof) = (pre-tax prot + interest expenses)/book
value of assets; Size = book value of assets; Collateral (Coll) = (total securities + treasury bills + other bills
+ bonds + CDs + cash and due from banks + land and buildings + other tangible assets)/book value of
assets; and Dividend dummy (Div)= one if the bank pays a dividend in a given year.
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We obtain the OLS regression of equation (9) using the panel data of 708 US based banks
obtained from Bankscope database for the period 2001 to 2011. We also add the dummy
for the time xed eects to control for any changes in the variables over the ten years of our
study. We report the coecients column 2 of Table 4.3 below. We compare the coecients
with the results of regressions for non-nancial rms as reported in Rajan and Zingales
(1995) and Frank and Goyal (2004). We note that, when making a comparison with these
standard results, it is important to bear in mind that these studies rst use long-term debt
as the dependent variable and secondly they use much more heterogeneous samples (in size,
sector and other characteristics, Frank and Goyal 2004, Table 1). Although bank's capital
structure is dierent from non-nancial rms' capital structure since it includes deposits, we
facilitate comparisons with non-nancial rms by reporting the result of estimating Equation
(9) (using leverage as the dependent variable) in a sample of rms that are comparable in
size with the banks in our sample. We therefore break down banks' leverage into deposits
and non-deposit liabilities in our robustness analysis.
Table 4.3: Capital structure model with Market leverage as dependent variable;
***,**, * as signicance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively
Variables Capital structure Reint & Gropp Frank & Goyal Rajan & Zingales
model (2010) (2004) (1995)
Market leverage US based Banks Table 5 Table 8 Table 9, US
M-T-BR -0.9861 -0.463 -0.022 -0.08
Prots -0.1254 -0.141 -0.104 -0.60
Log(Size) -0.0188 0.006 0.021 0.03
Collateral 0.4582 -0.003 0.175 0.33
Dividends -0.0964 -0.021 -0.092
Time xed eects Yes Yes
R2 0.8781 0.79 0.29
Adjusted R2 0.8767
where M-T-BR represents market-to-book ratio.
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Table 4.3 above shows the results of estimating equation (4.9). In the rst column are
the results of the our sample consisting of 708 traded banks in the U.S. while column 3
reproduces estimates from Table 5 of Reint and Florian (2010). They considered a sample of
200 largest publicly traded banks in the U.S. and the EU from the Bankscope database from
1991 to 2004. The fourth column reproduces estimates from Table 8 of Frank and Goyal
(2004) and nally we compare with the coecients in the fth column which are reproduced
estimates from Table 9 of Rajan and Zingales (1995).
We can note from Table 4.3 above that all coecients are statistically signicant, with
log(size) being the our only variable that is signicant at one percent level and the rest
at 5% except coecient corresponding to the prots, which is signicant at the 10 percent
level. MTB, PROF and Coll coecients have the same sign as in the standard regressions
of Rajan and Zingales (1995), while for Frank and Goyal (2004) the MTB and PROF are
the only variables that have same signs. We can interpret the results to mean that banks'
leverage depend negatively on MTB, prots, size and dividends, while depends positively on
collateral at xed time eects. We note that the banks with higher market-to-book ratios,
higher prots and pay dividends are expected to hold less capital. This is because they can
be expected to face lower costs of issuing equity. However, the banks in our sample hold
more capital hence their leverage has a positive eect by the collateral. Thus 45.8% of the
banks will have the leverage amount increased due to the issue collateral.
It follows that banks facing a higher cost of issuing equity should be less levered. Ac-
cording to the buer view, the cost of issuing equity is caused by asymmetric information (as
in Myers and Majluf, 1984). Dividend paying banks, with higher prots or higher market-
to-book ratios can therefore be expected to face lower costs of issuing equity because they
either are better known to outsiders, have more nancial slack or can obtain a better price.
The eect of bank size on the extent of buers is ambiguous ex ante. Larger banks may
hold smaller buers if they are better known to the market. Alternatively, large banks may
hold larger buers if they are more complex and, hence, asymmetric information is more
important. The size of buers should also depend on the probability of falling below the
regulatory threshold. If buers are an important determinant of banks' capital structure, we
expect the level of banks' leverage to be positively related to risk. Finally, there is no clear
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prediction on how collateral aects leverage.
4.8 POLICY IMPLICATION
Capital structure dynamics through time might dier signicantly from the predictions of
trade-o theory. Trade-o theory is often presumed, for empirical tests, to predict that
rms have target debt ratios to which leverage reverts over time. But if internal equity is
less costly than external equity, optimal capital structure will be a function of internally-
generated cash-ows and leverage can wander around without a specic target. Debt will
tend to decrease when the rm has an internal cash surplus and increase when it has a cash
decit (the rm faces a trade-o between debt and retained earnings in the rst case, but
between debt and external equity in the second).
The banks in US and worldwide could end up using greater amounts of debt since the
main benet of increased debt is the increased benet from the interest expense as it reduces
taxable income. Interest expense rises and cash ow needs to cover the interest expense also
rise. Banks that are debt issuers become nervous that they will not be able to cover their
nancial responsibilities with respect to the debt they are issuing.
The value of a bank's stock is but one part of the company's total value. The value
of a bank comprises the total value of the bank's capital structure, including debt-holders,
preferred-equity holders and common-equity holders. Since both debt-holders and preferred-
equity holders have rst rights to a bank's value, common-equity holders have last rights to
a bank value, also known as a "residual value".
The cost dierential between internal and external equity suggests that protable banks,
with internal cash, should have less leverage than rms that need external nance (holding
all else constant). If banks lever up until the costs of nancial distress outweigh the tax
advantages of debt, banks with more internal equity will choose lower leverage. Although
the traditional view of a rm's cost of capital is fairly straightforward, our results shows it
has not been the same case for the banks. According to trade-o theory, a rm's cost of
capital is a weighted average of the after-tax cost of debt and the cost of equity, hence the
same could apply for banks. The relative weighting of the two is generally assumed to be
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fairly constant, consistent with the notion that the bank has a target debt ratio.
A consequence of our result is the investment decisions should depend on a bank's internal
cashow. That is, the advantage of internal equity implies that the bank's investment-
to-cash-ow sensitivity should be positive, consistent with empirical evidence (Fazzari, et
al.,1988; Hoshi, et.al, 1991). The size of this eect will depend on whether the rm uses
dividends or repurchases, on corporate and personal taxes. Our results imply that cost of
capital is more complex than suggested by the traditional trade-o model.
We have shown that investment projects undertaken by a bank will involve cash ows
that need to be appropriately discounted. The management always need to consider what
the return the bank will receive on any given alternative investments that bear the same
risks. Hence, proper calculations on the cost of capital that is measured by the opportunity
cost of the funds used in the investments. The banks need to use the found rate of return as
the discount rate to always compute the net present value of the investments. If the banks'
assets have same risk as project evaluated and they are unlevered, then the bank will always
need to use equity cost of capital as the equivalent cost of capital for the project the given
project to be funded.
Banks' investment projects that produce steady cash ows and have easily redeployable
assets that they can use as collateral (e.g. real estate) have high debt ratios. Risky projects
by the banks with little current cash ows, and banks with intangible assets tend to have
low leverage. Banks whose value consists largely of intangible growth options (high market-
to-book ratios and heavy R&D spending) have lower leverage ratios.
The policy indication is that most protable banks tend not to borrow as much, they rely
on internally generated funds. This implies that in absence of neutral taxes and bankruptcy
costs (and other imperfections), a banks asset value is independent of its capital structure
and nancing decisions are irrelevant. However, the current nancial market is dierent since
US taxes paid by banks have mainly been dependent on the debt/equity mix. In the presence
of corporate taxes, with interest expenses being tax deductible, a banks asset value increases
with its debt/equity ratio. Personal taxes favour equity over debt and partially oset the
eect of corporate taxes. Bank asset values may be lost in bankruptcy, and leverage increases
the likelihood. When bankruptcy is costly, there may exist an optimal capital structure with
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a mixture of debt and equity.
4.9 ROBUSTNESS
In this section we present robustness checks on the main results presented above. Firstly,
to account for the choice of the model, we use two dierent robust regressions: GMM and
pooled OLS (see Tables 4.4). Secondly, we have considered the denition of the depen-
dent variable, market leverage. We break down the leverage into deposits and non-deposit
liabilities and check the impact on the results.
4.9.1 Pecking order theory, asymmetric information and bank capital structure
The results for the pooled OLS regressions are shown in column 2 of Table 4.4 below, while
the results for the GMM analysis are shown column 3 of Table 4.4. The new version of
the pecking order may be more appropriate in explaining the nancing behaviour of small,
young and/or high growth rms because these rms may have more asymmetric information
about risk.
The results of pooled OLS regressions show that protability, size, risk and tangibility
variables have signicant inuence on debt issuance. These results are consistent with the
results of xed eect estimation with the exception that risk variable loses its signicance.
Our results are generally robust to time periods, but the signicance of some variables
changes over time. Protability has a persistent and consistent negative relationship with
debt ratios in all periods and under all estimation methods. This conrms the capital
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structure prediction of the pecking order theory in a developed capital market.
Table 4.4: Pooled OLS and GMM coecients;
***,**, * as signicance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively
Debt - Equity by US banks
Explanatory variables Pooled OLS GMM
Asset composition -1.0076 1.2160
Beta 0.0017 0.1425
Current ratio 0.1924

0.0193

Dividend pay out -0.0017 -0.0002

Log total assets 0.5806

0.6172
Number of directors -0.0040

-0.0045

Pre-tax prot -0.0406

0.0013

Price-Earning ratio 0.0001

0.0001
Cash ow margin 0.0257

0.2754

Retained earning 0.1211

0.0144
Time xed eects dummy No Yes
R2 0.78727
Adjusted R2 0.78450
4.9.2 Decomposing leverage
The dependent variable we considered earlier in section 4.6 comprised of market values that
includes both debt and non-debt liabilities such as deposits. We considered using market
leverage rather than debt as the dependent variable since unlike debt, leverage is well dened
(Welch, 2007). We considered leverage as a structure that increases the sensitivity of equity
to the underlying performance of the bank. Welch, 2007, suggests that the nancial-debt-
to-asset ratio is awed as a measure of leverage, because the converse of nancial debt is
not equity. We therefore decompose the market leverage and t the data to equation (4.11)
considered earlier. The results in Table 4.5 below show the results of dependent variable
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(Leverage) is either non-deposits liabilities or deposits divided by the market or book value
of assets.
Table 4.5: Decomposing Market leverage;
***,**, * as signicance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively
Dependent variable Non-deposit liabilities. Deposits
Market leverage coecients coecients
Market-to-book ratio -0.9874

-0.9829

Prots 0.0208

0.7642

Log(Size) -0.0162

0.0398

Collateral 0.4707

0.0964

Dividends -0.4066

-0.2443

Adjusted R2 0.8526 0.8403
The signs of the coecients in the regression using non-deposit liabilities are the same
as in the previous leverage regressions, which is consistent with these banks having better
access to debt markets. More protable banks substituting away from deposits may be an
indication of a larger debt capacity as they are less likely to default. risk and dividend payout
status, since they are signicant for either deposits or non-deposit liabilities.
Therefore the standard corporate nance style regression works well for the components
of leverage for the given sample we considered. Although there is a drop in the adjusted
R2 from 85% and 84% in non-deposit liabilities and deposit composition of market leverage
regressions. This is around 14-15% in regressions with the market leverage (deposits and
non-deposit liabilities inclusive) used as the dependent variables. Except for prots, the
signs of the estimated coecients when the dependent variable is non-deposit liabilities are
as before for total market leverage, in Table 4.3. But the signs are the opposite when the
dependent variable is deposits.
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4.10 CONCLUSION
We can conclude from this study that banks have been nding debt to be more advantageous
than equity. Asymmetric information has also played a role by giving insiders the privileged
position to know the quality of the bank. Hence placing the issue of debt is more attractive
for larger banks even if it is risky. The result shows that debt issues can keep protable
banks in the market, improving the quality and value of the bank assets. This is also means
that smaller banks have diculty in issuing debt; hence they are kept out of the market.
Therefore the banks capital structure decision balances the benets of the funds raised for
the various investments, benets of interest tax shields against any bankruptcy costs.
The main result of our study is that when securities of a given bank are being underpriced
by the market, the bank will prefer debt to equity. If we have risk free debt, then even
undervalued banks would prefer debt to underpriced equity, similar to results by Myers and
Majluf (1984). The results therefore hold that debt will be preferred to equity even if the debt
is risky and that bank nancial managers should use debt nancing when faced with risky
investments and only consider the equity nancing when the bank assets are undervalued.
Empirical evidence reveals the market reaction following announcements that will change
nancial leverage. Therefore announcements of actions that decrease leverage result in stock
price decreases, e.g., an equity for debt swap. While announcements of actions that increase
leverage result in stock price increases, e.g., a debt for equity swap (such as a leverage recap-
italization). Managerial announcements that change leverage will always signal information
about the value of the rm.
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5.0 IMPACT OF STOCK MARKET SLUMP ON PENSIONS | THE CASE
OF THE NETHERLANDS.
5.1 INTRODUCTION
It worthwhile to note that the pensions industry's view of equities as the main source of
portfolio growth has been of great interest after the nancial market crisis. Despite an
equity performance recovery of around 70% in UK, from the low point of 2009, pension
schemes continue to display a desire to move away from the asset class. While equities will
continue to play an important role in scheme portfolios, the focus for the future is on risk
management through hedging and diversication. The \cult of the equity" is history for
dened benet schemes in most countries, (Cocco et al., 2005).
The steep drop in nancial markets in 2008 coupled with the ongoing economic recession
has posed immediate challenges for some public pension systems, particularly those that
rely partly on equity investments. Most people today know that share prices are getting to
levels lower than they were a decade ago, but few understand the main source of pension
income has plunged to little more than a third of its level 20 years ago. Millions of savers
have seen their dreams of a comfortable retirement dashed by falling share prices and rising
life expectancy. As global stock markets fell during 2008 and into 2009, it was widely
reported that investors had lost well over $2 trillion in retirement savings.1 Indeed, from the
market highs at the end of October 2007 through to January 31, 2009, the broad U.S. stock
market lost 47%; European markets registered a loss of 56%; Asian markets lost 47%; and
emerging stock markets lost 60%.2 An important question arises: Has the \average" retiree
1According to an October 2008 study by the U.S. Congressional Budget Oce
2Return sources for these statistics: U.S. stock market|MSCI Broad Market Index; European stock
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(or worker) suered irreparable loss? This has been a reason why thousands of pensioners in
many countries nd themselves forced by nancial necessity to go back to work. The Oce
for National Statistics (ONS) labour market survey shows that in the UK in July, August
and September of 2011 there was an extra 40,000 people over the retirement age of 65 who
joined the work force, taking the total number to 823,000. This is the highest number since
the ONS started keeping these gures3 in 1992.
This chapter of our study presents a pension model geared to the typical pension contract
in the Netherlands. It is based on a dened benet/average earnings pension system. We note
that the nominal benets are guaranteed and indexation is intended. The model provides
a framework for analysing adjustments to such factors as the asset mix, returns and the
method of market indexation. The importance of uncertainty over interest rate movements
and returns on shares is made explicit by means of stochastic and historical simulations
would have been an interesting theoretical study of the pension asset mix.
The main aim of this chapter is to assess whether Dutch pension funds' investment
policies was aected by the nancial market crush. It is worthwhile to note that the strategic
investment policy always reects the objectives of the pension funds, while the actual asset
allocation may depart from the objective as a result of asset price shocks, since pension
funds do not continuously rebalance their portfolios (Bikker, et.al 2009). We therefore focus
particularly on the allocation of equities and bonds as representing, respectively, risky and
safe assets. The argument of the stock market volatility-dependent on equity allocation
stems from optimal asset allocation and investing models (Campbell and Viceira, 2002;
Cocco et al., 2005; Ibbotson et al., 2007). An important outcome of these models is that the
proportion of nancial assets invested in equity would decrease over the life-cycle, thereby
increasing the proportion of the relatively safer bonds. As long as the correlation between
labour income and stock market returns is assumed to be low, a young worker may better
diversify away equity risk with their large holding of human capital.
Dutch pension funds eectively are collective savings arrangements, covering almost the
entire population of employees. Pension funds often take the characteristics of their partici-
market|MSCI Europe Index; Asian stock market|MSCI Pacic Index; and emerging markets|MSCI
Emerging Markets Index.
3http://www.investmentsense.co.uk/tag/oce-for-national-statistics-gures-on-pension-age-workers/
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pants on board in their decision-making on strategic investment allocation. We investigate
whether { in line with the life-cycle saving and investing model { more mature pension funds
pursue a more conservative investment policy, that is, whether they hold less equity in favour
of bonds. An important feature of most Dutch pension funds is that they explicitly base their
funding and benet allocation decisions on intergenerational risk sharing, that is, nominal
benets are guaranteed, indexation is likely and pension premiums are adjusted, the latter
two depending on the funding ratio.
According to the consultancy's latest quarterly research4, only 13 of the FTSE 100 com-
panies would have disclosed a surplus if they had a year-end of December 31 2012, compared
to 16 which reported a surplus in their most recent annual report and accounts. Five FTSE
100 companies had total disclosed pension liabilities at the end of 2012 which were greater
than their equity market value. These include International Airline Group, whose liabilities
were almost ve times their equity value, while BAE Systems and BT had disclosed liabilities
more than double their market value. However, the total decit of the FTSE 100's pension
schemes fell from $58bn to $50bn { partly as a result of a rally in equity markets, but also
because companies paid a combined $12.7bn into their DB pension schemes to help close
the funding gap. Most signicantly, BT made a decit contribution of $1.9bn, but 63 other
FTSE 100 rms also reported signicantly decit contributions in their most recent annual
report and accounts. Pension schemes were continuing to de-risk and move away from in-
vestments in stocks and shares towards bonds. The average pension scheme asset allocation
to bonds at the end of the 2012 stood at 56%, compared to 50% at the end of 2011.Three
FTSE 100 companies reported they had changed the proportion of their assets invested in
bonds by more than 10% over the year. The gures show that pension schemes were taking
the opposite approach to the retail investment sector, where the `great rotation' had seen
investors move out of bonds into equities.
4www.theactuaries.com
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5.1.1 Trend of global pension funds
The major global pension markets involve 13 countries (these are; Australia, Canada, Japan,
Netherlands, Switzerland, United Kingdom (UK), United States of America (US), Brazil,
France, Germany, Ireland, Hongkong, South Africa,) which had total pension assets of
$26,496 billion at the end of 2010. This represented a 12% increase from the end value
in 2009. Pension assets rose in all major pension markets except for Ireland (we could at-
tribute this to the sovereign debt) and France (which we could attribute to the depreciation
of the euro), as can be seen in Figure 5.1 below. The nancial meltdown has thus had
an impact on the pension market. This means that the factors aecting the economy and
nancial market also has an impact on the pension markets.
Figure 5.1; Global Pension asset value trend and the
GDP, 2000 to 2010, Source: Tower Watson
The recent nancial crisis has created an interest in pension fund investment and security.
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This is because pension fund assets are invested in capital markets and as such are exposed
to market risks. In addition, the pension fund is exposed to a variety of other risks, including
longevity risk, ination risk, liquidity risk and the sponsor's default risk. These risks relate
to the mismatch of assets and liabilities. If all future cash outows constituting the pension
fund's liabilities are similar to the future cash inows generated by its assets, then the
mismatch risk is negligible. However, if such a match cannot be realized, then shortfalls or
surpluses will occur in the future. This has led to development of a pension buy-out market
as shown below in Figure 5.2 with respect to UK's FTSE index. We see from the graph
that the market has been volatile. There is panic buying and selling whenever the market
index falls or rises. Great losses that accompany this impulse buying and selling has aected
portfolios involving pension funds.
Figure 5.2: FTSE All share total returns 1990 - 2011; Source: Data
stream
5.1.2 The pensions assets trend in past decade
After posting record gains in the late 1990s, the stock market began to fall dramatically
starting in the year 2000. The benchmark S&P 500 Index showed that the US stock market
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for a twelve-month period lost one-quarter of its value and the NASDAQ Composite Index
lost over sixty percent of its value. Considering that more workers in the world are exposed to
the stock market now than ever before, this fall in the market will aect retirement schemes.
However, the risks of equity holdings surfaced after the collapse of the stock market in 2000{
02, which resulted in large losses for pension funds. We can see from Figure 5.3(a) below, how
the FTSE share total returns had a number of large stock market corrections throughout the
two decades. This reected a 16.9% drop in 1992, 16.5% in 1994, 24.4% in 1998 the followed
by very high drops of 46.45 and 45.6% in 2000-2003, 2007 - 2010 periods. The FTSE All-
Share Index had a 53 basis point fall and 15-year gilt yields at the end of September 2011.
It is also seen from Figure 5.3(b) that the pension assets and funds have been on the decline
in the past ten years, the main concern being 2008, when it hit the lowest level. There has
been a slight rise since then (2009 to 2010) hopefully due to the ongoing pension reforms
that might have led to many countries changing their asset allocation strategies from equity
based investment to bonds, real estate, cash and other assets. Reacting to decline, pension
benets were curtailed and contributions steeply increased.
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Figure 5.3(a): FTSE all share returns between 1990 to 2011, Source: Data
stream
Between December 2007 and December 2008, the S&P 500 index fell by over one-third. As
a result, retirement accounts lost about $2.8 trillion, or 32 percent of their value (Soto 2008).
Individual investors also lost substantial wealth in equities outside of retirement accounts.
Urban Institute simulations show that the long-term eects of the 2008 stock market crash
on retirement incomes will depend on the stock market's future performance, as well as
investors' market exposure at the time of the crash, the amount and composition of their
future contributions, the proportion of their retirement income coming from assets, and how
many years they have to rebuild their assets. Pensions decits for FTSE350 companies grew
by 21% in September 2011 as falling bond yields and volatile stock markets were mitigated
by a reduction in interest rate projections5.
5The gures, from Mercer's Pensions Risk Survey, show the aggregate shortfall climbed to $64bn.
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Figure 5.4 (b): The global pension fund index trend for the past decade.
Source: Towers Watson
5.1.3 Pension funds asset allocation
In some of the G7 countries, for instance the US, when a company sponsors a dened-benet6
pension plan, the plan's assets and liabilities are assets and liabilities of the company. There
has been a controversy on how pension liabilities (especially dened-benet liabilities) should
be valued: actuaries and economists dier in their approaches. There are also dierences in
the approaches between accountants and economists over how pension assets and liabilities
should be treated in company accounts. Another important issue is the appropriate asset
allocation (i.e. the weights of the key asset classes in) for the pension fund. We consider the
concept of optimal asset allocation of a pension fund and show that it depends on whether
the pension fund is over or underfunded, whether or not pension liabilities are linked to
6Dened benets pension plan is where the annual contributions are determined by the benets \dened"
in the plan paid at retirement. If value of pension assets exceeds (over funded - Occurred during stock and
bond boom of the 1990's) current and future benets owed, employer may: Reduce future contributions, or
Distribute surplus to shareholders
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earnings growth and whether the pension fund is insured or not. Finally, the pension fund
is inuenced by the sponsoring company's share price.
Usually the company and its pension plan are considered as consolidated entities, having
three groups with a claim on the rm's total assets. The groups are: 1) The employees
who include both the retired and active. 2) The investors which include the shareholders
and creditors. 3) The government, involved through corporate taxes and corporate pension
benet guarantees. The employees' claim on retirement benets | the pension liability |
is a debt-like liability of the rm, secured by the pension assets as specic collateral.
In this study, using the Dutch market data, we examine the empirical question whether
pension funds are aected by the equity risk as measured by beta. There can be a number
of reasons to suspect this. The main one is the unclear set of accounting rules used to
report pension assets, liabilities, and expenses. Pension plan assets and liabilities are o-
balance sheet and are often viewed as segregated from the rest of the rm, with its own
trustees. Hence the pension accounting rules are seen to be complicated. We also have
the real relationship between pension plan risk and rm equity risk which has not been
clearly covered in most literature. The empirical ndings in this study are consistent with
the hypothesis that the presence of equity risk reects the risk of the rm's pension plan;
hence an indicator that the market slump would have a big negative impact on pensions.
Furthermore, we consider the pension asset allocation during the past decade, 2002 to 2011,
and note that despite the great volatility in the stock market, the equities asset class are the
leading investment class for pension funds in the Netherlands. This is how the fall in the
markets has inuenced the retirement income.
5.1.4 Research on pensions and the stock market
There has been great interest in research on pension market issues from the 1980's till
2007. The following subsections consider the past work, starting with those that covered
the relationship between the pensions and stock market, pension risk and share prices, in
addition to pension asset allocation.
Coile et al, (2006) investigate the relationship between stock market performance and
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retirement benets, paying particular attention to the boom and bust periods of the late
1990s and early 2000s. First, retirement rates did not rise during the market boom of the
late 1990s, even after adjusting for the eect of the strong economy. Second, as the sustained
market decline only began in September 2000, the retirement response in late 2000 would
have had to be very large to drive a two-point reduction for the year as a whole. The authors
compare the eect of the stock market on the retirement behaviour of individuals likely to
have been dierentially aected by changes in the market.
Franzoni and Martin (2006), argue that the market signicantly overvalues rms with
severely underfunded pension plans. These companies earn lower stock returns than rms
with healthier pension plans for at least 5 years after the rst emergence of the underfund-
ing. The low returns are not explained by risk, price momentum, earnings momentum, or
accruals. Further, the evidence suggests that investors do not anticipate the impact of the
pension liability on future earnings, and they are surprised when the negative implications
of underfunding ultimately materialize. Finally, underfunded rms have poor operating per-
formance, and they earn low returns although they are value companies. Their results and
ndings note that investors have failed to realize that an underfunded pension will eventually
hurt earnings. So when earnings nally do take a hit the stock gets punished.
Jin et. al (2006) examined the empirical question of whether equity risk of U.S. rms as
measured by beta, from the Capital Asset Pricing Model reects the risk of their pension
plans. They note that pension plan assets and liabilities are o-balance sheet, and are often
viewed as segregated from the rest of the rm, with its own trustees. Their empirical ndings
are consistent with the hypothesis that equity risk does reect the risk of the rm's pension
plan.
One recent study on pension information is by Cardinale, M.(2007) who empirically
tested pensions and corporate bond spreads. Cardinale considered corporate bond data of
U.S. companies for the 2001-2004 period where unfunded pension liabilities are incorporated
in credit spreads. This study is limited to US pensions and not many studies have been
extended to other markets pension plans in the world. Klumpes and McMeeking (2007)
had a study to examine the impact of pension reforms. They considered how the new U.K.
pension accounting regulations signicantly increase the exposure of the balance sheets of
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U.K. rms to volatilities in pension fund valuations. Their results suggest that unexpected
changes in interest rates have a dierential eect on a rm's sources of pension, nancial,
and core earnings. Klumpes and McMeeking fall short of covering the impact of the stock
market on the pensioners' investment.
5.1.5 Firms' pension risk and share prices of the pension sponsoring rms
There is earlier work by Feldstein and Seligman (1981), where they nd results consistent
with the conclusion that share prices fully reect the value of unfunded pension obligations,
so the market correctly takes into account pension liabilities when valuing a company|a one
dollar change of pension funding status will change the share price by one dollar (both relative
to the rm's market value). Feldstein and Seligman (1981) was one of the earliest studies
to investigate the eect of a rm's pension decit on the rm's share price. They found,
using a sample of US manufacturing rms, that the emergence of a decit is incorporated
rapidly into the share price, in the sense that the share price is reduced (relative to tangible
assets) by the per share size of unfunded pension liabilities. Feldstein and Mrck (1983) then
showed that company share prices reect pension plan surpluses as well as decits, and that
the nancial markets `see through' the manipulation of pension liabilities considered above
and instead value the pension liabilities of all rms at a common standard discount rate,
very close to the average used across all rms.
Bodie and Papke (1992) is the one paper that provides considerable empirical evidence
that the equity market valuation of rms takes into account the dierence between the value
of pension plan assets and its liabilities, i.e., the pension surplus or decit (if that dierence
is negative).
Carroll and Niehaus (1998) had their results later conrmed by Ibbotson and Kaplan
(2000) in a parallel test of debt market recognition of the value of the pension surplus or
decit, by empirically examining the positive relationship between funding of dened-benet
pension funds and debt ratings. Furthermore, in both equity and debt markets, there seems
to be an asymmetric information in the impact of changes in pension assets and liabilities
on the market value of the rm and on debt ratings. This is due to each dollar increase in
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liabilities lowers the market value of the rm by about a dollar. This is consistent with the
view that, while an under-funded pension liability should be fully reected as a corporate
liability, over-funded pension assets are not entirely a corporate asset, due to the diculty of
converting an overfunded pension plan's assets into unburdened corporate assets. Moreover,
Ibbotson and Kaplan (2000) note that in line with the ecient-market theory, evidence shows
that pension funds are unsuccessful in exploiting market timing to generate excess returns.
Vrinda Gupta (2006), analyses whether employees with a dened-benet pension scheme
perceive risk to their expected income in retirement while forming their opinions about the
long-term business success of their employer. They use a dataset of pension risk indicators
for FTSE 100 companies and data from employees' opinion in the UK to show that employees
do seem to care about the level of funding of their benets. Earlier, Alier and Vittas (2000)
investigated the impact of the volatility of investment returns on replacement rates in the
context of personal pension plans. The authors' ndings suggest that overconcern about the
impact on replacement rates of short-term volatility in stock markets may not be warranted.
5.1.6 Recent research on pension asset allocation
A few studies have also shown that strategic asset allocation dominates portfolio perfor-
mance. In particular, strategic asset allocation is shown to explain more than 90 percent of
the variability in pension fund returns over time, while the additional variation explained by
market timing is less than 5 percent. This is considered by Blake et al (1999). They note
that stock market timing is shown to cause an average loss of 20{66 basis points per year.
In their study they found a negative correlation between asset class returns and net cash
ows to the corresponding asset class, which points to rebalancing. In addition, they noted
that the asset allocation for UK pension funds drifts toward asset classes that performed
relatively well, in line with a free-oat strategy. Apparently, UK pension funds only partly
rebalance their investments in response to dierent returns across asset categories. Hence,
the degree of rebalancing versus free oat in pension fund asset allocation remains an open
question. Despite this initial study Blake has now turned his attention on Longevity and its
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impact on pensions7.
We can note that in the literature there has been almost no analysis, either theoretical
or empirical, about how the risk level of a pension plan is aected by the stock market
volatility. Jin et al. (2006), a paper mentioned above, is the closest to our research goal.
The authors are concerned about the rms' equity risk and whether it reects the risk in a
pension scheme. We extend the model used in their research to examine how stock market
movement aects pensions.
5.1.7 Pensions in Netherlands
The Netherlands' retirement income system comprises a at-rate public pension and a quasi-
mandatory earnings-related occupational pension linked to industrial agreements8. Most em-
ployees belong to these occupational schemes which are industry-wide dened-benet plans
with the earnings measure based on lifetime average earnings. The pension scheme involves
a regulation where about 600 pension funds, (theoretically) fully funded, provide pensions
to probably over 90% of non-self-employed workers. Most are dened-benet, although, the
share of dened contribution is rising. The investment strategy of Dutch pension funds,
which is the best managed fund in Europe, is of key importance to society, as it involves
more than e700 billion in assets. The way in which these assets are invested has a sig-
nicant inuence on the level of required premiums or nal benets. There has been one
percent lower annual return reported over the life cycle of a typical worker in the Nether-
lands which translates into 27 percent lower accumulated pension assets. Consequently, one
of the most important responsibilities of pension funds' trustees is to maximize the expected
return on assets at an acceptable level of risk, e.g., measured in terms of the probability of
underfunding.
7http://www.pensions-institute.org/
8Melbourne mercer global pension index; http://www.mercer.com/articles/global-pension-index-
netherlands
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Figure 5.5 (a) Dutch pension funds in last ve years. Source: De Nederlandsche Bank
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Figure 5.5 (b) Balance sheet of Dutch pension funds in last ve years. Source: De
Nederlandsche Bank
Figures 5.5 (a) and 5.5 (b) show the results and the balance sheet of Dutch pension funds
in the years, 2005 - 2010. It is can be noted that the values drop due to the nancial market
crisis in 2008. This is seen in Figure 5.5 (a) where the Dutch funds lost e236,817 millions.
Figure 5.5(b) indicates an interesting trend of the balance sheet of pension funds. We note a
maximum of e774,170 millions worth of assets in 2010 while the lowest of e604,680 millions
in 2008.
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5.1.8 Pension asset allocation
The assets allocation of pension funds are allocated over the following four broad classes:
equities, bonds, cash, and real estate (other assets), are illustrated in Figure 5.6(a). The
percentages in the Figure 5.6(b) below shows that the pension fund investment policy in-
cludes the strategic asset allocation decision in the UK and US had higher proportion for the
equity above all the other classes. The equities asset class have the highest expected return
but also the highest volatility. For most pension funds in the world, equities are the largest
asset category. Consequently, equity allocation is one of the key policy variables determining
the risk-return prole of a given pension fund.
PENSION FUND
Equity allocation
Bonds
Cash
Real Estate
and
Other
investment
Figure 5.6 (a): The pension asset allocation classes. Source; Author's
illustration
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Figure 5.6(b): Global pension asset allocation for 2010. Source: Towers
Watson 2011 analysis; Switzerland, UK and US, do not include the
personal and stakeholders assets
Figure 5.6(b) shows that a number of countries have been cautious in investment policy
strategy during this nancial crisis period which directly aects the pension plans. As can
be seen in Figure 5.6(b), Canada, Japan,and Netherlands have the largest percentage (95%,
98% and 94% respectively) of the dened-benets (DB) pension plan which corresponds
to lower percentage of asset allocation to the equities While Australia with 81% has the
largest proportion dened contributions9 (DC) pension plan, which corresponds to lowest
percentage allocated bonds.
5.1.9 Dutch stock market index performance
The Amsterdam Exchange index (AEX) is the stock market index which began in 1983.
It is composed of a maximum of 25 of the most actively traded Dutch securities on the
exchange. It is one of the main national indices of the pan-European stock exchange group
Euronext alongside Brussels' BEL20, Paris's CAC 40 and Lisbon's PSI-20. It was formed
9Dened-contribution plan provides benets determined by the accumulated contributions and the fund's
investment performance. \Contributions" are designated in plan, not amounts available at retirement. The
Firm knows with certainty the amount of the contribution and it provides uncertain benets to participants.
169
on 3 January 1983 and it consisted of 13 stocks. On 3 January 1985 the index started using
a weighting factor: "As of this date the value of the Amsterdam Exchanges-index (AEX)
is calculated by multiplying the price of each stock by its weighting factor. These amounts
are then cumulated and divided by one hundred". Since that time the composition and
weighting of the AEX index has changed many times.
5.2 METHODOLOGY
There are two opposing views on optimal asset allocation by pension funds may be distin-
guished: the long-term strategy and the all-bonds strategy. Starting with the rst one, we
consider that a pension fund has to meet benet promises to both current and future retirees.
For a typical pension plan in the Netherlands, the duration of accrued benets is between 15
and 20 years. Campbell and Viceira (2002) argue that the risks of the various asset categories
are dierent for varying time horizons. So, portfolio choices by long-term investors will dier
from those of short-term investors. Both short-term and long-term investors benet from
risk diversication across asset classes. As risk is horizon-dependent, long-term investors also
benet from any time diversication within asset classes. Some empirical research nds that
stocks are less risky in the long run due to their mean reversion: the annualized standard
deviation halves over a 25 year horizon (Campbell and Viceira, 2002; Hoevenaars, 2008).
Besides, long-term investors may invest in less liquid assets such as real estate. Money mar-
ket instruments are relatively safe for short-term investors, but not for long-term investors
because of reinvestment risk, that is, uncertain future short-term interest rates.
Most theories suggest that the relationship of the pension fund members and equity
allocation is linear, (Malkiel, 2007), while others postulate a non-linear or hump-shaped
relationship (Benzoni et al., 2007).
w =
H + F
F
 Rf
2
(5.1)
Lucas and Zeldes (2009) investigate a relationship between the relative share of active
participants and the equity allocation, also assuming a non-linear age pattern: a (constant)
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eect during the active years compared to the retirement years. Gerber and Weber (2007)
regarded two denitions of average age: age of all participants and age of active participants,
where the latter implies a non-linear functional form of age, due to the truncation at the
retirement age. Taking the various specications in the literature into account, we investigate
both a linear and a nonlinear version of our model. Our linear age-dependent model for the
strategic equity allocation of pension funds reads as:
Estrategic allocation = +  age +  log(size) +  Dene benet +  funding ratio + i (5.2)
The argument from this model was that the pension fund size would go hand in hand
with degree of investment expertise and willingness to exploit return-risk optimization. They
also dened the pension fund's size as the total number of participants, where the logarithms
of size is taken to reduce possible heteroscedasticity. The funding ratio was considered as a
determinant of equity allocation, where by a higher funding ratio may stimulate higher risk
taking as it provided a larger buer against equity risk. A higher risk margin for equity is
required under the Dutch supervisory regime (Bikker and Vlaar, 2007).
We therefore note that these studies managed to capture that { unlike the actual equity
allocation, the strategic equity allocation is not aected directly by price shocks, although
gradually, over time, the strategic equity allocation may be inuenced somewhat by trends
in the stock market (Bikker, Broeders en De Dreu, 2009). We therefore consider another
alterantive model, although linear it considers the liabilities, the pension surplus, leverage
ratio and even the market value of equity.
5.2.1 Pension and stock market volatility
Jin et al (2006) conrmed that a company's equity returns do reect the risk of its pension
plan. This is despite that the accounting rules for pensions are known by few analysts, Jin
et al (2006). Using the improved balance sheet for a company:
Assets = OA+ PA = E +D + PL = Liabilities (5.3)
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where
OA = value of operating assets of the company; E = market value of equity in the rm;
D = market value of debt in the rm; PA = value of pension assets; PL = value of pension
liabilities
We can also dene the pension surplus and leverage ratio as;
S = PA  PL = pension surplus; L = D=E = leverage ratio.
The share price of the company in an ecient market10 will reect the true operating
risk. This is measured by the beta or systematic risk of the operating assets, (OA)
OA =
E
OA
E +
D
OA
D  

PA
OA
PA  
PL
OA
PL

(5.4)
=
E
OA
(E + D) +
D   E
OA
D  
PA
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(PA   PL) 
S
OA
PL (5.5)
If the pension fund and its risk are ignored, then the beta of the operating assets becomes:
'OA =
E
E +D
E +
D
E +D
D (5.6)
Now this gives us:
'OA   OA =
PA
OA+ S
(PA   PL) 
S
OA+ S
(OA   PL) (5.7)
This will be positive if PA > PL; OA > PL and S 6 0: These conditions will often
hold in many rms sponsoring pension funds. Therefore the company's nancial capital
(dened as equity plus debt) is now found by rearranging
E +D = OA+ PA  PL = OA+ S (5.8)
and will be equal to the value of the operating assets plus the pension fund surplus.
Hence the capital structure risk, the systematic risk borne by the company's equity and
debt-holders, is:
E+D =
E
E +D
E +
D
E +D
D (5.9)
10since in an ecient market, share prices fully reect all relevant information
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which we can write as
E+D =
PA
E +D
PA  
PL
E +D
PL +
OA
E +D
OA (5.10)
and simplied to
E+D = PF +
OA
E +D
OA (5.11)
This shows that there is a one-to-one relationship between a company's capital structure
risk and its pension fund risk. Where the pension fund risk is dened as:
PF =
PA
E +D
PA  
PL
E +D
PL (5.12)
5.3 DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA AND VARIABLES
In the previous section we looked at the risk relations between the pension plan's assets
and liabilities when they are fully recognized by investors and measured at market prices.
We now explore the question: Do those relations hold in practice? We consider, as an
empirical matter, the extent to which a company's pension funding status and asset mix
are incorporated in the risk of its equity. We estimate the size of the pension risk-rm risk
relation then use this result to test the hypothesis that a higher overall rm market risk
translates into a higher pension plan risk.
From the asset allocation information reported in Bloomberg, we compute the total
amount of pension assets. We also measure the average systematic risk exposure from the
pension plan assets by making certain assumptions about the beta risk of various categories
of assets.
We obtained the data used in our study from three sources: 1) Bloomberg provides asset
allocation information for each plan sponsored by a company and company level data about
pension liabilities and other balance sheet and income statement variables, 2) AMADEUS
and 3) statistics provided by the central bank of Netherlands, De Nederlandsche Bank
(DNB). We match data from these three sources to create a merged company level panel
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data set. Bloomberg data in addition to the merged data set is used to calculate equity betas
for the rms in our sample. We will then carry out panel data regression for the individual
rms. We consider a linear model to check the relationship between the market risk and
pensions. We dene all the variables used in the following subsection.
5.3.1 Denition of variables:
Overfunded (underfunded) pension: This is the funded status of the post-retirement
benet plan. it represents the dierence between the fair value of plan assets less the pro-
jected benet obligation. The plan is overfunded if the plan assets exceed the projected
benet and the plan is underfunded if the plan assets exceed the projected benet obliga-
tion.
Pension Market capitalization: This compares the present value of the company's
total employee invested and non-invested pension benet to the market capitalization of the
rm. It displays the company's burden compared to its total value. It is calculated as:
Projected Benet Obligation/Historical market cap.
Pension plan asset (Fair value): This is the fair market value of the pension plan
assets at the end of the period.
Pension Benet paid: This is the actuarial present value of the total cost of all em-
ployees invested and non-invested pension benets that have been attributed by the pension
benet formula to services performed by employees at the end of the period.
Pension liabilities: Future payouts that a pension is obliged to make.
Service cost: This is the actuarial present value of pension benets attributed by the
pension benet formula to employee service during a specic period. It is the amount of
pension benets earned by employees during the period.
Expected rate of return on Pension Asset (PA): This is the estimated expected
long term rate of return on pension plan assets expressed as a percentage. The higher the
expected rate of return, the lower the pension expense.
Pension income: This is the pension income reported by the company which represents
the net amount of pension income that is recognized in the income statement. The compo-
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nents of pension income are the service cost, interest cost or the projected benet obligation,
expected return on plan assets and amortization of unrecognized prior service cost
Pension and post retirement reserve: This is the pension and post retirement gure
as reported by the company
5.4 THE MODEL
We consider linear models based on one-to-one relationship between the market risk and
pensions fund risk as shown in equation (5.10) above.
5.4.1 Market risk, capital structure and pensions
First, we look at the relationship between a rm's equity beta and the pension fund risk;
then, a rm's capital structure and pension fund risk. The relationship are outrightly linear
as shown earlier in equations (5.7) and (5.8). The data input into the model is what we
have obtained from a rm's balance sheets information submitted to Bloomberg. The rms
considered are all the twenty-ve rms listed on AEX index. We take equity betas11 from
Bloomberg as the dependent variable to capture the eect of the market risk relative to
individual rms. Then, independent variable is the pension fund beta risk as calculated
from equation (5.8) above. Therefore, we have the following linear model in equation (5.9).
itE+D = a+Coefficienti
NX
i=1
it 1;PF i, where i = 1; 2; :::25 and t = 1; 2; :::; 10 (5.13)
Where itE+D is the equity beta for rm i, while it;PF is the pension fund beta for each
individual rm i for the year t
Similarly, we t a linear model in equation (5.11) with the dependent variable being the
measure of cost of capital12. The measure used in this case is the Weighted Average Cost of
11This is calculated in Bloomberg from the following formula:
itE+D =
Cov(ri;rAEX)
V ar(rAEX)
where ri are returns of individual rms and rAEX is the return of the market.
12This is our indirect measure of capital structure for the rm
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Capital (WACC). The values used for WACC are obtained in Bloomberg for all the listed
rms on the AEX index. The WACC is a calculation of a rm's cost of capital in which each
category of capital is proportionately weighted. It is obtained by the following formula
WACC =
E
V
 Ce+ D
V
 Cd  (1  Tc) (5.14)
where, V = E + D;Cd=cost of debt; Ce=cost of equity; Tc=corporate tax rate; E
V
=
percentage of nancing that is equity; D
V
= percentage of nancing that is debt
Furthermore, we t a linear model to the pension fund variables with beta equity as the
dependent variable. The model is dened by
itE+D = a+ Coefficienti 
KX
k=1
Pt 1; + "i, where k = 1; 2; :::9 and t = 1; 2; :::; 10 (5.15)
AEX = i +  
4X
i=1
t 1, where t = 1; 2; :::10 years (5.16)
5.4.2 Volatility and pension fund asset allocation
We also consider the linear relationship between the stock volatility and the natural logarithm
of the amount invested in various asset classes. Equation (5.13) is used to examine this linear
relationship. We use AEX as a measure for the volatility of AEX stock market index. We
obtain the quarterly data of 30-day historical volatility13 (HV) data of AEX index for the
2000 - 2010 period from Bloomberg database. The 0ts are the ve pension fund asset
classes14, equities, bonds, cash, and real estate (other assets).
13This is the realized volatility of a index over a given time period, in our case, last 10 years. It is
calculated by determining the average deviation from the average price of the index in the given time period.
the formula used in this case is:
HV =
qP
(Rt)2
n
14The equities include all the investment made to the emerging markets, mature amd private equities.
Then, the real estate included both the direct and indirect investment into the real estate. The xed
yield securities asset class include the investment into Government bonds (for instance the non-index-linked
bonds), the index-linked bonds, mortgage loans and credits.
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5.4.3 Equity in pension fund investments
We consider that a pension fund has to meet benet promises to both current and future
retirees. For a typical pension plan in the Netherlands, the duration of accrued benets
is between 15 and 20 years. Campbell and Viceira (2002) argued that the risks of the
various asset categories are dierent for varying time horizons. So, portfolio choices by long-
term investors will dier from those of short-term investors. Both short-term and long-term
investors benet from risk diversication across asset classes. As risk is horizon-dependent,
long-term investors also benet from any time diversication within asset classes. Some
empirical research nds that stocks are less risky in the long run due to their mean reversion:
the annualized standard deviation halves over a 25 year horizon (Campbell and Viceira, 2002;
Hoevenaars, 2008). Money market instruments are relatively safe for short-term investors,
but not for long-term investors because of reinvestment risk, that is, uncertain future short-
term interest rates. Apart from the favourable return-risk trade o in the long run, equities
may partly hedge increasing wage- or ination-indexed liabilities, due to the positive long-run
correlation between stock returns, on the one hand, and wages and ination on the other
Pension funds have participants in a wide range of ages, from just over 20 to over 100.
In models of optimal life-cycle saving and investing, the age of the investor plays a key role.
Therefore, the question is whether the average age of participants acts as a determinant of
the asset allocation in the greater entity of pension funds, and to what extent (Bovenberg
et al., 2007). The rationale is that young workers possess more human capital than older
workers, where younger workers can diversify investment risk, assuming that human capital
is a relatively safe, so bond-like, asset. The age-dependency of human capital results in a
negative age-dependency of equity exposure.
The original literature on optimal lifecycle investments (Bodie et al. 1992, Campbell and
Viceira 2002)) has pointed out that the optimal investments in risky assets over the lifecycle
should be structured as follows:
x =
  r
2
HCx + FCx
FCx
(5.17)
where:
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x = fraction nancial capital in stocks at age x;
 = expected rate of return stocks;
r = risk free rate;
 = risk aversion;
2 = riskiness stocks (variance);
HCx = human capital at age x;
FCx = nancial capital at agex;
The basic version of the life-cycle model with risk-free human capital can be summarized
by the following equation for the optimal fraction of stock investment, denoted w
w =
 Rf
2
H + F
F
(5.18)
Here H is the human capital (the total of current and discounted future wages) of an
individual, and F is the person's current nancial capital. The risk-premium of the stock
market is given by    Rf , while  and 2 denote, respectively, the individual's constant
relative risk aversion and the variance of stock market returns. As can be seen, more human
capital leads to higher optimal investment in stocks.
Not only do young workers have more human capital, they also have more exibility to
vary their labour supply { that is, to adjust the number of working hours or their retirement
date { in the face of adverse nancial shocks. Flexible labour supply acts as a form of
self-insurance for low investment returns. Bodie et al. (1992) show that this reinforces the
optimality result, i.e. that young workers should have more equity exposure.
The negative relationship between age and equity exposure in the portfolio is usually
derived under the assumption that human capital is close to risk-free, or at least is not
correlated with capital return. Benzoni et al. (2007) put forward that in the short run, this
correlation is indeed low while in the longer run, labour income and capital income are highly
cointegrated, since the shares of wages and prots in national income are almost constant.
This nding implies that the risk prole of young workers' labour income is equity-like and
that they should therefore hold their nancial wealth in the form of safe bonds to oset
the high risk exposure in their human capital. Therefore, Benzoni et al.(2007) suggest that
the optimal equity share in nancial assets is hump-shaped over the lifecycle: cointegration
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between human capital and stock returns dominates in the rst part of working life, whereas
the decline in human capital accounts for the negative age-dependency of optimal equity
holdings later in life.
The negative age-dependency of asset holdings corresponds to the rule of thumb that an
individual should invest (100 { age) % in stocks (see Malkiel, 2007). All in all, the economic
theory suggests a negative relationship between participants' age and pension fund's equity
exposure, although a single theory indicates that this relationship might be reversed.
5.5 RESULTS ANALYSIS
5.5.1 Descriptive statistics
Pension asset, pension liability and market capitalization information in Table 5.1 below is
based on the balance sheet information of the individual rms as obtained in Bloomberg.
The Beta of equity values in the table are estimated using the Single index model. In our
case it is for the ten year-quarterly stock return as reported in Bloomberg. It is can be noted
that the average pension liabilities are quite high (e865.51 million) for all the rms listed
on the AEX index. This explains the reason for the average pension surplus being negative
(-e23.87 million)despite the average equity beta being close to 1(i.e. 1.08). The beta equity
beta is positive which indicates the direct dependence between the pension funds return and
the AEX market returns.
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Table 5.1: Summary statistics of the Dutch pensions, 21 listed rms
Firm Name ROPA(%) IW Last Px PL (e mil) PS (e mil) EB Mkt CAP(e mil) PI (e mil)
TNT express 6.50 1.41 9.94 45.00 -146.00 0.97 4567.74 -37.00
PostNL NV 5.70 0.69 4.88 218.00 1181.00 1.25 1721.44 1555.00
ING Groep NV-CVA 6.09 9.69 6.77 0.00 904.00 1.72 35302.52 217.00
Air France-KLM 7.65 0.00 4.69 1040.00 -421.00 1.21 1923.14 231.00
Aegon NV 0.00 2.57 4.00 0.00 -3436.00 1.43 10296.13 590.00
Arcelormittal 10.47 5.29 16.49 0.00 -25.00 1.46 34836.74 4.00
Aperam 3.20 0.28 15.89 181.00 -5.13 1.43 1701.57 30.73
SBM oshore NV 0.00 0.85 13.39 0.00 -24.30 1.18 3077.35 94.20
RANDSTAD holding 5.70 1.14 27.46 24.40 -1049.00 1.28 6324.03 316.00
AKZO nobel 5.70 3.89 44.97 0.00 -86.00 1.04 13810.90 15.00
Koninklijke phil 0.00 5.99 16.25 0.00 -997.00 1.15 21956.68 0.00
Heineken NV 0.00 3.87 39.91 1174.00 -15.57 0.75 30559.54 27.40
Boskalis WES 0.00 0.69 28.01 0.00 -103.00 1.14 3898.44 21.00
DSM (Konin) 0.00 2.71 42.02 270.00 -2.00 0.97 10208.66 -0.80
Corio NV 5.95 1.19 35.20 1.20 -64.52 1.08 4449.92 29.30
Fugro NV-CVA 5.20 1.36 53.37 71.60 -716.00 1.18 5850.48 128.00
KPN (Konin) NV 0.00 4.62 8.08 441.00 0.00 0.68 15339.67 0.00
Reed Elsevier 0.00 2.53 9.34 0.00 0.00 0.82 9009.71 40.59
ASML Holding NV 6.30 5.71 35.39 0.00 -2070.00 0.96 20472.14 276.00
Unilever NV-CVA 0.00 15.57 25.55 4206.00 0.00 0.64 101553.49 8.31
Tomtom 4.25 0.16 4.31 0.00 -10.40 1.22 1276.98 3.80
Unibail-Rodamco 5.90 2.09 144.45 10.90 -22.00 0.91 17891.13 46.00
Wolters Kluwer 0.00 1.56 13.99 142.00 81.00 0.93 5674.75 65.00
Ahold NV 6.60 4.89 10.97 92.00 -2586.00 0.72 16075.81 1364.00
Royal Dutch SH-A 0.00 17.90 27.38 5931.00 0.00 0.84 231133.66 0.00
Average 3.41 4.03 25.71 865.51 -23.57 1.08 24356.51
Std.Dev. 3.31 4.4 28.05 1653.13 1.33 0.26 46766.98
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Table 5.1 above shows that out of the ve top rms listed on the AEX index (based on
market capitalization), that is, the Royal Dutch Shell, Unilever, ING Groep, Arcelormittal
and Heineken, only one, the ING Groep NV, is overfunded. Two, Royal Dutch and Unilever
break-even on average while Arcelormittal and Heineken are among the 15 listed rms that
have a negative pension surplus. The equity beta for most of the rms is less than one.
For example Royal Dutch Shell and Unilever have betas of 0.8385 and 0.6442. The rms
with higher equity beta have negative pension surplus which may show how the market risk
aects the pensions.
5.5.2 Empirical results
The equity beta of the rms listed on the AEX index have direct linear impact on their
pension fund betas. Table 5.2 below shows that eight of the listed rms,have statistically
signicant positive coecient. Arcelormittal which is one of the underfunded rms has a
signicant negative coecient indicating that the equity beta has an impact on the pension
fund beta, which is reected in the pension surplus. ING Groep has a positive coecient
which also coincides with its positive pension surplus. Royal Dutch Shell which broke even
on its pension funding also a signicant positive coecient.
The data is now tted to the model in equation (5.11) with WACC as the dependent
variable. The results are as shown in Table 5.3 below. The capital structure of the rms is
directly related to the pension fund risk. We also get similar relationship as from the beta
equity vs pension fund risk relationship where for instance Arcelormittal has a signicant
negative coecient and Royal Dutch Shell has a signicant positive coecient.
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Table 5.2: OLS, Equity beta as the dependent variable
*, **, and *** are coecient signicance at 1%, 5% and 10%.
Firm Name coecient Probability
TNT express 0.08 0.05**
PostNL NV 0.37 0.04**
ING Groep NV-CVA 0.99 0.03**
Air France-KLM 0.23 0.01*
Aegon NV 0.22 0.01*
Arcelormittal 0.29 0.01*
Aperam 0.04 0.00*
SBM oshore NV 0.11 0.47
RANDSTAD holding 1.16 0.03**
AKZO nobel -0.84 0.02
Koninklijke phil -0.09 0.21
Heineken NV 0.89 0.07***
Boskalis WES 0.14 0.08***
DSM (Konin) 0.34 0.00*
Corio NV 0.22 0.08
Fugro NV-CVA -0.26 0.03**
KPN (Konin) NV 0.34 0.06***
Reed Elsevier 0.89 0.94
ASML Holding NV -0.83 0.07***
Unilever NV-CVA 0.31 0.08***
Tomtom 0.71 0.04**
Unibail-Rodamco -1.29 0.03**
Wolters Kluwer 0.06 0.02**
Ahold NV 0.02 0.20
Royal Dutch SH-A 0.14 0.02**
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Table 5.3: Fixed eects, Cost of capital as the dependent variable
*, **, and *** are coecient signicance at 1%, 5% and 10%.
Firm Name coecient Probability
TNT express 0.14 0.10***
PostNL NV 0.22 0.02**
ING Groep NV-CVA 0.59 0.04**
Air France-KLM 0.11 0.00*
Aegon NV 0.07 0.00*
Arcelormittal 0.33 0.55
Aperam 0.46 0.01*
SBM oshore NV 0.15 0.20
RANDSTAD holding 1.08 0.04**
AKZO nobel -0.34 0.08***
Koninklijke phil 1.19 0.09***
Heineken NV -1.03 0.31
Boskalis WES -0.25 0.42
DSM (Konin) 0.50 0.01*
Corio NV 0.37 0.08***
Fugro NV-CVA 0.68 0.04**
KPN (Konin) NV 0.82 0.02**
Reed Elsevier 0.74 0.01*
ASML Holding NV -0.91 0.19
Unilever NV-CVA 0.43 0.04**
Tomtom 0.27 0.09***
Unibail-Rodamco 0.30 0.80***
Wolters Kluwer 0.55 0.00*
Ahold NV -1.06 0.40**
Royal Dutch SH-A 0.08 0.00*
We now consider the relationship between equity beta and the various pension fund vari-
ables (dened in section 5.3 above). We t the data to equation (5.13) above. The results are
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shown in Table 5.4 below. All but two pension variables are signicant. Overfunding (un-
derfunding) pension, pension assets, pension benet paid and pension expenses are among
pension variables that are signicant. Only coecients of pension market capitalization and
service cost are not signicant. These results are as expected since the pension assets and
pension benet have a positive coecient, showing a positive direct proportion relationship
with the equity beta. This shows that the higher the risk the higher the value of pension as-
sets, which means that pension funds will often be investing in diversied projects to boost
their value. This could also lead to an increase in the total pension benets paid, hence
the pension expenses have a signicant negative coecient. We note that the overfund-
ing/underfunding pension variable (measure of pension surplus) is negative, which indicates
that the increase of market risk will lead to drop in the pension surplus. Similarly, the
expected rate of return on pension assets has a negative coecient. Hence the service cost,
pension expenses, pension and post retirement reserve are all negative showing that increase
in market risk will always lead to a drop in the expenses. This means that high stock
volatility aects the pensions of the individual rms.
Table 5.4: Equity beta and pension variables,
*, **, and *** are coecient signicance at 1%, 5% and 10%.
Variable Coecient P-value
Intercept {1.06 0.330
Overfunding (Underfunding) pension -0.06 0.091***
Pension assets (Fair value) 0.04 0.049**
Pension Benet paid 0.01 0.101*
Pension liabilities 0.08 0.004*
Service cost -0.04 0.730
Expected rate of return on Pension assets -0.10 0.0.064***
Pension expenses -0.02 0.100
Pension and post retirement reserve -0.02 0.041
Pension market capitalization 0.10 0.024
Multiple R 0.94
Adjusted R
2
0.70
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5.6 PENSION ASSET ALLOCATION
After looking at market risk | pension risk relationship, we look at the impact of the
market volatility on pension asset allocation. The question we consider is what happens to
the pension fund investments? Is there any impact on proportion invested into the equity,
real estate, xed yield securities and other investments? Table 5.5 below shows the summary
statistics of quarterly data for the period, 2000 | 2010, for the aggregate pension asset
allocation for the Dutch pension funds. The allocation to equities is the second largest with
a mean of e239,300.11 million. The allocation to the other investments that include hedge
funds, commodities and liquid assets is the least, at an average value of e33,174.94 million.
This shows how the stock volatility has had an impact on asset allocation.
Table 5.5: Netherlands' pension fund asset allocation, 2000 - 2010
Descriptive statistics for the amount of asset allocation
Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
Total equities 239,300.11 36,377.38 -1.1336 3.3534
Total xed yield securities 314,425.44 22,493.96 0.2946 1.5974
Total investments at fund's risk 657,748.83 60,940.71 -0.8906 3.0954
Total other investments 33,174.94 11,888.91 -0.3473 2.0987
Total Real estate invest 70,848.50 5,571.70 -0.4707 2.2428
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Table 5.6: Fixed eects results, Equity beta and asset classes.
*, **, and *** are coecient signicance at 1%, 5% and 10%
R
2 = 0:75 and Adjusted-R2 = 0:63
Variable Coecient Probability
Total equities -1.42 0.0109*
Total xed yield securities {0.55 0.0048*
Total investments at fund's risk 0.30 0.0020*
Total other investments -0.31 0.0903***
Total Real estate invest -0.72 0.0501**
5.7 POLICY IMPLICATION
Given the size of pension assets, it is not surprising that pension funds are the dominant
institutional investors in capital markets: a signicant percentage of equities and xed income
securities are held by pension funds. These observations suggest that the valuation and the
nancial policies (funding and asset allocation) of pension funds should be of great interest
to policy makers and researchers.
Over the past 10 years, retirement planning strategies used by the top asset managers
in the world experienced an increase in equity allocations and had signicantly increased
exposure to non-traditional asset classes till the nancial crisis. The rational conclusions
are that asset managers then, viewed equity investments as better value than xed income
investments. Asset managers had found additional diversication value in non-traditional
asset classes. The 2008/2009 global nancial crisis was a turning point for pension funds
after their equity-heavy portfolios suered heavy losses and spurred them to seek alternative
investments. That triggered a step-change in the way that our clients and pension fund
managers think about building out alternative portfolios. That was the start of introducing
things like real assets and commodities.
Dutch pension funds are in need of \far-reaching measures" to strengthen the nancial
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buers that protect their retirement savings, as low interest rates and investment returns
continue to exacerbate funding shortfalls. The average funding ratio of Dutch pension funds
has fallen15 to 99%. De Nederlandsche Bank, the Dutch nancial regulator, requires that
pension funds have a funding ratio of at least 105%. Falling below this threshold means they
must submit a recovery plan to the regulator, detailing how they propose to get back to the
required level. The capital position of the life insurance industry has been under pressure
from high guarantees provided and disappointing investment performance in combination
with low interest rates. However, 103 of the Netherlands' 454 pension funds are facing cuts
to benets in order to hit their funding target, according to data submitted to the regulator.
The 103 funds represent about 7.5 million active members, pensioners and deferred members,
and a total pension liability of e390 billion. Benets are expected to be slashed by an average
of 2.3%. However, 34 of these funds intend to cut benets by over 7%. According to DNB,
298 of the 454 pension funds in the Netherlands have now had to put their recovery plans in
place. These plans usually run for three years, but the regulator extended this to ve years
due to the current 2008 - 2012 economic crisis.
Pension funds must then hold enough buers, in the form of equity, to be able to cope
with any nancial setbacks. While the size of these buers could vary depending on several
factors, such as the age of pensioners, the average pension fund will require a coverage ratio
{ including buers { of about 125%. Buers had been sucient to support pension funds in
the past, but the nancial crisis saw fund portfolios fall sharply. The buers work for short-
term shocks, but in reality there is a risk that the Dutch economy will remain in a prolonged
period of low economic growth, meaning that further measures are necessary. There is a
possible suggestion of long-term solution being increasing the retirement age. Although, this
will not provide a solution for the current funding decits. In February 2012, the Dutch
regulator suggested that, as one potential solution, a number of Dutch pension funds could
be forced to cut their payments to members by the end of next year
European Pensions Brieng reports that the pension decits of the world's largest 100
companies had risen to e290 billion at the end of September 2011. The funding situation
deteriorated further throughout the following six months, following falls in equity values and
15Dutch nancial regulator De Nederlandsche Bank, (DNB)
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bond yields. The decit had increased to e300 billion by end-March 2012 (according to
LCP update16). The latest Purple Book17, jointly produced by the UK's Pension Protection
Fund and The Pensions Regulator and focusing on the risks faced by occupational dened
benet pension schemes, reports that there were 5,450 schemes in decit (85% of the total) in
December 2011, and their aggregate funding decit on a Pension Protection Fund liabilities
(section 179) valuation at 31 March 2011 was $78.3 billion, or $470.7 billion on a full buy-out
basis.
Our results have arrived at similar conclusions to Yermo and Severinson (2010) com-
pared the regulatory frameworks for pension funds across OECD countries and examined
how dierent pension systems had responded to the nancial crisis. The Netherlands may
consider how the UK Pensions Act 2004 empowered the pensions regulator to intervene
when pension schemes were in decit and required sponsoring companies to fully fund their
pension liabilities. Although, UK had low economic growth and scal austerity at that time,
it is interesting to see the eectiveness of these regulations and how companies responded
to such obligations. Potentially, companies deferred funding their liabilities, or alternatively
they reduced wages and other costs, dividends, and investments.
The results imply that if the pension funds aim to meet their pension obligations in
the future, more focus should be placed on the developing a comprehensive pension asset
and liability management. This could lead to modication of the Dutch regulations that
will support an appropriate asset and liability management system. This is an important
issue particularly now when pension reforms in the Netherlands and other Western European
countries are aiming at tackling the longevity risk due to the rapidly aging population.
We nd there is a strong negative relationship between a rm's dividend payments and its
mandatory pension contributions, even after controlling for the endogeneity of pension fund-
ing status on dividends and investments. The eect of pension contributions on investments
16http://www.lcp.uk.com/
17Pension Protection Fund/Pension Regulator (2012) Table 4.2 page 39, and Chart 5.6 page 51. The
Purple Book is based on a comprehensive dataset of 6,432 schemes in the UK, and reports the extent of
scheme underfunding, and the risks of the sponsoring employer becoming insolvent. Pension Protection
Fund-liabilities are the value of pension liabilities if the Pension Protection Fund (equivalent to the US's
Pension Benet Guaranty Corporation) took over responsibility for the pension, and includes caps on pension
payments; full buy-out liabilities are calculated without any of the Pension Protection Fund caps. The PPF
7800 index of funding decits was $206 billion at 31 March 2012
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is weaker than the evidence for study involving US companies, Rauh (2006). This suggests
that pension regulations in the Netherlands allow rms sucient discretion to maintain in-
vestment spending, and that in the Netherlands the response of balance sheet adjustments
to nancial pressures takes place through dividends rather than real investments.
Under the Minimum Funding Requirement, pension contributions for underfunded rms
were smoothed over a number of years, but after 2005, the MFR was replaced with rm-
specic funding requirements { allowing rms to focus on developing optimal funding plans
appropriate to the circumstances of the scheme { and the Pensions Regulator, with the
powers to require companies to fund their pension liabilities. Dividend and investment
sensitivities to pension contributions are more pronounced in and after 2005, indicating
that the regulations in the Pensions Act 2004 have had a signicant eect on corporate
expenditures. These results show that the channel through which companies with large
pension decits make up their funding shortfalls is paying lower dividends to shareholders,
rather than cutting back on investments. The implication is that shareholders in a company
with a pension decit should anticipate that future dividends are likely to be reduced and this
may have implications for share prices. The chart in Figure 5.8 below shows at a glance how
as volatility increases so does the long term potential for growing pension savings respective
to dierent asset class. Volatility can be seen to be a factor that be worthwhile being included
among variables aecting strategic asset allocation of pension funds.
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Figure 5.8: Pension asset classes vs volatility
Our ndings are in line with Mercer's annual European Asset Allocation Survey18. They
found that pension fund allocations to alternatives increase as European investors continue
to turn their back on the equity markets as they are rattled by the volatility created by the
Eurozone crisis. The survey of more than 1,200 European pension funds with assets of over
e650 billion found that an increasingly broad range of alternative asset classes are being
considered by pension plans, with 50% of schemes now holding an allocation to alternatives,
up from 40% last year. Mercer's research reveals that schemes in traditionally equity-heavy
markets such as the UK and Ireland still have the largest equity weightings although they
have witnessed the largest falls in equity allocations, mainly driven by a move away from
domestic equities. In the UK, average allocations to domestic and non domestic equities fell
by 4% (from 47% to 43%) over the last 12 months. In Ireland the current average allocation
to equities is 44%, down 6% from last year and down over 20% since 2008.
5.7.1 Robustness.
First using Quantile regression, we check above results by using dierent models. We consider
the median-quantile regression for the equity beta, WACC relationship with the pension fund
beta. The results in Tables 5.7(a) to (c) below conrm the previous results obtained by OLS
18http://uk.mercer.com/home
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in Table 5.2. This conrms the one-to-one linear relationship between equity beta, capital
structure and pension fund beta.
Table 5.7(a): Quantile regression, equity Beta,
*, **, and *** are coecient signicance at 1%, 5% and 10%.
Firm Name coecient Probability
Air France 0.23 0.0001*
AEGON NV 1.11 0.0000*
AHOLD NV 0.02 0.2036
AKZO Nobel -0.84 0.0000*
Arcelormittal -0.30 0.0000*
Aperam 0.23 0.0000*
SBM oshore NV 0.11 0.4694
RANDSTAD holding 1.16 0.0000*
ING Groep nv-cva 0.99 0.0001*
Koninklijke phil -0.09 0.2165
Heineken NV 0.89 0.0001*
Boskalis WES 1.36 0.0011*
DSM (Konin) 0.35 0.0003*
Corio NV 1.89 0.0001*
Fugro NV-CVA 0.26 0.0046*
KPN (Konin) NV 2.34 0.0002*
Reed Elsevier -0.01 0.9420
ASML Holding NV 0.82 0.0000*
Unilever NV-CVA 0.32 0.0010*
Tomtom 0.72 0.0005*
Unibail-Rodamco -1.29 0.0021*
Wolters Kluwer 2.06 0.0011*
Royal Dutch SH-A 0.47 0.0021*
Postnl nv -0.54 0.0001*
TNT express 0.08 0.0002*
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Table 5.7(b): Quantile regression, WACC,
*, **, and *** are coecient signicance at 1%, 5% and 10%.
Firm Name coecient Probability
TNT express 0.05 0.5292
PostNL NV -2.55 0.0003*
ING Groep NV-CVA -2.12 0.0372*
Air France-KLM -0.49 0.0551*
Aegon NV 1.71 0.1106
Arcelormittal 0.76 0.0005*
Aperam -0.19 0.4365
SBM oshore NV 4.37 0.0001*
RANDSTAD holding 1.50 0.0149*
AKZO nobel 3.13 0.0080*
Koninklijke phil 0.17 0.4148
Heineken NV -7.69 0.0001*
Boskalis WES 1.40 0.1914
DSM (Konin) 1.10 0.1227
Corio NV -2.24 0.0186*
Fugro NV-CVA -2.39 0.0004*
KPN (Konin) NV -0.05 0.9707
Reed Elsevier 0.95 0.0799*
ASML Holding NV -0.62 0.2198
Unilever NV-CVA 0.19 0.6757
Tomtom 0.65 0.1831
Unibail-Rodamco -1.51 0.0426*
Wolters Kluwer 3.51 0.0078*
Ahold NV 0.05 0.6503
Royal Dutch SH-A -1.58 0.0288**
R
2
0.6258
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Table 5.7(c): Equity beta, pension variable, Quantile regression, ,
*, **, and *** are coecient signicance at 1%, 5% and 10%.
Variable Coecient P-value
Overfunding (Underfunding) pension -0.68 0.5205
Pension assets (Fair value) -0.45 0.0664***
Pension Benet paid 0.72 0.0097*
Pension liabilities 0.38 0.0719***
Service cost 0.18 0.0862***
Expected rate of return on Pension assets -0.43 0.6774
Pension expenses -0.20 0.0847***
Pension and post retirement reserve -0.58 0.0058*
Pension market capitalization -0.62 0.5550
Adjusted R
2
0.55
5.7.2 Modeling with EGARCH
We use the Exponential Generalized Autoregressive conditional Heteroscedasticity (EGARCH)
model to consider stock market swing and asset allocation. We also include the sub classes
of the assets classes. The EGARCH model we use is shown in equation (5.15). The re-
sults shown in table (5.8) are consistent with the results shown earlier in Table 5.6 The
EGARCH(1,1) model is given by:
log(ht) = ! +   j "t 1 jp
(ht 1)
+   "t 1p
(ht 1)
+   log(ht 1);ht = ! + "2t 1 + ht 1 (5.19)
where the historical volatility is the dependent and is represented by ht, which can
be dened as in equation 5.16, and the term j"t 1jp
(ht 1)
is the standardized residual and the
positivity constraints on the model parameters in the variance equation are ! > 0; ;  > 0
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Table 5.8: EGARCH model, with logAEX returns as dependent variable vs investment classes.
*, **, *** are signicance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels
Variable Coecient Prob
Real estate investments
Total rate of return -22.019 0.00*
Direct investment in real estate 22.017 0.00*
Indirect investments in real estate 22.035 0.00*
Equities
Mature Markets 0.001 0.66
Private Equity -0.015 0.03**
Equity investment fund 0.019 0.03**
Emerging markets 0.016 0.02**
Fixed yieLd securities
Government bonds 0.000 0.91
Index linked bonds -0.003 0.46
Mortgage loans 0.001 0.58
Short term claims on banks 0.002 0.87
Other investments
Hedge funds 0.008 0.92
Commodities 0.011 0.00*
Other investment funds 0.004 0.79
Liquid assets 0.008 0.04
Total investments at funds risk -0.002 0.00
Variance equation
C(20) 7.503 0.02**
C(21) -0.739 0.51
C(22) 0.994 0.05**
C(23) 0.835 0.29
C(24) 0.056 0.88
It is notable that the EGARCH above capture the impact of the AEX index behaviour on
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Equity investment. At least one independent variable is signicantly positive. This shows
that a rise or a fall of the stock market will be followed by a similar trend (fall or rise)
in equity investment. The real asset variables are also signicant for the EGARCH model
which shows that the volatility of the stock market strongly aects the pension investment
to real estate. Therefore, the xed yield investment is the possible option for the pension
fund investment when the stock market is very volatile.
5.8 CONCLUSION
The results indicate that there is a relationship between the capital structure, equity beta
and pension fund beta, and hence a concrete relationship between market volatility and
asset allocation. The study indicates the wide dispersion in pension asset allocation. A
portion of the dierent asset allocation is explained by the market volatility. Our ndings
indicate that the equity beta, capital structure of the pension sponsoring rms and market
volatility aect the pension fund risk and asset allocation. The move away from equities is
particularly marked among larger schemes { those with over $1bn of assets { where 37%
expect to increase their allocation to bonds in the next 12 months. Nearly half of these
larger schemes also plan to grow their alternative asset holdings. As the battle for decit
reduction intensies, what we have seen is a growing focus on developing more sophisticated
asset management strategies that aim to provide equity-like growth potential with bond-like
volatility.
The Netherlands pension funds had the largest asset allocation to bonds, (50%), second
to Japan's 56%. This leaves only 33% going to the equity assets and mere 1% to be held in
cash There has been an interesting up and down trend in assets allocated to equity increased
from 33% in 2006 to 35% in 2007, but dropping to 32% in 2008 before the latest percentage
of 33% in 2010. This indicates how the pension fund management has been concerned on the
impact of the stock market volatility during this period, 2006 - 2011. In the UK, the pension
market has also been decreasing the allocated proportion to the equity. The reported drop
from 68% in 2003 to 58% in 2008 and nally 55% in 2010 shows the same trend of moving
away from the stock market risk.
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The results provide evidence that most rms who allocated a large percentage of their
asset into the equity were negatively aected by the stock market crush. Most pension funds
have a highly dispersed asset allocation. This applies to investments in a sponsor, real estate
investment, and money market investments, which will all uctuate dramatically between
funds.
We can conclude that the long-term eects of the 2008 stock market crash on retirement
incomes will depend on the stock market's future performance, as well as investors' market
exposure at the time of the crash, the amount and composition of their future contributions,
the proportion of their retirement income coming from assets, and how many years they
have to rebuild their assets. Pensions decits for AEX companies could grow as falling bond
yields and volatile stock markets are mitigated by a reduction in interest rate projections.
Therefore market volatility has been of great inuence on pension assets. This could also
have implication to foreign markets where the continued fall in gilt yields for example means
that UK pension funds need to nd a way to diversify further away from traditional methods
of reducing risk by investing in corporate and government bonds.
`As a matter of urgency the government must develop mechanisms that provide low-risk
opportunities with an attractive yield { bond-like structures, such as asset-backed securities
or special \infrastructure bonds" which would benet pension schemes at the same time as
providing funding for much-needed private nance initiative projects
During the past decade, we can generalize that all global pension assets decreased relative
to nancial market performance. This implies that pension funds have become a major
capital market participant. Pension funds in the Netherlands will mature in the coming
years. This may lead to a shift in policy focus towards the interests of the elderly. The
asset mix may become more conservative to safeguard the payout of benets to retirees as
promised. A conservative mix is not in the interest of the young participants. The lifecycle
investing approach recommends that individuals accept high risk exposure early in life and
the risk exposure has to decline gradually over the lifecyle.
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6.0 SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS
This study has analysed banks and pension funds. We summarise our ndings as follows.
6.1 BANK SECURITIZATION
We have analysed the reasons why UK banks securitize or did securitize during the period
before the 2007 nancial crisis. We have shown that the search for liquidity (i.e. the need
to fund their balance sheets) has been the principal motive for UK banks to securitize. We
have also shown that regulatory capital arbitrage and credit risk transfer have played a role,
albeit a smaller one, in the decision of banks to securitize. We have shown that banks which
issued more asset-backed securities (ABSs) before the nancial crisis suered more defaults
after the nancial crisis. We attribute this to the fact that the market for ABSs was frozen
abruptly in the summer of 2007 and hence they were unable to sell o their loans and suered
the consequences as the credit-crunch and the global nancial crisis took their toll on the
quality of the banks' loan books.
Finally, we showed that large banks were the ones for which securitization was more
important to explain prots while commercial and savings banks were the ones whose balance
sheets were the most exposed (and highly sensitive) to changes in the conditions of the
securitization market.
The new regulation and market concerns with regard to high information disclosure may
lead ABS to be losing the attractiveness as a funding tool when compared to alternative
asset based instruments such as covered bonds. Thus the market may resume with the level
of activity previous to the crisis. Therefore, information is crucial for all markets but it is
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particularly important for ABS markets. However, enhancing information, both in content
and in disclosure aspects, may not be the key factor to restore the markets.
The goal of regulation should be to preserve those benets while achieving important
public policy objectives, including nancial stability, investor protection, and market in-
tegrity. Devising an appropriate regulatory response to nancial innovation is challenging.
We should strive to implement a regulatory regime that is principles-based, risk-focused, and
consistently applied. Enhancing market discipline can complement and strengthen such an
approach.
6.2 BANK CAPITAL STRUCTURE
From our empirical analysis we can clearly argue that due to the nancial crisis the cost of
funding has increased for commercial banks and funding is not as easily accessible before
the crisis. Additionally, we further argue that due to the nancial crisis commercial banks
now have stronger incentives to attain debt relative to new equity as the probability of
undervaluation has increased. It is due to the fact that the recent nancial crisis will make
the investors risk appetite to invest in banking is decreased. Funding structure will be more
towards stable and long term sources such as capital and deposits. As a consequence, the
median costs of capital and bond will increase accordingly.
The nancial crisis has further diminished liquidity and created insolvency for commercial
banks. The response by regulators has been to increase capital requirements in Basel III
and further restrict the liquidity ratio and the Leverage Ratio. The increase in capital
requirements can be considered as a radical change in this current nancial crisis that is
increasing cost of funding for commercial banks. This is because debt nancing is considered
as cheaper nancing relative to new external equity nancing. As a result, the increase in
capital requirements could potentially increase the overall cost of funding.
It is also important to bear in mind that upon the implementation of the Basel III, debt
will remain the major funding source for commercial banks. It leaves the commercial banks
a highly leverage sector. Consequently the government should start to think how to deal
with \too big to fail" nancial institutions so that they are not become \too big to regulate"
198
institutions. The main purpose of the capital requirement is to limit the risk exposure of
the government and taxpayers that stand behind it.
In this study, we have oered a new advantage to the use of debt such that in situations
where only insiders know the quality of the rm, the use of debt acts as a barrier to entry
of inferior rms and banks. This implies that those banks issuing debt have improved the
average quality of the banks in the nancial market, thus beneting both the investors
and shareholders even when perfect discrimination is impossible. We have also provided
the normative result that bank managers and directors will use debt nancing (even if it
is risky) if they perceive that the bank is undervalued and use equity nancing if they
perceive it is overvalued. The way managers decide about the type of debt nancing is not
universal. Furthermore, factors such as liquidation and renegotiation, moral hazard and
adverse selection, oatation costs are found to be signicantly relevant while deciding the
mix of debt to be issued by the bank.
A bank will not issue equity unless it has already exhausted its \debt capacity"|that
is, unless the bank has issued so much debt already that it would face substantial additional
costs in issuing more debt than planned level. Therefore, we can conclude that the large
banks will nance their investment opportunities with debt and small banks with equity.
New equity issues are associated with small, loss-making banks such that after an IPO,
equity issues are more important for small banks than for large banks. When larger banks
do issue equity, the number of issues can be expected to be large. As noted earlier, the
liquidity of banks' assets can be taken as evidence to show the extent to which these assets
of companies can be manipulated by shareholders at the expense of debt holders.
6.3 PENSION FUND ASSET ALLOCATION
The pension problem illustrates how the recession and the meltdown in the nancial markets
can become self-reinforcing. Ballooning pension decits will leave some companies with
diminished prots, weaker credit ratings and higher borrowing costs, which can translate
into lower stock prices. The results provide evidence that most rms who allocated a large
percentage of their assets to equity were negatively aected by the stock market crush.
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Most pension funds have a highly dispersed asset allocation. This applies to investments in
a sponsor, real estate investment, and money market investments, which will all uctuate
dramatically between funds.
The results indicate that when the pension plans are underfunded, companies are required
to plough enough additional money into the funds each year to correct the imbalance. This
will always lead to a better performance by the stock market as it did in January 2011 and
helped put pension funds on a sounder footing. The Standard & Poor's 500 index gained
nearly 11 percent in the fourth quarter of 2011. Similarly reported was an increase in the
funding ratios of pension plans, on average, by 11 percent in the same fourth quarter. This
helped push up the average pension fund to gain roughly 7 percent for the quarter. This is
due to the rising bond yields which resulted in pension discount rates rising 30 basis points
from 5.3 to 5.6 percent.
We can conclude that the long-term eects of the 2008 stock market crash on retirement
incomes will depend on the stock market's future performance, as well as investors' market
exposure at the time of the crash, the amount and composition of their future contributions,
the proportion of their retirement income coming from assets, and how many years they
have to rebuild their assets. Pensions decits for AEX companies could grow as falling bond
yields and volatile stock markets are mitigated by a reduction in interest rate projections.
Therefore market volatility has been of great inuence on pension assets. Therefore we have
shown that;
 Pension fund allocations to equities has fall { majority of reduction through domestic
equities.
 Allocations to alternative assets has increased as pension schemes seek to diversify port-
folios.
 Faced with low bond yields pension funds adopt a `wait and see' approach to increasing
bond allocations.
 Demand for ination-linked assets is expected to remain strong due to ination concerns.
 Property (real estate) allocation falls out of favour across continental Europe
The asset allocation of dened benet pension plans is a setting where both risk-shifting
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and risk-management incentives are likely be present. Empirically, rms with poorly funded
pension plans and weak credit ratings allocate a greater share of pension fund assets to safer
securities such as government debt and cash, whereas rms with well-funded pension plans
and strong credit ratings invest more heavily in equity. These relations hold both in pooled
regressions and within rms and plans over time. The incentive to limit costly nancial
distress plays a considerably larger role than risk shifting in explaining variation in pension
fund investment policy among rms in the Netherlands. During the past decade, we can
generalize that all global pension assets decreased relative to nancial market performance.
This implies that pension funds have become a major capital market participant.
These ndings suggest that the investment policies of pension funds are partially driven
by the cyclical performance of the stock market. Pension funds respond asymmetrically to
stock market shocks: rebalancing is much stronger after negative equity returns. On average,
this strategy led to negative excess returns over the period under consideration. Investment
policies of large funds deviate from that of small funds: they hold more equity and their
equity allocation is much more strongly aected by actual equity returns, reecting less
rebalancing. The largest funds react highly asymmetrically to positive excess equity returns,
adjusting their portfolios by signicantly more than 100%, reecting `overshooting' of free
oating, or positive feedback trading. Apparently, managers of large funds demonstrate
great risk tolerance, particularly in bull markets.
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7.0 FUTURE RESEARCH AND EXTENSIONS
The next couple of years will be crucial in establishing a new framework for the OTC market.
The ABS security market will be in the line of re. Dierent proposals are being advanced.
In the previous sections we focused on a few of them. Particularly we focused on the two
which we believe are likely to have a severe impact on the ABS market, namely xed oor
for the proportion of the security retained and full disclosure of the pool. We concluded
that, each of these two proposals, will lead to a severe decline in the protability for this
market. It follows that, given the importance of this market itself for the wide economy,
such decisions should be based on empirical studies assessing their impact on the market.
Therefore the introduction of a xed oor will have unknown implications and also, it is
not yet obvious if the retained proportion of the security should be chosen using a vertical
or a horizontal approach. We believe that a better approach might consist of disclosing data
on the quantity of the security issued that has been put on sale and the proportion of the
same retained. Investors may use this information to infer about the quality of the security.
Should the sponsor retain the security for a period of time before re-selling it? Once again,
we believe that the best approach is full disclosure of the proportion of the (retained) security
put on sale. What about investors? Should investors retain the security for a certain period?
Why should they be asked to do so? Investors (and not only speculators) generally buy a
security at a lower price and sell it at a higher price. Why should it not be the same in this
case?1
The SEC has proposed the adoption of new rules for the disclosure requirements for ABS
1It has been suggested that under this proposal one would better ensure that the resale is not a distri-
bution. We do not see much wrong with the old model based on the distribution approach. Afterall, it is
not a model which causes a crisis but it is the way the model is interpreted and applied.Regulators should
probably focus on these issues.
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securities: specic data on each loan or asset in the pool, obligor characteristics, description
of the methodology used to calculate the pool performance and computer program to run
the cash ow provisions of the transaction. Thus, the issuer (sponsor) is obliged to ling
a computer program of the contractual cash ow provisions of the securities and all the
information cited earlier. This information should be made available to investors in full.
We have discussed the possible impact on the ABS market of the "full disclosure approach"
above. We believe that full disclosure may have a substantial impact on the market (see the
example above). To mitigate this eect we propose that investors should only have access to
aggregate information rather than specic informations as mentioned above. On the other
hand, one may think of a regulatory body to whom sponsors (originators) should be obliged
to report full information on the security (including the methodology used to obtain the
price). We believe that all the information cited above should be disclosed in aggregate
form, considering similar deals conducted by the same issuer2.
7.1 PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE
The next couple of years will be crucial in establishing a new framework for the Over the
Counter Market (OTC). The ABS security market will be in "the line" of re. Dierent
proposals are being advanced. In the previous sections we have focused on two. We have
focused on two, which we believe are likely to have a severe impact on the ABS market and
concluded that, they may lead to a severe decline in the liquidity of this market. Given
the importance of the ABS market for the whole economy, we need empirical evidence
assessing the impact of these proposals on the economy. In this section we shall make some
recommendations. Two main conclusions can be reached from the discussion above: Firstly,
given the high cost for the issuer to retain a larger proportion of the security, and given
the market asymmetry, investors rationally anticipate the demand curve and they interpret
the proportion of the security put on sale by the issuer as a credible signal3. Secondly, as
2This can follow the same approach as for the aggregate CDS position data released by DTCC (see also
discussion in Due et al, 2010).
3It is not a coincidence that sponsors in the ABS market already used to retain a proportion of the
security, and it is typical practice for credit card ABS market. The model above claries the reason why that
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Figure A8 shows, if the market asymmetry is largely removed by regulations, the prot for
the issuer may fall signicantly which, in the last instance, may imply that most of the ABS
products will disappear. As discussed earlier, the eect of the introduction of a xed oor is
largely unknown and also it is not yet obvious how this policy should be implemented (see
Fender et al, 2009)4.
The information made available to investors should include factors such as illiquidity
for that category of assets, credit risk and also model risk. On the other hand, one may
think of a regulatory body to whom sponsors (originators) should be obliged to report full
information on the security (including the methodology used to obtain the price). In this
way the new body will have a clear picture of the overall systemic risk and banks' total
risk exposure. Information can be disclosed in aggregate form, considering similar deals
conducted in the market The new regulatory framework for the ABS market may lead it
to loose the attractiveness as a funding tool. This study has reviewed recent developments
in this market and focused on two recent regulatory proposals (SEC, 2010), namely xed
retention oor of the security and new disclosure principles. The study concluded that, if
implemented, these policies are likely to have a major impact on the liquidity of the ABS
market. The recent crisis in the ABS market has more to do with reputational concerns than
retention policy. This study suggests using alternative approaches which should alleviate
the pressure on originators (issuers). It is important that regulators nd the right balance
between maintaining a such client interest in the securitization market and at the same time
avoid the errors made in the past.
To do this, we need theoretical as well as empirical studies to analyze the impact of the
new regulatory framework on the securitization market and the economy as a whole. The
availability of information to market participants is crucial for the correct functioning of the
securitization market. However, full disclosure of information may not be the key to restart
the market. Indeed, it may even reduce the market liquidity. The goal of regulation should
be to preserve the benets deriving from the ABS market while achieving important pub-
happened. Thus, the retention of a proportion of the security may have very little to do with the "inability
or lack of incentive to sell those securities" as suggested by the SEC (2010) document.
4However, under technical regularity conditions, Innes (1990) shows that the optimal security to retain
is pure equity, which is, in eect, what has generally happened in the past.
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lic policy objectives, including nancial stability, investor protection, and market integrity.
Devising an appropriate regulatory response to nancial innovation is challenging. The intro-
duction of the regulations may well lead to either the shut-down of the securitization market
(or at least a signicant reduction of the market), or to the rise of riskier instruments5.
At this level of our study, we will rest the impact of the Basel III Accord of higher capital
requirement (common equity) on the commercial banks' capital structure and risk taking to
other researchers to elaborate upon its implementation in the near future.
It remains somewhat unclear why UK pension funds invest so much more in equities than
their US counterparts, hence could be an area of further research. It will also be necessary
to understand what appear to be nontrivial eects of lagged investment returns on pension
fund asset allocation, and whether this is ecient or not. Finally, given that a large part
of rm-level variation in asset allocation remains unexplained, further studies could aim to
identify other factors that aect variations in pension fund investment strategies. Is the
equity allocation of Dutch pension funds age dependent?
7.2 APPENDIX:
In this section we consider some concepts that we could not cover in details in the main text
of the chapter. We address the possible factors that may have impact on the results. First, we
start by looking at the detection of outliers and then multicollinearity analysis. Afterwards,
we also look at the additional study on securitization, in particular Asset Backed Securities
(ABS) market.
7.2.1 Detection of Outliers
An outlier is an observation that appears to deviate markedly from other observations in
the sample. Outliers can be caused by experimental or measurement errors, or by a long-
tailed population. It is therefore desirable to identify the outliers and remove them from
5For example for the case of Collateralised Loan Obligation (CLO), Due (2007), based on Innes (1990),
shows that if the cost of eort (for the issuer) of controlling for the quality of the loan in the pool is very
high, the issuer will simply sell the entire loan portfolio, making minimal eort.
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data before performing a statistical analysis. According to Rousseeuw and Leroy (1987),
this is because the outliers can throw o the results since they do not accurately represent
the sample population. The simplest way we use to identify outliers is the quartile method.
This involves using the interquartile range6, obtained together with descriptive statistics.
Multiplying the interquartile range by 1.5, (150%) then adding this to the upper quartile
and subtracting it from the lower quartile we get data points; any data point which is outside
these values is a mild outlier. While when we multiply the interquartile range by 3, (300%)
and add this to the upper quartile and subtract it from the lower quartile, any data point
outside these values is an extreme outlier.
In this way we detect and determine the impact of the extreme outliers in our data. We
nd that the data points representing the extreme outliers represent large securitizing banks.
This accounts for the lower impact that can be observed by inclusion of outliers in the original
sample. Table A1 below shows the descriptive statistics after excluding the outliers, and the
mean and the standard deviation are similar to those in Table 4(a) considered earlier.
6We nd the upper quartile, Q2; this is the data point at which 25 percent of the data are larger; then the
lower quartile, Q1; which is the data point at which 25 percent of the data are smaller. Thus, we subtract
the lower quartile from the higher quartile to get the interquartile range, IQ.
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Table A1: Descriptive statistics, banks using securitization, without outliers
We calculate the descriptive statistics of the banks that securitize without the outliers
We have the descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables for number of securitizing banks, N=527.
Mean Std.Error Skewnesss Kurtosis Std.Dev
Funding
Interbank ratio 68.61 7.58 3.51 13.52 157.90
Liquid assets/Customer deposits & ST funding 63.13 6.31 4.07 18.87 131.47
Liquid assets/Total deposits & borrowing 40.10 4.67 4.96 28.40 97.30
Net loans/Deposits & ST funding 31.25 1.61 0.59 -1.15 33.59
Net loans /Total assets 48.38 4.56 5.53 40.23 95.01
Net loans/Total deposits & Borrowing 25.32 1.85 1.61 2.65 38.46
Capital regulation
Cap.Funds/Deposits & ST funding 5.87 0.71 4.22 19.82 14.89
Cap.Funds/Net loans 15.37 2.91 5.95 37.68 60.57
Cap. Funds / Total assets 14.99 2.49 5.84 40.46 51.93
Equity/Liabilities 29.34 1.79 -0.81 12.97 37.37
Equity/Total assets 71.48 7.63 3.04 9.39 159.00
Tier 1 Ratio 3.10 0.46 6.42 60.37 9.61
Total capital ratio 3.64 0.56 8.07 100.43 11.74
Risk transfer
Impaired loans/Equity 1.51 0.29 11.36 172.21 6.00
Impaired loans/ Gross loans 9.57 1.44 4.92 29.48 30.07
Loan loss prov. / Net int.Rev 11.91 2.89 0.99 70.07 60.27
Loan loss Res. / Gross loans 1.68 0.27 7.31 66.63 5.60
Unreserved impaired loans /Equity 4.91 0.88 5.68 37.05 18.35
Net charge-o/Average Gross loans 0.39 0.14 9.03 131.31 2.92
Size
Log total assets 43.14 9.32 6.32 43.14 194.16
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7.2.2 The Originate-To-Distribute model and securitizing banks
The Originate-To-Distribute (OTD) model is where banks originate loans without intentions
of holding them in portfolio. The main aim of the banks is to sell the loans and transfer risk.
Section 3.3.5 showed that growth of securitization made it easier for banks to sell loans that
they originated. The OTD model is made easier by securitization, but banks that sell loans
need not be `securitizers' as shown in Table A2(a) and A2(b) below. In these tables, we
consider the model in equation (4) but exclude the preotdt, a time invariant variable mea-
suring the extent of the bank's participation in the Originate-to-distribute (OTD) market,
aftert a dummy variable taking the value one in the period after the nancial crisis began
and zero otherwise and hence the interaction term aftert  preotdi measuring the change in
net charge-os around the crisis period across banks with varying intensities of participation
in the OTD market prior to the crisis.
The results show the same signicant results as in Tables 3.9(a) and 3.9(b) considered
earlier. We can remark that the dummy was eective at splitting the banks into securitizing
and non securitizing banks. We can also note from the results in Table A2(a) and A2(b),
that banks that used the OTD model were the ones to suer the most (in terms of default).
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Table A2(a): Default rate for Securitizing banks, 2004 -2010;
*, **, and *** are coecient signicance at 1%, 5% and 10%.
Variable Coecient Prob
Funding
Interbank ratio 0.26 0.01*
Net loans/Total assets 0.42 0.82
Capital regulation
Capital funds/Total assets 0.40 0.19
Tier 1 ratio 2.17 0.01*
Risk Transfer
Impaired loans/Equity 0.02 0.05**
Impaired loans/Gross loans 0.02 0.84
Size of the banks
Natural log of total assets 0.02 0.04**
Table A2(b): Default rate for Non securitizing banks, 2004 -2010;
*, **, and *** are coecient signicance at 1%, 5% and 10%.
Variable Coecient Prob
Funding
Interbank ratio 0.26 0.03*
Net loans/Total assets 0.02 0.87
Capital regulation
Capital funds/Total assets 0.40 0.02*
Tier 1 ratio 2.17 0.01*
Risk Transfer
Impaired loans/Equity -0.02 0.08***
Impaired loans/Gross loans -0.08 0.01**
Size of the banks
Natural log of total assets 0.01 0.06**
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7.3 APPENDIX B:
Basel capital accords are produced by the Bank for International Settlements Basel Commit-
tee on Banking Supervision, (Walter, E., B., 1984). These agreements provide a framework
for determining the minimum capital nancial institutions must hold as a cushion against
losses and insolvency. The less capital a bank holds the more capital it has to lend, which
generally increases the bank's protability, but makes it more vulnerable to losses and fail-
ure, which could lead to the need for government nancial assistance. Without nancial
institutions holding this minimum amount of capital, banking regulators would not permit
banking organizations to conduct normal banking business.
7.3.1 Bank capital structure and Basel accords
The rst Basel accord was adopted in 1988 and is credited with providing stability to the
international banking system, both through dening consistent safety and soundness stan-
dards and by promoting better coordination among regulators and nancial supervisors in
participating countries. However, Basel I had aws. Banking regulators in the United States
and other countries developed Basel II in 2004 because it had become clear to regulators
that the methods use to calculate the requirements in Basel I were not suciently sensitive
in measuring risk exposures. It was also clear that the regulatory capital needed in the
increasingly complex and dynamic banking system could not be determined accurately and
consistently under the Basel I framework.
The Basel II capital accord upon which Basel III was built is a three-pillared framework.
The rst pillar draws the most attention. It provides the methodology for calculating the
minimum capital requirements for various categories of banks and banking instruments, such
as mortgages, payment cards, and private and government securities. In the Basel II frame-
work the capital requirement for each bank asset was subject to measurement. Consequently,
it was found to account for more of the risk exposures in the assets in a bank's balance sheet
than Basel I. Basel I determined the risk exposures for large categories of assets, making it
less sensitive to individual asset risk exposure. The second pillar species the supervisory
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review process. For example, pillar two requires banks to maintain management mechanisms
to conduct ongoing internal self evaluation of risk exposures and compliance with the mini-
mum regulatory capital requirement for each level of risk exposure. It also requires regulators
to validate these mechanisms. The third pillar facilitates market discipline in the banking
system to create the proper incentives to adopt the best safety and soundness practices. A
bank's nancial disclosure, for example, could determine the willingness of depositors and
investors to do business with that bank.
7.3.2 Basel III and capital structure
The purpose of Basel III is to remedy the regulatory capital and liquidity failures that
resulted in the 2007-2009 global nancial crisis. Basel III would make signicant changes
in bank regulatory capital requirements. It would increase the amount of common tangible
equity held as minimum regulatory capital because common equity improves loss absorbency.
Tangible common equity consists of bank shares and retained earnings. This increase is a
signicant change in regulatory capital requirements because many assets that are being
used as regulatory capital would have to be converted to common tangible equity. By 2015,
more than half of the total regulatory capital would be composed of common tangible equity
capital. Common tangible equity will also be used in a new conservation capital buer.
This capital conservation buer is to ensure that banks build up capital outside periods of
nancial stress that can be drawn down when losses are incurred. The minimum total capital
plus conservation buer would be 10.5% of risk-weighted asset in January 1, 2019, which is
2.5% higher than the current minimum requirement. If another element, the countercyclical
capital buer, is fully added, the minimum total capital requirement would be 13% of risk-
weighted assets. This would be a remarkable increase in capital requirement from current
levels. Very few U.S. banks were able to maintain 13% of risk-weighted assets at the highest
level of U.S. bank protability. At that time, the average total equity capital ratio was
10.52%.
Basel III will eventually tighten capital requirements. The minimum requirement for
common equity, the highest form of loss absorbing capital, will be raised from the current
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2% to 4.5% after the application of stricter adjustments. This will be phased in by 1 Jan-
uary 2015. The total Tier 1 capital requirement, which includes common equity and other
qualifying nancial instruments based on stricter criteria, will increase from 4% to 6% over
the same period. There will also be a \buer requirement" of 2.5% that can be drawn down
to the 4.5% minimum requirement during times of stress. This eectively will raise common
equity requirements to 7%.
If a bank draws below the 7% common equity requirement, including the buer, distri-
bution of earnings must be curtailed until the 7% level is recovered. These restrictions would
apply to dividends and executive compensation, including bonuses.
It appears that actual implementation won't start until 2012 and the accords will not be
fully implemented until 2018. Here, Table B1, is the implementation schedule:
Table B1: Phase in Arrangements as January of each year from 2011 to 2019
Source: Bank for international settlement
Variable 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Leverage ratio Supervisory monitoring Parallel run 1 Jan. 2013 - 1 Jan. 2017 Migration to pillar 1
Minimum common equity capital ratio 3.5% 4.0 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5
Capital conservation buer 0.625 1.25 1.575 2.50
Minimum common equity plus capital conservation buer 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.125 5.75 6.375 7.0
Phase -in of deductions from CET1 20 40 60 80 100 100
Minimum Tier 1 capital 4.5 5.5 8.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0
Minimum Total capital 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0
Minimum Total capital plus conservation buer 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.625 9.125 9.875 10.6
Capital instruments that no longer qualify as Tier 1 or Tier 2
According to an article by Brooke Masters in The Financial Times, the UK and the U.S.
had pushed for earlier implementation (2016). Many countries (including the UK and U.S.)
wanted higher Tier 1 capital ratios, up to 10%, but others, most notably Germany, argued
for lower ratios, some as low as 4% including buer. Germany was also on the opposite side
of the implementation schedule argument, at one time wanting a 15 year schedule.
It had long been agreed that Tier 3 capital, that bastion of dark capital instruments such
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as CDS (credit default swaps) and SIV (special investment vehicles), would be eliminated
from the capital structure of banks by the Basel 3 accords. Tier 2 capital will remain in the
equation (up to 2% of total capital) but just what can be held in tier 2 is uncertain. As
shown in the bottom line of the graphic, by 2013 denitions of prohibited instruments will
be dened.
7.3.3 The Basel III capital adequacy
The Basel III capital adequacy accord is the most recent international eort to establish a new
capital standard for banks. Specically, Basel III is an agreement on capital requirements
among countries' central banks and bank supervisory authorities.
Basel III redenes regulatory capital. To raise the quality, consistency and transparency
of regulatory capital, the committee determined that Tier 1 capital must consist predom-
inantly of common equity and retained earnings. Under current standards, there are two
types of capital counted in meeting the capital adequacy rules under Basel I|core capi-
tal and supplementary capital. Tier 1 is core capital and is made up of mainly common
shareholders' equity (issued and fully paid), disclosed reserves, most retained earnings, and
perpetual non-cumulative preferred stocks. Supplementary or Tier 2 capital consists of sub-
ordinated debt, limited-life preferred stocks and loan loss reserves, and goodwill. Banks can
hold as little as 2% of common equity to risk-weighted assets. Consequently, banks can
display strong Tier 1 capital containing a limited amount of tangible common equity. The
nancial crisis demonstrated that the resources to cushion against credit losses and write-
downs came out of retained earning, which is a part of a bank's tangible equity base. Under
the Basel III framework Tier 1 capital is adjusted to narrow it as close as possible to bank
tangible common shares. Goodwill and preferred stocks, as well as other assets, would not
be included in the new Tier 1 capital.
7.3.4 Conclusion
Capital regulation based on the Basel Accord advises that banks hold capital in proportion
to the amount of the risk they take. Based on the CAR calculation of the US Commercial
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Banks from 1992 to 2011 we concluded that the economic capital, which is high for small-
sized banks and around the same level as the BIS Minimum Regulatory Capital for large-
sized banks, is more important for the bank to hold than the regulatory capital in running
their businesses. Consequently the impact of the capital buer theory, that predicts banks
hold safety cushions above the regulatory capital requirement, can be proved for the US
Commercial Banks small-sized banks capital buer and lightly observable among the US
Commercial Banks large-sized banks.
Commercial banks high level of leverage implies that a signicant level of debt funding
composes the optimal capital structure. However, the increase in capital requirements in
Basel III embrace that regulators deem that commercial banks high level of leverage is
not privately and/or socially optimal. An increase in capital requirements will decrease the
undervaluation of new equity nancing.
7.4 APPENDIX C:
Pension plans in the private and public sectors have become a key institution in the func-
tioning of nancial markets. These plans provide a mechanism for consumers to save, and
can inuence the retirement incentives.
7.4.1 Dutch pensions
Dutch pension funds eectively are collective savings arrangements, covering almost the
entire population of employees. Pension funds often take the characteristics of their partici-
pants on board in their decision-making on strategic investment allocation. The Netherlands
as all the European countries face an ageing population which will have a major impact on
the design of the pension schemes. Countries with a pure pay-as-you-go system foresee prob-
lems with this system because a diminishing working population has to support an ever
increasing population of retired people. This calls for far-reaching reforms. However, even
countries such as the Netherlands with a second pillar that is funded foresee diculties. New
accounting rules and new rules for technical provisions in order to keep a proper solvency
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margin of the schemes as well as an ageing society and increasing costs of pension systems
may result in the reduction of pension benets.
In Europe, pension systems dier largely from country to country. At one end of the
spectrum we have countries with only a pay-as-you-go system, where pension benets are
fully paid for by the working population. At the other end we have countries where people
save for their pension individually, in which case the level of pension benet t is largely
determined by the amount of return on investments. However many combinations of these
two basic systems are possible, and the Netherlands in fact do have such a combination.
From a European point of view it is important that the advantages and disadvantages of the
various systems are being considered. We have therefore summarised the key aspects of the
Dutch pension system.
7.4.2 Characteristics of Dutch pension funds
As in most developed countries, the institutional structure of the pension system in the
Netherlands is organized as a three-pillar system. The rst pillar comprises the public
pension scheme nanced on a pay-as-you-go base. It oers a basic at-rate pension to all
retirees. The benet level is linked to the legal minimum wage. The second pillar provides
retired workers with additional income from the supplementary scheme. The third pillar
comprises tax-deferred personal savings, which individuals undertake on their own initiative.
The Dutch pension system is unique as it combines a state run pay-as-you-go scheme in the
rst pillar with funded occupational plans in the second pillar. The rst pillar implies that
a young individual cedes part of its human capital to elder generations, in exchange for a
claim on part of the human capital of future generations. Given the life-cycle hypothesis,
this type of intergenerational risk sharing enforces the preference of younger people to invest
in equity. For that reason, we might expect a stronger age eect on equity exposure for
Dutch pension funds.
Pension funds typically adjust contributions and indexation of accrued benets as in-
struments to restore the funding ratio. Higher contributions weigh on active participants
whereas lower indexation hurts older participants most. The less exible these instruments
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are, the longer it takes to adjust the funding level, and the more strongly will shocks be
shared with future (active) participants. Eectively, intergenerational risk sharing extends
the risk bearing basis in terms of human capital. The literature on optimal intergenerational
risk sharing rules in pension funding concludes that intergenerational risk sharing within
pension funds generally should lead to more risk taking by pension funds compared to in-
dividual pension plans (e.g. Cui et al., 2009). Thus Dutch pension funds, with their high
call on intergenerational risk sharing, may be expected to invest relatively heavily in risky
assets.
There are three types of pension funds in the Netherlands. The rst is the industry-
wide pension fund, organized for a specic sector of industry (e.g. construction, health
care, transport). Participation in an industry-wide pension fund is mandatory for all rms
operating in the sector. A corporate can opt out only if it establishes a corporate pension
fund that oers a better pension plan to its employees than the industry-wide fund. Where
a supplementary scheme exists, either as a corporate pension fund or as an industry-wide
pension fund, participation by the workers is mandatory and governed by collective labour
agreements. The third type of pension fund is the professional group pension fund, organized
for a specic group of professionals such as physicians or notaries. Occupational pension
plans are nanced primarily through company and industry-wide pension funds.
The Dutch pension fund system is massive, covering 94% of the active labour force. But
whereas all employees are covered, the self-employed need to arrange their own retirement
plans. As reported in Table C1(a) to (c), the numbers of pension fund members has been
on the decrease since the end of 2007. More than 85% of all pension funds are of the
corporate pension fund type. Of the remaining 15%, most are industry-wide funds, besides
a small number of professional group funds. The circa 95 industry-wide pension funds are
the dominant players, in terms of their relative share in total active participants (> 85%)
and in assets under management (> 70%). Almost 600 corporate pension funds encompass
over a quarter of the remaining assets, serving 12% of plan participants. Professional group
pension funds are mostly very small funds.
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Table C1: Dutch pension funds data, 2007 - 2011. Source: De Nederlandsche Bank
Number of pension funds Number of pension schemes Number of members (000s)
Professional group pension funds
2007 508 837 856
2008 483 839 821
2009 450 835 790
2010 394 752 760
2011 348 696 715
Corporate pension funds
2007 13 16 46
2008 12 15 43
2009 12 15 51
2010 12 15 53
2011 12 15 54
Industry-wide pension funds
2007 94 138 5,061
2008 93 138 5,119
2009 86 142 4,983
2010 85 135 5,007
2011 82 140 5,082
Totals
2007 615 991 5,964
2008 588 992 5,984
2009 548 992 5,823
2010 491 902 5,820
2011 442 851 5,851
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Table C2: Source: OECD Global Pension Statistics.
Netherlands Demographics and macroeconomics
Nominal GDP (EUR bn) 559.5
GDP per capita (USD) 46,761.9
Population (000s) 16,346.0
Labour force (000s) 8,741.4
Employment rate 96.8
Population over 65 (%) 14.4
Dependency ratio 27.4
Table C3: Dutch pension funds data, 2003 - 2007. Source: OECD Global Pension Statistics.
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Total investments (EUR bn) 482.6 531.1 619.6 671.9 739.8
Total investments as % of GDP 101.2 108.1 121.7 125.7 132.2
Total contributions as % of GDP 4.4 4.6 5.0 4.4 4.2
Total benets as a % of GDP 3.2 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.6
Total number of funds 876 843 800 768 713
Participation in a sectoral pension plan becomes mandatory if the sector's employers
request the Ministry of Social Aairs and Employment to declare membership obligatory,
and if the employer organisations making the request represent at least 60% of employees in
the sector. With over 90% of the working population covered, the system can be described
as quasi-mandatory. Employers may opt out of a sectoral plan if they oer a provision that
promises equal or better benets.
7.4.3 Typical Dutch pension plan design
Occupational pension plans can be dened benet or dened contribution. The vast majority
of employees (over 90%) are covered by dened benet plans, although collective dened
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contribution plans and hybrid schemes are gaining popularity. Dened benet plans can be
nal salary plans or lifetime-average earnings, while a small number of plans combine the
two or provide xed amounts. Most plans were switched to career-average dened benet
schemes after 2000. Benets generally vest after one year of membership. Most nal salary
plans give 1.75% of earnings for each year of service, yielding a replacement rate of 70% for
a 40-year career. In most average-earnings plans, the accrual rate varies between 1.75% and
2% per year of service. The indexation of pension benets is typically conditional, being at
the discretion of the funds themselves and depending, in practice, on funding levels.
Pension funds are obliged to inform their members of their indexation expectations. Half
of all pensions in payment are adjusted for wage growth in the relevant sector or industry,
27% are price-indexed, and just under one-quarter use other means of benet adjustment.
Occupational plans are fully funded. Contribution levels for employers and employees are
determined by collective bargaining, though the employers' share generally represents three-
quarters of total contributions. There is no ceiling on pensionable earnings. The ocial
retirement age for men and women is 65, which is the average age at which people actually
do retire. Benets can be paid out as a lump sum or as annuities, which enjoy tax relief.
Members do not pay fees to pension funds, whose estimated administrative costs are about
0.18% of total assets per year.
Employer contributions to an occupational plan are tax-deductible and employee contri-
butions are not considered taxable income. Assets and investment returns are tax-exempt,
while benets paid out as annuities are subject to ordinary taxation. Plans must comply
with the scal limitations on them. Taxation levels depend on benet levels: nal pay plans
may have an accrual rate of no more than 2% per year, leading to a 70% replacement rate
after 35 years. Career-average plans may apply a maximum accrual rate of 2.25% per year.
If, on a member's retirement, his or her benets exceed 100% of nal pay (including public
pension benets), the surplus is taxed at a progressive rate.
Personal voluntary plans are also oered in the Netherlands in order to meet the growing
demand for greater exibility in terms of participation requirements, contributions, etc.
Anyone may enter into a contract for any type of personal pension savings plan. Members
may pay their contributions as a lump sum when they sign a contract, or at regular or exible
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intervals thereafter. Benets can be paid out as a xed or unit-linked annuity and, in some
circumstances, in a xed number of withdrawals. If an insured person dies before taking his
or her benets, they generally revert to one or more beneciaries. Contributions to annuity
policies are tax-deductible up to a ceiling of EUR 1 036. Contributions made to bridge a
gap in the accrual of occupational plan assets may also benet from tax relief. Investment
income is tax-exempt, while benets are subject to income tax at a rate of 30%.
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